Warning Intelligence in Nuclear Crisis Management:  Avoiding Catastrophic Miscalculation by Sartorius, Christopher
  
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE 
 
 
 
WARNING INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT:   
AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC MISCALCULATION 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
By 
CHRISTOPHER M. SARTORIUS 
Norman, OK 
2018 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
WARNING INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGMENT: 
AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC MISCALCULATION 
 
 
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
 
 
 
 
 ___________________________ 
 Dr. Ronald K. Gaddie, Chair 
 
 
 ___________________________ 
 Dr. Colin M. Barry  
 
 
 ___________________________ 
 Dr. Deven E. Carlson 
 
 
 ___________________________ 
 Dr. Jorge L. Mendoza 
 
 
 ___________________________ 
 Dr. Shad B. Satterthwaite 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by CHRISTOPHER M. SARTORIUS 2018 
All Rights Reserved.  
  
This dissertation is dedicated to my family and all intelligence professionals, 
military and civilian, past and present, who have dedicated their lives to 
protecting our great nation and our allies. 
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Working on this doctoral dissertation has been both a joy and a challenge.  
This work would not have been possible without the support and encouragement 
of countless individuals.  At the most personal level, I would like to thank my 
wife, Fulvia, for her support over the past three years of this doctoral program and 
for her care and love over the past 25 years.  I wish to thank my son, Konrad, for 
providing inspiration, much needed breaks in my work routine, and for sharing 
lunch together at the OU cafeteria followed by our fun table tennis matches.  I 
also would like to thank my parents, Tim and Wanda Sartorius, for instilling in 
me the value of a great education. 
I would also like to thank Dr. Shad Satterthwaite, always friendly, open, 
and upbeat for enthusiastically encouraging me to pursue a doctoral degree at OU 
and Dr. Peggy Lerner, a great OU colleague, a fantastic OU leader in Europe, and 
a friend.  She also provided strong encouragement while I was serving as the OU 
North America Advanced Programs Director and later as I transitioned to become 
a doctoral student.  I will forever thank Dean Lee Williams for his amazing 
dedication and leadership with OU Advanced Programs, his recommendation that 
I teach for OU, and for his continuing mentorship and friendship. 
I want to recognize The Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, History and Public Policy Program which was kind enough to invite me 
to attend their 2017 Seminar Institute on Conducting Archival Research.  This 
fantastic experience helped prepare me for archival research in Berlin, 
Washington, DC, and Boston.  Dr. Bernd Schaefer from George Washington 
v 
 
University provided me information regarding the Ministry for State Security of 
the former German Democratic Republic Archive (BStU) in Berlin and Mr. 
Christian Dellit, an archivist at the BStU, was instrumental in helping find 
relevant documents for my review and sending copies to me in the United States.  
I also have great memories of our nice lunches together in Berlin during my 
November 2017 visit.  My great friend Bengt Klemp from Hamburg was also key 
in facilitating my visit to the archive in Berlin. 
I want to thank Nate Jones, the definitive expert on the Soviet War Scare 
of 1983 from the National Security Archive in Washington, who took time out of 
his busy schedule to meet with me in late-February 2018 about my project and 
provide suggestions for additional sources.  Ms. Michelle DeMartino, an archivist 
at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, provided a great overview of their 
archival holdings along with prompt and courteous support during my March 
2018 visit, making this as another highlight of my archival research effort.  I am 
grateful to the OU Political Science Department for research funding assistance 
via the George B. Williams Award. 
Throughout this effort, my two great, long-time friends, Colonel Tim 
Henke (USAF, Retired) and Bengt Klemp have provided constant encouragement 
and support.  I look forward to spending more time with them on future European 
and US bicycle tour/camping adventures. 
I wish to thank three key committee members:  Dr. Shad Satterthwaite, Dr. 
Jorge Mendoza, and Dr. Deven Carlson.  These three outstanding scholars and 
OU leaders were always professional, available, and willing to provide me their 
vi 
 
very best professional advice, encouragement, and friendship.  Thanks to Dr. 
Colin Barry for his work on the committee as well.   
Special thanks to Drs. Hertzke, Kenney, Ripberger, Tipler, and Shortel for 
making me feel welcome in the Political Science Department.  Jeff Alexander, 
Graduate Programs Coordinator, is a key player and is widely recognized for 
doing such fine work to facilitate the degree program’s administrative 
requirements.  Dr. Johnson, the department’s Graduate Liaison, was also helpful 
in facilitating the dissertation defense.  Abby Young at the OU Graduate College 
is truly an amazing source of knowledge and was essential to successfully 
navigating the numerous degree requirements. 
Finally, I want to recognize and thank my fellow graduate students in the 
OU Political Science Department.  As the “old guy” in the program, you were 
gracious in accepting me into the group and I have really enjoyed all the fun 
social events we have shared.  I can’t thank them enough for your help in 
preparing me for the comprehensive exams.  I wish them all the best as 
researchers, teachers, and leaders. 
If any readers are considering working with Drs. James “Larry” Regens 
(OUHSC), Ronald “Keith” Gaddie (OU), or Greg Russell (OU), please feel free 
to contact me at cmsartorius@ou.edu or cmsartorius@gmail.com. 
Although I have tried to be comprehensive, I am certain I have 
inadvertently overlooked some very key individuals.  Please accept my deepest 
appreciation for your help and support.  
vii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................. iv 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................ xi 
List of Figures ...................................................................................................... xii 
Abstract ............................................................................................................... xiii 
Chapter 1 – Introduction ..................................................................................... 1 
RESEARCH PROBLEM ........................................................................................... 3 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................. 6 
Theory ........................................................................................................... 10 
Hypothesis ..................................................................................................... 12 
Variables ....................................................................................................... 13 
Model ............................................................................................................ 14 
Scope ............................................................................................................. 15 
METHODOLOGY/PROCEDURES ........................................................................... 15 
Analyzing Quality Warning Intelligence ...................................................... 16 
Analyzing Policy Maker Receptivity Toward Intelligence........................... 18 
Analyzing Objective Interpretation of Intelligence Warning ....................... 20 
Accurate, Current Situation Assessment ....................................................... 20 
CASE SELECTION AND THE LOGIC OF THE STUDY .............................................. 21 
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 ................................................................ 23 
The Soviet War Scare of 1983 ...................................................................... 24 
DATA SOURCES .................................................................................................. 26 
Online Sources .............................................................................................. 26 
Archival Sources ........................................................................................... 27 
Secondary Sources ........................................................................................ 28 
Specialized Training ..................................................................................... 28 
Archival Research ......................................................................................... 29 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE .................................................................. 30 
DISSERTATION OUTLINE .................................................................................... 32 
Chapter 2 – Warning Intelligence ..................................................................... 35 
WARNING INTELLIGENCE – ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY .................................... 40 
Strategic versus Tactical Warning ................................................................ 45 
The Strategic and Tactical Warning Relationship ........................................ 46 
Intelligence Challenges ................................................................................. 48 
Policymaker Challenges ................................................................................ 49 
Characteristics and Benefits of Effective Warning ....................................... 51 
Indications and Warning Intelligence in the Cold War................................. 53 
Indications and Warning Intelligence Today ................................................ 55 
viii 
 
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS AND 
POLICYMAKERS ................................................................................................. 56 
The “Traditionalist” School .......................................................................... 57 
The “Activist” School ................................................................................... 59 
The response to Those Advocating a Closer Relationship ........................... 62 
Impediments to Strong Intelligence-Policy Relationships ............................ 62 
Potential Solutions ........................................................................................ 66 
The Intelligence-Policy Relationship Today................................................. 68 
Chapter 3 – The Cuban Missile Crisis .............................................................. 71 
KEY EVENTS ...................................................................................................... 73 
THE CONTEXT .................................................................................................... 77 
WARNING INTELLIGENCE QUALITY ................................................................... 83 
Intelligence Sources ...................................................................................... 83 
Strategic Intelligence and Warning ............................................................... 87 
Tactical Intelligence and Warning .............................................................. 101 
Warning Intelligence Assessment ............................................................... 103 
WARNING RECEPTIVITY ................................................................................... 108 
The New President’s Intelligence Immersion ............................................. 110 
Bay of Pigs Effect on Intelligence Receptivity ........................................... 113 
The Kennedy-McCone Relationship ........................................................... 116 
McCone’s Relationship with Others ........................................................... 121 
Intelligence Receptivity During the Cuban Missile Crisis ......................... 123 
The Kennedy-McCone Relationship after the Crisis .................................. 128 
LEADERSHIP INTERPRETATION OF WARNING ................................................... 138 
Cognitive Factors ........................................................................................ 141 
Motivational Factors ................................................................................... 144 
CONCLUSION – CURRENT SITUATION ASSESSMENT ......................................... 146 
Chapter 4 – The Soviet War Scare of 1983..................................................... 151 
KEY EVENTS .................................................................................................... 155 
THE CONTEXT .................................................................................................. 157 
Vulnerability of Soviet Nuclear Forces to a US/NATO Nuclear Surprise 
Attack .......................................................................................................... 158 
The Soviet Shootdown of KAL 007 ........................................................... 165 
The Serpukhaov-15 Early Warning Launch Incident ................................. 167 
WARNING INTELLIGENCE QUALITY ................................................................. 170 
Intelligence Sources .................................................................................... 170 
The East German Intelligence Service Role in Operation RYAN .............. 175 
Strategic Intelligence Warning.................................................................... 179 
Tactical Intelligence Warning ..................................................................... 184 
Warning Intelligence Assessment ............................................................... 188 
WARNING RECEPTIVITY ................................................................................... 193 
ix 
 
Andropov’s Intelligence Background ......................................................... 194 
Intelligence Failures - Impact on Receptivity ............................................. 197 
The Andropov-Chebrikov Relationship ...................................................... 199 
Intelligence Receptivity During the Soviet War Scare of 1983 .................. 200 
Operation RYAN After the Crisis ............................................................... 201 
LEADERSHIP INTERPRETATION OF WARNING ................................................... 203 
Sources of Soviet Anxiety .......................................................................... 206 
Cognitive Factors ........................................................................................ 209 
Motivational Factors ................................................................................... 213 
Soviet Reaction based on their Intelligence Interpretation ......................... 217 
CONCLUSION – CURRENT SITUATION ASSESSMENT ......................................... 219 
Chapter 5 – The Russian Nuclear Threat to the United States .................... 224 
RUSSIA’S THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND STRATEGIC GOALS ............................... 225 
Threat Perceptions ...................................................................................... 226 
RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT ... 229 
RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY ............................................... 234 
CURRENT RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES ............................................................. 240 
Strategic Rocket Forces – Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles .................... 241 
Navy - Ballistic Missile Submarines ........................................................... 243 
Aerospace Force – Manned Strategic Bombers .......................................... 244 
Russian Nuclear Command and Control ..................................................... 245 
Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Forces ................................................................ 246 
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION .................................................. 248 
Strategic Rocket Forces – Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles .................... 252 
Navy - Ballistic Missile Submarines ........................................................... 253 
Aerospace Force – Manned Strategic Bombers .......................................... 253 
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TREATIES CURRENTLY IN FORCE .......................... 254 
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) .............................. 254 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty ...................................... 255 
RUSSIAN DOCTRINE:  ESCALATE TO DE-ESCALATE – POTENTIAL SCENARIOS . 257 
CURRENT AND FUTURE RISKS OF ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR ...................... 258 
Scenario 1 – Early Warning False Alarm Scenario .................................... 260 
Scenario 2 – Accidental Escalation of a Conventional Conflict ................. 266 
Scenario 3 – “Dead Hand” Scenario ........................................................... 268 
Deliberate Nuclear Attack Risks ................................................................. 273 
PERCEPTIONS OF VULNERABILITY ................................................................... 273 
Deliberate Escalation .................................................................................. 275 
FUTURE RISK TRENDS ...................................................................................... 275 
Risk-reduction Options – What can be done to help prevent inadvertent 
nuclear conflict between the U.S. and Russia? ........................................... 277 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 283 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion .................................................................................... 287 
x 
 
DEVELOPING AND TESTING THE THEORY ......................................................... 288 
CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY ....................................................................... 296 
SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH .............................................................. 299 
Theoretical Questions ................................................................................. 299 
Suggestion for Additional Research on the Soviet War Scare of 1983 ...... 300 
Potential Research on the Current/Future of the Russian Nuclear Threat and 
the US Intelligence Warning System .......................................................... 301 
WARNING INTELLIGENCE AND THE CONTEMPORARY NUCLEAR THREAT ........ 302 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 307 
References .......................................................................................................... 310 
Appendix A – Acronym List ............................................................................ 324 
Appendix B – Definitions of Key Terms ......................................................... 327 
Appendix C – Chronology of Events:  Cuban Missile Crisis ........................ 329 
Appendix D – Chronology of Events:  Soviet War Scare .............................. 334 
 
  
xi 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table Page 
 
1 – Current and Planned Russian ICBM Forces 243 
2 – Operationally Deployed Russian Strategic Bombers 245 
  
xii 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure Page 
 
1 – Warning Intelligence and Situation Assessment 14 
2 – Case Study Summary 291 
  
xiii 
 
Abstract 
 
Despite efforts to reduce nuclear weapons proliferation and the general 
norm against nuclear weapons use which has survived since 1945, the threat of 
nuclear war between the United States and Russia continues.  The United States 
and the Soviet Union were involved in two nuclear crises, the Cuban Missile 
Crisis of 1962 and the Soviet War Scare of 1983, which came perilously close to 
escalating to nuclear weapons use.  Strategic and tactical warning intelligence 
played a critical role in shaping the current situation assessments senior military 
and political leaders used to manage events which nearly led to a catastrophic 
nuclear exchange.  But this raises the following questions:  1) What factors 
contribute to accurate situation assessments?  2) How important is quality 
strategic and tactical intelligence?  3) How significant is the intelligence – 
policymaker relationship in accurately assessing the threat?  4) What prevents 
senior leaders from objectively interpreting intelligence?  5) Could a “Russian 
War Scare of 20XX” occur in the future?  This study examines the relationship 
between intelligence professionals and the senior political leaders they serve, and 
the role warning intelligence plays in helping leaders accurately assess the current 
situation as part of the crisis response decision making process.  Using a 
comparative case study approach, I found intelligence quality, leadership 
receptivity towards intelligence, and objective interpretation of intelligence are 
key factors which increase the probability senior leaders will accurately assess the 
threat during nuclear crises. 
xiv 
 
 Keywords:  warning intelligence, nuclear weapons, current situation 
assessment, nuclear crisis
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
The end of the Cold War in 1991 caused public fear in the United States of 
sudden, catastrophic, nuclear annihilation to subside, but the threat of nuclear war 
persists.  Two decades into the 21st century, nine states possess nuclear weapons 
and despite the promise of nuclear non-proliferation based on the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and international norms, the number of nuclear armed 
states continues to grow.1  Although the norm against nuclear weapon use has 
thankfully survived from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings until today, the 
nuclear threat continues.  In the United States, the direct threat comes from states 
such as Russia with a large nuclear arsenal, from China which is expanding and 
modernizing its nuclear capabilities targeting the United States, and from lesser 
regional power such as North Korea and potentially Iran.2  North Korea has 
captured the most recent focus given the accelerated pace of nuclear weapon and 
ballistic missile development in 2017 under Kim Jong-un.  North Korea, which 
has conducted six nuclear tests between 2006-2017, has successfully developed 
an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of targeting the continental United 
States and is making rapid progress towards weaponizing their nuclear weapons 
program.  Their final steps to reach a fully weaponized capability include 
                                                 
1 The nuclear armed states are:  The United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, 
presumably Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.  Israel does not confirm or deny its 
possession of nuclear weapons in a policy known as strategic ambiguity.  
2 The Iranian nuclear program is currently regulated under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
which was negotiated to prevent the Iranian development of nuclear weapons in exchange for 
suspension of international economic sanctions. 
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developing and testing a survivable re-entry vehicle and perfecting warhead 
guidance systems.3   
Iran, although currently constrained by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA), has made substantial progress in enriching uranium for a 
potential nuclear weapon.  The nuclear threat from states with established nuclear 
weapons programs is also evolving.  India is considering revising its military 
doctrine to emphasize early, first-strike use of nuclear weapons in a future conflict 
between India and Pakistan (Shah, 2017).  Pakistan continues to emphasize 
nuclear first use in its doctrine to offset India’s conventional military superiority 
(Shankar & Paul, 2016). Finally, and perhaps most dangerous to the United States 
and our North American Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, Russia is 
modernizing its nuclear weapons arsenal (Doyle, 2016, p. 10), and has revised its 
nuclear doctrine to place a greater emphasis on nuclear weapons use.  This 
doctrine includes a concept known as “escalate to de-escalate—a strategy that 
seeks to de-escalate a conventional conflict through coercive threats, including 
limited nuclear use” (Work & Winnefeld, 2015, p. 4).  In fact, Russia now 
believes it may be possible to use one or a few nuclear weapons to consolidate 
territorial gains or discourage US/NATO intervention in a conflict near Russia 
(The Growing Russian Military Threat in Europe, 2017, pp. 20, 42, and 51). 
These complex, evolving nuclear developments make nuclear warning 
intelligence more important than ever.  Iran and North Korea do not represent the 
                                                 
3 Recent events in East Asia signal the possibility of an end to a nuclear North Korea. However, 
such signals of rapprochement have come from the North Korean regime in the past.  This issue is 
unresolved at the time of this writing (spring 2018). 
3 
 
end of regimes which might seek nuclear capabilities.  Other, unknown state or 
irregular actors will doubtlessly seek nuclear capabilities in the future.  Therefore, 
a better understanding is required of how leaders make current situation 
assessments of imminent nuclear threats based on warning intelligence.   
To advance our understanding in this area, I develop and present an in-
depth, comparative case study of warning intelligence presented to senior US 
decision makers during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and to Soviet 
decision makers during the November 1983 Soviet War Scare.  This research is 
intended to increase our understanding of the role intelligence played in 
influencing U.S. and Soviet threat perceptions during these two extremely 
dangerous nuclear crises. 
Research Problem 
This study seeks to determine the role warning intelligence plays in 
influencing senior leader current situation assessments during nuclear crises.4  
Studying how warning intelligence influences such assessments of nuclear threats 
is important because it provides insights regarding how leaders accept and 
evaluate intelligence under extreme duress.   
The world was fortunate to avoid nuclear catastrophe during the Cold 
War.  The United States and Soviet Union came perilously close to nuclear 
conflict on several occasions, most notably, during the October 1962 Cuban 
                                                 
4 Senior leaders in this study are the senior most civilian and military national leaders, with special 
emphasis on the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union. 
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Missile Crisis and the 1983 Soviet War Scare.  During the Cuban crisis, US 
leaders suffered from an initial strategic warning failure, however, subsequent 
tactical warning intelligence analysis greatly aided Kennedy Administration 
decision makers in formulating effective national security policies which 
successfully ended the crisis peacefully largely on US terms.  In contrast, the 
Soviet Union became increasingly fearful of US/NATO conventional and nuclear 
military capabilities in the early 1980s and launched a special intelligence 
warning operation (Operation RYAN)5 to improve their intelligence collection 
and analytic capabilities against this threat.  Although nuclear conflict was 
avoided, Soviet warning intelligence was deeply flawed which exacerbated Soviet 
fears of an imminent US/NATO nuclear attack.  Perhaps most interesting is the 
fact that the US Intelligence Community failed to recognize the real, genuine 
level of Soviet fear during this period, and did not provide US senior leaders 
proper warning of this dire situation facing the United States and NATO. 
These past crises prompt several relevant, contemporary questions 
concerning nuclear warning and international security. 
1.  What factors were most important in providing accurate intelligence 
warning which led to nuclear crisis de-escalation and which were most important 
in contributing to fears which led to nuclear crisis escalation? 
                                                 
5 Different documents refer to this special intelligence warning effort as either RYAN or VYRAN 
which is an acronym for the Russian words vnezapnoe raketno yadernoye napadeniye – meaning 
sudden or surprise nuclear missile attack. 
5 
 
2.  Today, given the growing tension between the US/NATO and Russia, 
Russia’s increased emphasis on modernizing their nuclear capabilities, and their 
revised nuclear warfighting doctrine, is a “Russian War Scare” scenario plausible 
in the future? 
3.  What can be done to improve nuclear warning intelligence to reduce to 
potential for nuclear weapons use based on miscalculation between Russia and the 
United States? 
This study seeks to fill gaps in our existing knowledge about warning 
intelligence in nuclear crisis management and its impact on situation assessment.  
The following three key questions are based on the elements required for senior 
leaders to make accurate current situation assessments.  Decision makers must 
first have quality intelligence.  This is a critical input in the process.  A faulty 
intelligence input at the beginning of the process will almost certainly result in a 
false or skewed assessment.  The second research question revolves around 
leaders’ attitudes towards intelligence.  Do they trust the veracity of the 
information?  Do they trust the organizations and the leaders of those intelligence 
agencies providing them warning intelligence?  Is there a sense of urgency which 
compels them to act?  In summary, how receptive are senior leaders to the 
intelligence provided?  The third research question addresses how leaders 
interpret crisis warning intelligence.  Even if leaders receive quality intelligence 
and are receptive to the warning, they are still capable of misinterpreting the 
intelligence; such a failure will also result in a faulty current situation assessment.  
These three questions are important because they reflect three major elements in 
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the intelligence – policymaker relationship required for leaders to make accurate 
situation assessments. 
Q1 – Warning Intelligence Analytic Products - Did the US Intelligence 
Community provide senior US leaders quality intelligence warning during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis? 6  Did the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) 
provide Soviet leaders quality intelligence warning during the Soviet War Scare? 
Q2 – Senior Leader Use of Warning Intelligence – How receptive were 
US leaders to intelligence warning during the Cuban Missile Crisis?  How 
receptive were Soviet leaders to intelligence warning during the Soviet War 
Scare? 
Q3 – Senior Leader Interpretation of Warning Intelligence – How did US 
leaders interpret this warning?  How did Soviet leaders interpret this warning? 
Conceptual Framework 
Assessing threats to national interests is one of the most fundamental 
missions of national intelligence services.  Warning intelligence is a formal 
methodology the US Intelligence Community uses to monitor indicators of 
pending military attack (Joint Publication 2-0, 2013, pp I-18 and GL-12).  The 
Soviet KGB and GRU also used a formal, indicator-based analytic methodology 
to assess the US/NATO threat during the Soviet War Scare of 1983 (President’s 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Report [PFIAB Report], The Soviet War 
                                                 
6 Quality intelligence is defined in this dissertation based on U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 
2-0, Joint Intelligence. 
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Scare, 1990, p. v).  This type of intelligence is designed to avoid both strategic 
and tactical surprise.  Other national intelligence services have also developed 
formalized, analytic intelligence methodologies to aid in their assessment of 
enemy threat levels.  As James Wirtz states in his article Indications and Warning 
in an Age of Uncertainty:  
Indications and warning intelligence is an important and time-tested 
methodology employed by intelligence analysts to warn military officers 
and policy makers about changes in an opponent’s operations posture 
which indicates that the likelihood of dangerous or aggressive activity is 
increasing. (Wirtz, 2013, p. 550) 
According to US joint intelligence doctrine, “Warning provides a distinct 
communication to a decision maker about threats against US security, interests, or 
citizens.  Warning carries a sense of urgency, implying the decision maker should 
take action to deter or mitigate the threat’s impact” (JCS Publication 2-0).7  The 
goal of warning intelligence is not to specifically predict future events, since that 
is beyond human capability, rather it is to accurately gauge trends which indicate 
increased threat. 
 The warning intelligence analytic framework rests on prior identification 
and careful assessment of the systematic steps an enemy state or other non-state 
actor (such as a terrorist group) must take to prepare for an attack.  The systematic 
prior identification of the various steps a given state must take to launch an attack 
                                                 
7 Traditionally, this type of intelligence has been known as “Indications and Warning 
Intelligence.”  The US Joint Staff has modified this concept to simply “Warning Intelligence” as 
of its most recent doctrinal publication on the subject in 2013. 
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involves carefully thinking through the sequential preparations it must undertake 
to engage in an attack.  These preparatory steps provide detectable intelligence 
signatures called indicators.  Quality indicators are observable and thus 
susceptible to routine, standing intelligence collection.  Warning analysts must be 
thoroughly familiar with the set of warning problems under their responsibility.  
They must also have a very thorough understanding of the various indicators and 
the intelligence collection plan associated with each warning problem.  Warning 
analysts must then monitor the raw intelligence flow to determine if enemy 
activities are sufficient to activate their corresponding indicators, analyze the 
situation, given the context of events, and if necessary, to develop and 
communicate careful, precise, clear warning assessments to senior military and 
civilian leaders. 
 Recognizing the importance of surprise and secrecy as key components of 
victory, states usually attempt to conceal their political, economic, and military 
preparations for an attack.  Leaders may openly use political rhetoric and/or 
military exercise activity as overt measures to conceal a pending attack.  But they 
can also engage in denial and deception operations to throw enemy threat 
assessments off course.  For these reasons, state actors need intelligence services 
to collect and analyze classified information to make warning intelligence 
assessments.  Implicit in this methodology is an assumption that foreign 
intelligence organizations can also effectively collect information using either 
technical collection systems or human intelligence sources. 
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 This study will examine warning intelligence produced by the US 
Intelligence Community, the East German Ministry for State Security (Stasi), and 
the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) to detail how senior military and 
political leaders used intelligence to assess the current situation during nuclear 
crises.  Following the warning intelligence input, senior leaders must be receptive 
to intelligence.  This may seem intuitive; however, it is also possible for leaders to 
dismiss intelligence warning or fail to fully recognize the validity of the warning.  
Such instance can occur following a serious intelligence failure, such as the 2003 
Iraq WMD failure, which primes leaders to not trust intelligence assessments.  
Senior leaders can also dismiss intelligence warnings, if warning officers make 
frequent, warning that end up as false alarms, also known as “crying wolf” (Wirtz, 
2017, pp. 3, 9).  This represents a challenge, as intelligence professionals must 
continuously balance their duty to provide warning with the potential for threat 
desensitization based on continuous or ambiguous warnings.  I have incorporated 
the concept of leadership receptivity from fellow intelligence professional and 
scholar Erik Dahl.  Dahl further discusses the issue of leadership receptivity 
extensively in both his 2008 dissertation Preventing Terrorist Attacks:  
Intelligence Warning and Policy Response and in a 2013 article, Why Won't They 
Listen?  Comparing Receptivity Toward Intelligence at Pearl Harbor and 
Midway. 
Finally, nuclear crisis decision making requires senior leaders to 
objectively evaluate and integrate intelligence into their overall current situation 
assessment.  While this too may seem self-evident, Mikhail Alexseev, points out a 
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combination of factors can emerge which shape senior leader perceptions based 
on the foreign intelligence assessments they receive.  Alexseev observes in 
Without Warning:  Threat Assessment, Intelligence, and Global Struggle, during 
the Soviet War Scare of 1983, the Kremlin was “preoccupied with hostile 
imperialist intentions and competing ideologies in the global power arena” and 
this “set the stage for an unprecedented intelligence alert (Operation RYAN) in 
1983 over the possibility of a NATO surprise nuclear attack” (Alexseev, 1997, p. 
255).  He goes on to state that senior Soviet leaders including the aging Soviet 
Politburo became increasingly reclusive and fearful of the West based on its 
superior economic and military strength.  “In the absence of public debate and 
alternative information sources, Soviet leaders fell prey to conspiracy theories of 
NATO preparations for a nuclear missile attack” (Alexseev, 1997, p. 256). 
Theory 
The theory of successful warning intelligence in nuclear crises presented 
here is based on three factors:  quality warning intelligence, leadership receptivity 
towards that intelligence, and policy makers’ objective interpretation of that 
intelligence.  To test this theory, I will compare cases of success and failure in 
current situation assessment using a qualitative analytic case study approach. 
The theory is developed based on the critical need for intelligence 
professionals and senior-level policy makers to cooperate to ensure intelligence 
organizations effectively produce and communicate warning intelligence and to 
ensure decision makers are receptive and correctly interpret the warning.  
Therefore, this dissertation fulfills an empirical and practical need of importance 
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to the profession.  For the purposes of explanation, the theory appears to be a 
recursive, linear process.  However, it is a cyclical, iterative, interactive process 
between intelligence professionals and senior leaders.  It is therefore non-
recursive in that all information is considered simultaneously and changes through 
time.   
The following offers a theory of intelligence warning and situation 
assessment.  The theory posits the following - If intelligence professionals provide 
senior leaders quality warning intelligence and if senior leaders are receptive 
(accept the intelligence as valid) and objectively interpret the warning, they are 
more likely to accurately assess the situation.  Conversely, if intelligence 
professionals provide poor quality warning intelligence or if senior leaders reject 
or misinterpret the warning, they are more likely to inaccurately assess the crisis.  
The model presented below describes this relationship between intelligence 
professionals and senior, national political and military leaders responsible for 
using intelligence to more fully understand the current situation in nuclear crises. 
My argument can be summarized as a theory of accurate situation 
assessment which is critical to successful nuclear crisis decision making.  If 1) 
intelligence professionals develop and communicate accurate, objective 
intelligence warning, and 2) senior national leaders are receptive towards that 
intelligence, and 3) senior national leaders objectively interpret intelligence 
warning, then they are more likely to make an accurate situation assessment. 
 While this may seem obvious, errors in each of these three elements of my 
argument can and have occurred which have skewed situation assessments and 
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exacerbated extremely dangerous nuclear crises in the past.  To the extent this 
theory is made explicit and better understood through historical analysis, the 
likelihood of inaccurate situation assessments may decrease, improving decision 
making and potentially avoiding inadvertent, catastrophic nuclear war. 
Hypothesis 
 I postulate the following hypotheses based on my theory and an initial 
review of the literature on warning intelligence theory and specific intelligence 
related to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Soviet War Scare: 
H1(a) – Intelligence Quality - Senior US leaders received quality warning 
intelligence of the Soviet threat prior to and during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
which contributed to an accurate current situation assessment. 
H1(b) – Intelligence Quality - Senior Soviet leaders received inaccurate 
and/or highly biased intelligence reporting prior to and during the Soviet War 
Scare of 1983 which contributed to a distorted current situation assessment. 
H2(a) –  Leadership Receptivity - US leaders were receptive of the threat 
warning and their receptivity increased over time based on the strength of the 
intelligence evidence which contributed to an accurate current situation 
assessment. 
H2(b) – Leadership Receptivity - Soviet leaders were highly receptive of 
the threat warning to the extent that it led to an inaccurate, distorted current 
situation assessment (irrational fear of imminent US nuclear attack). 
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H3(a) – Objective Interpretation - US leaders objectively interpreted 
warning intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis which contributed to an 
accurate current situation assessment. 
H3(b) – Objective Interpretation - Soviet leaders did not objectively 
interpret warning intelligence during the Soviet War Scare which contributed to 
an inaccurate, distorted current situation assessment. 
Variables 
This study seeks to assess the accuracy of senior leader situation 
assessments based on intelligence warning.  Based on the theory above, key 
factors which influence the current situation are the quality of the warning 
intelligence product, the leaders’ receptivity towards intelligence, and their 
objective interpretation of the intelligence warning.  Thus, I will use the following 
dependent and independent variables in this study. 
Dependent Variable – Senior Leader Current Situation Assessment - 
Accurate senior leader crisis situation assessment (based on warning intelligence 
input, leader receptivity, and interpretation of warning intelligence).  This will be 
assessed in terms of strategic intelligence provided prior to the crisis and tactical 
intelligence during the crisis.  
Independent Variable 1 – Warning Intelligence – Quality of the warning 
intelligence input to the decision maker 
Independent Variable 2 – Senior Leader Receptivity – Leadership 
receptivity towards intelligence 
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Independent Variable 3 – Senior Leader Interpretation – Leadership 
objective interpretation of intelligence 
Model 
 This dissertation suggests a combination of three factors, quality warning 
intelligence, leadership receptivity, and objective interpretation of intelligence 
yields accurate current situation assessments.  The following model represents a 
theory of actionable intelligence for nuclear crises.  
Independent Variables     Dependent Variable  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Warning Intelligence and Situation Assessment  
Nuclear Crisis 
Intelligence 
Community 
 
Warning 
Quality 
Senior 
Leadership 
 
Receptivity 
Senior 
Leadership 
 
Interpretation 
Senior  
Leadership 
 
Current Situation 
Assessment 
National 
Security 
Decision 
Making 
Process 
Area of Study 
15 
 
Scope 
This theory is intentionally limited in scope.  The focus is on the 
interaction between intelligence professionals and decision makers and does not 
attempt to explain the complete decision making process during nuclear crises.  
Therefore, it focuses on a critical information seeking and formulation stage of 
the decision process.  I seek to concentrate specifically on the role warning 
intelligence plays in nuclear crisis decision making, how leaders value or discount 
that information, and how other, pre-existing beliefs may bias their assessment of 
the current situation during a nuclear crisis. 
Methodology/Procedures 
To answer the research questions, I use a qualitative, comparative case 
study method centered on structured, focused comparison as described in George 
and Bennett’s (2005) classic work, Case Studies in Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences.  This study will differ from the current literature which focuses 
almost exclusively on intelligence failures by including a case of successful 
tactical warning in the Cuban Missile Crisis.8  Additionally, while other scholars, 
such as Graham Allison, have focused on various decision making theories and 
devised organizational, psychological, or bureaucratic models to explain various 
national security decisions (Allison & Zelikow, 1999), I will concentrate on 
determining the accuracy of the warning intelligence provided to senior leaders 
                                                 
8 Must of the literature on intelligence warning focuses on case studies of warning failures.  
Examples include:  The U.S. failure to warn of the Japanese attack against Pearly Harbor, Israeli 
warning failures associated with the Yom Kippur War, and the US failure to foresee the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11. 
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and how that intelligence influenced their current situation assessments.  The 
Cuban Missile Crisis represents a case of successful tactical warning, which 
provided President Kennedy and his Executive Committee of the National 
Security Council (EXCOMM) the intelligence and time to take diplomatic and 
military measures which defused the crisis.  The Soviet War Scare is an example 
of how inaccurate, distorted warning intelligence, and biased interpretation of 
intelligence contributed to Soviet fears of the U.S. and NATO which nearly led to 
nuclear war in 1983.  The following three sections describe how I will analyze 
each of the three variables (warning intelligence quality, leadership receptivity, 
and objective interpretation of intelligence). 
Analyzing Quality Warning Intelligence 
 Based on the model above, I will first study and assess the quality of 
warning intelligence products the intelligence communities of the United States 
and Soviet Union provided to their most senior political and military leaders.  To 
assess the quality of warning intelligence provided to these decision makers, I will 
use the Attributes of Intelligence Excellence defined in US Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) Joint Publication 2-0 (Joint Publication 2-0 - Joint Intelligence, 2013, pp. 
II-7 - II-8).  Quality warning intelligence is defined in Joint Publication 2-0 as 
having the following features and attributes: 
• Anticipatory – Intelligence professionals must anticipate information 
needs of decision makers.  Intelligence analysts must identify and fully 
understand current and potential missions and adversary courses of action. 
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• Timely – Intelligence must be available when decision makers need it.  It 
must warn leaders to avoid surprise.  There is an inherent tension between 
timeliness and completeness which should be resolved in favor of 
timeliness. 
• Accurate – Intelligence must be factually correct, portray the situation as it 
exists, and provide an understanding based on rational judgement of 
available information.  It should account for possible denial and deception 
efforts.  It should place greater emphasis on information from the most 
reliable sources. 
• Usable – Intelligence must be tailored to the decision maker’s needs and 
suitable for immediate comprehension.  Decision makers operate under 
various constraints in a crisis and may not be able to analyze complex 
intelligence.  Therefore, quality intelligence must present the “bottom 
line” up front, it must be understandable, oral presentation should be 
direct, and common terminology should be used to effectively 
communicate intelligence. 
• Complete – Intelligence must answer decision maker questions about the 
adversary to the extent possible.  It must also communicate intelligence 
gaps.  Intelligence must identify alternative enemy courses of action 
(COA) and identify the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs. 
• Relevant – Intelligence must be relevant to the issue at hand and 
contribute to the decision maker’s understanding of the adversary but not 
become a burden, laden with trivial information. 
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• Objective – Intelligence assessments must remain objective and 
independently developed.  Analysts and intelligence leaders must be on 
guard against biases that shade, slant, or frame assessments that favor a 
perceived preference for a certain course of action or any other 
preconceived decision maker notion.  Analysts much recognize each 
situation is unique and avoid the analytic pitfalls of mirror imaging and 
cultural bias. 
• Available – Intelligence must be accessible to decision makers.  
Intelligence professionals should maximize consumer access, while 
protecting sources and methods of intelligence collection and analysis. 
 
While this is a US-centric approach to intelligence evaluation, these 
principles are sufficiently broad and relevant to effectively evaluate products of 
any intelligence service.  This first section focuses on how intelligence 
professionals produce quality warning assessment for senior leaders, the primary 
consumers of intelligence warning products. 
 The second major element of my analysis focuses on how leaders use 
warning intelligence.  For warning intelligence to be effective, leaders must 1) be 
receptive to the warning intelligence professionals provide and 2) objectively 
interpret the warning intelligence. 
Analyzing Policy Maker Receptivity Toward Intelligence 
Senior political and military leaders must be receptive towards 
intelligence.  Receptivity is a combination of belief in the seriousness of a threat 
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and trust in the intelligence being provided.  Leaders may or may not be receptive 
to warning intelligence based on their level or respect for the role intelligence 
plays in the national security policy making process or their knowledge of and 
experience with successful or failed policy outcomes based on intelligence 
inputs.9  Erik Dahl argues leadership receptivity to warning intelligence is of 
critical importance for leaders to make accurate intelligence assessments to 
prevent terrorist attacks.  He contends leaders are especially receptive to 
intelligence warnings when “previous intelligence failure serves as a focusing 
event to concentrate the attention of both the intelligence community and policy 
makers” (Dahl, 2008, p. vii).  Receptivity is also a factor in the intelligence-policy 
maker relationship during nuclear crises.  While there may not necessarily be a 
focusing event in a nuclear crisis as included in Dahl’s theory on intelligence 
support to counterterrorism, the powerful destructive nature of nuclear weapons 
and the immediate threat of nuclear conflict is certainly, in and of itself, sufficient 
to focus decision makers on the crisis.  Of more importance for this study, 
concerning receptivity, is the level of trust decision makers have in the 
intelligence agencies, their leaders, and the quality of the intelligence these 
organizations are providing for leaders to formulate current situation assessments.  
To assess leadership receptivity towards intelligence, I will assess the professional 
relationship between the senior-most decision maker in each crisis and his senior 
                                                 
9 Such as President Kennedy’s distrust of the Central Intelligence Agency immediately following 
the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of April 1962, the George W. Bush Administration’s cautious view 
of intelligence in the wake of the Iraq WMD intelligence failure of 2013, or President Trump’s 
distrust of the US Intelligence Community related to Russian interference in the 2016 US 
presidential election. 
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intelligence officer.  This includes the level of trust and respect at both the 
individual leader level and in the agency providing the warning intelligence (at 
the organizational level). 
Analyzing Objective Interpretation of Intelligence Warning 
Objective interpretation is the third necessary element for leaders to make 
accurate situation assessments.  Objective interpretation of intelligence warning is 
especially difficult because leaders have a tendency to understand their enemy’s 
behavior in light of their own perception of the situation (Wirtz, 2017, p. 15).  
Objectivity can be defined as “relating to external facts as opposed to internal 
thoughts or feelings” (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2010, p. 29). Dunne further expand 
the concept of objectivity as “not influenced by personal opinions or prejudices” 
(Dunne et al., 2010, p. 30).  I will assess both leadership receptivity and objective 
evaluation of intelligence in this study.  To assess leadership interpretation of 
intelligence I will analyze potential biases and other psychological factors that 
may influence a leader’s interpretation of intelligence. 
Accurate, Current Situation Assessment 
 The fourth element of this study involves making an overall assessment, 
based on a combination of the major elements above, to determine if senior 
leaders accurately assessed the current situation.  Based on my theory, an accurate 
situation assessment is based on:  1) quality warning intelligence, 2) leaders’ 
receptivity to the warning, and 3) their objective interpretation of the intelligence.  
Ultimately, leaders must accurately understand the current threat situation to 
formulate policies and direct actions which best serve the national interest. 
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 Using the comparative case study method which George and Bennett 
outline in Case Studies in Theory Development in the Social Sciences, I will 
collect data to answer a structured set of questions using the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis scenario and the 1983 Soviet War Scare scenario to draw conclusions about 
the quality of warning intelligence, senior leader receptivity, and objective 
interpretation of that intelligence to assess their ability to accurately assess the 
current situation during periods of extreme duress.  This systematic 
methodological approach will allow me to test my theory regarding the role 
warning intelligence plays in nuclear crisis situation assessment. 
Case Selection and the Logic of the Study 
I examine two case studies which represent the two most significant cases 
of nuclear crises in United States history.  The Cuban Missile Crisis is widely 
recognized as the point in which the United States and the Soviet Union came 
closest to the brink of nuclear confrontation.  The 1983 Soviet War Scare, as we 
have recently learned, is potentially the closest point the Soviets came to 
launching a nuclear attack against the United States, although we did not fully 
realize it at the time.  Fortunately, there have been few nuclear crises between the 
two superpowers.  These two crises provide interesting and appropriate cases for 
this study.  The Cuban Missile Crisis has been widely studied and with the 
passage of time, primary source archival data has been declassified and is 
available to researchers to test my theory of intelligence warning and current 
situation assessment.  The Soviet War Scare of 1983 is appropriate because it is 
the closest case we are aware of when the Soviets believed the U.S. and NATO 
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were prepared to launch a preemptive nuclear attack.  Additionally, the recent 
declassification of the 1990 PFIAB study provides formerly deeply classified US 
insights into Soviet thinking and concrete military reactions to US/NATO actions.  
The PFIAB report sheds light on how Soviet leaders used intelligence to 
formulate their current situation assessments and react to NATO activities.  Given 
the secretive nature of the Soviet system and the current closure of most Soviet-
era archives one cannot rule out the possibility that other cases exist in which the 
Soviets genuinely feared a pending US/NATO nuclear attack against their 
country.   
Selection of these two significant cases does not suggest these are the only 
cases in which one state has made either an explicit or implicit threat of using 
nuclear weapons against another state.10  While there have been many threats to 
use nuclear force, fortunately, there have been relatively few, sustained nuclear 
crises.  The study of intelligence in nuclear crisis decision making requires using a 
time dimension longer than an episodic nuclear threat.  This study specifically 
seeks to investigate nuclear crises between the two major superpowers.  The focus 
on nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union allows one to 
                                                 
10 Many nuclear armed states have threatened nuclear weapons use as a coercive foreign policy 
tool.  The US reminded the Soviets of American nuclear capabilities during the Berlin Airlift and 
threatened to use nuclear weapons during the Korean War.  Soviet Premier Khrushchev made a 
brazen threat to use nuclear weapons during the Suez crisis of 1956 and boasted this nuclear threat 
forced the British, French, and Israelis to abandon their effort to re-take the Suez Canal from 
Egypt.  The US threatened the Soviets by raising the Defense Condition during the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War to deter direct Soviet military intervention in that conflict to rescue their Egyptian 
allies.  There have also been instances of nuclear threats between India and Pakistan and between 
China and the U.S. and North Korea and the U.S.  None of these incidents rose to same level of 
danger as the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Soviet War Scare of 1983.  Additional study of 
intelligence and nuclear crisis management would further expand our knowledge of the 
relationship between warning intelligence professionals and senior political/military decision 
makers regarding how intelligence is interpreted to make current situation assessments. 
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draw conclusions which may be applicable to avoiding catastrophic 
miscalculations in a potential future nuclear crisis between the US/NATO and 
Russia.  There is sufficient variation in the factors which form my theory to 
compare the two crises and draw conclusions.   
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 
 The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is generally assessed as the most 
dangerous crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War.  In the crisis which 
culminated in October 1962, the Soviet Union deployed offensive strategic 
nuclear missiles and bombers to Cuba.  Soviet First Secretary Khrushchev ordered 
this deployment for several potential reasons including:  1) as an attempt to 
defend a new, key communist ally in the Western Hemisphere from a future US 
attack designed to overthrow the Castro regime, 2) to quickly rectify the strategic 
nuclear balance which heavily favored the U.S., 3) to serve as a bargaining chip to 
force Western withdrawal from Berlin, or 4) as a distraction to mask other Soviet 
offensive moves in other regions of the world.  U.S. intelligence played a critical 
role monitoring the Soviet buildup of defensive and offensive arms on Cuba.  
President Kennedy masterfully conducted an inter-agency decision making 
process using the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) of the National Security 
Council to analyze his policy options, and communicate, execute, and oversee the 
implementation of his decisions.  This case is considered a hallmark of successful 
nuclear crisis management.  The crisis was resolved after 13 tense days, on 
October 28, following a US naval quarantine of Cuba.  Soviet First Secretary 
Khrushchev announced the Soviet Union would withdrawal their nuclear weapons 
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from Cuba.  President Kennedy publicly pledged to not invade Cuba and secretly 
agreed to withdraw US Jupiter nuclear missiles from Turkey.11 
The Soviet War Scare of 1983 
 The Soviet War Scare of 1983 is arguably the second most dangerous 
nuclear crisis between the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War.  The U.S. 
failed to recognize the high level of danger at the time of this crisis but gradually 
learned of the intensity of Soviet fear of sudden nuclear attack.  This crisis was 
precipitated by a combination of factors in the U.S., Europe, and the Soviet 
Union.  In the U.S., President Reagan had ratcheted up anti-Soviet rhetoric, 
initiated a massive US defense buildup, engaged in provocative military 
psychological operation against the Soviet Union to test their defenses, and 
announced a new program, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which Soviet 
leaders feared would further degrade their strategic nuclear deterrent.  In Europe, 
the US/NATO were deploying new, highly capable Pershing II intermediate range 
nuclear missiles and Ground-launched Cruise Missiles which the Soviets feared 
could quickly reach and destroy the senior Soviet military and political leadership.  
In the Soviet Union, fear and paranoia gripped a series of aging Soviet political 
leaders (Brezhnev, Andropov, and later Chernenko) who were aware of the 
deteriorating strategic nuclear balance, presided over a moribund economy, and 
demonstrated unimaginative political leadership with bleak prospects for 
improvement.  Based on the deteriorating situation and the fear of a US/NATO 
                                                 
11 For additional information on the Cuban Missile Crisis please see the “Context” section of 
Chapter 3. 
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nuclear attack, the Soviets developed and implemented a special intelligence 
collection and analysis program called Operation RYAN in 1981.  This effort was 
designed to develop and executive an indications and warning system to 
systematically assess US/NATO preparation for a sudden nuclear attack against 
the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact.  Against this backdrop, NATO conducted 
Exercise Able Archer 83, an annual nuclear command and control exercise, which 
the Soviets came to believe was a cover for actual NATO preparations for a 
preemptive nuclear first-strike against the Soviet Union.12 
Using these two case studies, I will examine the quality of intelligence 
warning provided at the time of each crisis (Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1983 
Soviet War Scare).  A historical, retrospective approach allows me to assess the 
quality of the intelligence which analysts produced and communicated to decision 
makers.  I also will look at how senior leaders on both sides viewed the credibility 
of the intelligence they received and the level of trust they had in their respective 
intelligence agencies to determine their level of receptivity toward the intelligence 
they used to reach current situation assessments.  Finally, I will examine how 
leaders interpreted the intelligence they received to assess their objectivity and 
determine the accuracy of their conclusions based on the available intelligence 
and what we now know, with the passage of time, to be the facts concerning each 
case.  The combination of these three factors will allow me to test this theory of 
warning intelligence and determine which factors most influenced leaders as they 
                                                 
12 For additional information on the Soviet War Scare of 1983, Exercise Able Archer and the 
Operation RYAN program, please see Chapter 4. 
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made situation assessments, under great duress, in these two nuclear crisis 
scenarios. 
Data Sources 
I conducted this research using primary-source materials from several 
archives.  Much of the data is available via the internet in online archives.  I also 
conducted archival research to ensure a more comprehensive data collection effort 
for this study.  The following lists the data collection sources and types of data I 
collected at each source: 
Online Sources 
National Security Archive – This electronic archive maintained at George 
Washington University contains over 1,000 declassified, primary source 
documents in its “Able Archer 83 Sourcebook”.13  It also contains extensive 
primary source documentation on the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence – The Central Intelligence 
Agency has published declassified intelligence reporting on both the Cuban 
Missile Crisis and the Soviet War Scare.  The center has also produced a study on 
the Soviet War Scare which served as a valuable bibliographic tool for additional 
primary source research. 
                                                 
13 Able Archer is the name of the 1983 NATO nuclear exercise which represents the peak of 
Soviet fear during the Soviet War Scare period. 
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Government Publishing Office – Additional CIA studies and national 
security primary sources are available online and published through the 
Government Publishing Office. 
Archival Sources 
 National Security Archive – This archive, located in Washington, DC, is 
open to researchers and provides access to primary-source, declassified 
intelligence and national security documentation.  The archive, located in the 
George Washington University Gellman Library, specializes in obtaining key 
national security documentation via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and 
Mandatory De-Classification Review requests. 
 John F. Kennedy Presidential Museum and Library – Located in Boston, 
MA, this archive contains declassified intelligence and national security 
documentation pertaining to the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis which 
occurred during the John F. Kennedy presidential administration. 
 Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik (Ministry for State Security of the German Democratic Republic) – 
Contains intelligence analysis produced by the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung 
(HVA-Foreign Intelligence Directorate) and other divisions of the East German 
Ministry for State Security as well as correspondence from that intelligence 
service to the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB).  The MfS-HVA was 
one of the main KGB partners in collecting and analyzing US/NATO military 
intelligence during the Cold War and was especially important part of the KGB 
Operation RYAN. 
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Secondary Sources 
 Books – Countless books are available which discuss the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.  A similar, yet far less developed, body of literature is now emerging 
which deals directly with the Soviet War Scare.  Another body of literature, 
including biographies and memoires of key U.S. and Soviet intelligence 
professionals and leaders, also contributes to better understanding the role of 
warning intelligence in informing senior leader current situation assessments 
during nuclear crises. 
 Journals – Key journals for the study of intelligence and especially 
warning intelligence including the Defense Intelligence Journal, the Journal of 
Intelligence and National Security, and the International Journal of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence also address issues in this study. 
Specialized Training 
 To enhance my knowledge and improve my ability to deliver a quality 
research product, I was fortunate to have attended the Wilson Center Summer 
Institute on Conducting Archival Research (SICAR).  This institute was co-
sponsored by the Wilson Center History and Public Policy Program and the 
George Washington University Cold War Group and ran from 30 May–2 June 
2017 in Washington, DC.  The goal of the seminar was to bring doctoral students 
from around the world together to share research ideas and to learn how to 
conduct archival research from some of the leading Cold War history and national 
security scholars in the United States.  Specifically, the summer institute provided 
highly practical information and training on protocol and procedures for using 
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foreign archives, presentations on available archives in Washington, DC, 
including the National Security Archive, and an introduction to software tools to 
help organize vast amounts of research materials.  I was fortunate to receive 
funding to attend this summer institute and to conduct the archival research 
described below thanks to funding from the George B. Williams Award I received 
from the University of Oklahoma, Department of Political Science. 
Archival Research 
I conducted on-site archival research at the former East German Ministry 
for State Security archive (Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des 
Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 
(BStU)) in East Berlin from 1-3 Nov 2017, at the National Security Archive in 
Washington, DC from 26 Feb-1 Mar 2018, and at the John F. Kennedy 
Presidential Museum and Library in Boston from 6-9 Mar 2018.  In Berlin, I 
sought intelligence collection tasking directives and analytic advice from the 
KGB to their Stasi foreign intelligence service counterparts.  I also reviewed 
working papers and intelligence assessments which provided insights regarding 
specific political and military assessments of US and NATO forces and data 
regarding the perceived threat levels between the Stasi and the KGB.  In 
Washington and Boston, I worked to find intelligence warning assessments and 
policy working papers which provided insights on leadership receptivity toward 
intelligence and data on how intelligence informed their current situation 
assessment during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and Soviet War Scare of 
1983. 
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Contributions and Significance 
It may seem obvious that accurate crisis situation assessments are built on 
solid, accurate, comprehensive information that is readily received from trusted 
sources and objectively interpreted to reach a clear, complete understanding of 
current events.  Certainly, intelligence professionals strive to develop and improve 
warning intelligence analytic frameworks.  Collection, information, and 
communication technologies, among many other factors, have improved 
intelligence quality.  At the human level, intelligence analysts and their leaders in 
both the United States and in the Soviet Union intelligence services are hard-
working, dedicated, highly trained and highly educated professionals dedicated to 
serving the best interests of their nation.  Senior political and military leaders take 
issues of national survival and ultimately, the fate of mankind, seriously and 
therefore are focused and motivated to demand quality intelligence on nuclear 
crisis issues.  In the ideal world, high quality intelligence exists, is properly 
communicated to receptive decision makers who understand it and objectively use 
it to formulate an accurate picture of the current crisis.  Unfortunately, in the real 
world, this process is highly dependent on fallible human beings.  Intelligence can 
be inaccurate, leaders can be hostile and unreceptive in whole or in part to the 
intelligence warning assessment(s) they receive, leadership judgement is colored 
by ignorance of adversary military/foreign policy strategy, military capabilities 
and/or intentions, and finally, leaders can make grossly inaccurate assessments 
driven not by fact but by bias and fear.  This study sheds light on how these 
factors played into senior-level decisions in situations of extreme duress.  It helps 
us further refine our thinking concerning how warning intelligence impacts 
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leadership current situation assessments and contributes to our knowledge in both 
theoretical terms and in term of improving our ability to develop policies and 
practices to consistently improve our abilities to more accurately make current 
situation assessments. 
More specifically, in terms of theory, this dissertation contributes to a 
growing body of literature on warning intelligence.  It incorporates one of Erik 
Dahl’s theoretical concepts, leadership receptivity, which he used to study the 
relationships between warning intelligence and successful counter-terrorism 
efforts.  I have added additional factors such as the quality of the intelligence 
produced, and leaders’ ability to objectively interpret this information as 
additional factors which influence their ability to make accurate assessments of 
the current situation as applied to nuclear crises.  This study seeks to develop and 
test a theory of how warning intelligence can contribute to accurate, objective 
current situation assessments during nuclear crises.  It is the only study I am 
aware of which develops this theory and tests it using two Cold War nuclear 
crises, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Soviet War Scare of 1983. 
 In terms of policy, this work seeks to stimulate and further the study of 
warning intelligence in nuclear crisis management.  As the major international 
powers Russia and China continue to modernize their nuclear capabilities and 
adapt their national security strategies and military doctrines to the ever-changing 
international situation, the United States must also re-look and re-vitalize our 
strategies and capabilities in the nuclear domain.  Improving our understanding of 
how intelligence influences senior leader threat perceptions is a critical part of 
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ensuring leaders develop accurate, objective current situation assessments so they 
can make objective, rational, informed decisions regarding nuclear weapons use 
during a future, high-intensity, high-stakes crisis. 
Dissertation Outline 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters.  In chapter 1, I have laid out 
the importance of this topic, outlined a conceptual framework to study the key 
factors in using warning intelligence to reach accurate situation assessments, and 
discussed the sources and methods I employ to reach conclusions on how US and 
Soviet decision makers used warning intelligence during two key nuclear crises 
during the Cold War. 
 In chapter 2, I explain the theory of warning intelligence.  Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union used this specialized type of intelligence to assess 
military and political developments.  The intelligence warning framework is 
comprised of attack indicators, formulated over time, based on assessments of the 
necessary and observable steps needed to launch a nuclear attack.  In this chapter, 
I also explain key terms and the role intelligence watch officers, more formally 
known as Indications and Warning Officers, play in analyzing current, raw 
intelligence in the context of the indications and warning analytic framework to 
inform senior military and political leaders of strategic and tactical military 
threats. 
 In chapter 3, I discuss the Cuban Missile Crisis.  I start by providing 
background information on the crisis including the now declassified intelligence 
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President Kennedy and his advisors used to understand Soviet actions, military 
capabilities, and intent.  I then proceed to analyze the quality of the warning 
intelligence President Kennedy and the EXCOMM received from the US 
Intelligence Community to support their policy deliberations in the face of the 
Soviet strategic nuclear missile and bomber deployments to Cuba.  I examine the 
Kennedy Administration’s receptivity and trust in the intelligence provided during 
the Cuban missile crisis considering the difficult start President Kennedy had with 
the US Intelligence Community in the wake of the April 1961 Bay of Pigs disaster 
which adversely affected his trust of the intelligence community early in his 
administration.  I also analyze how Kennedy and his closest advisors integrated 
warning intelligence into their previously held beliefs towards the Soviet Union, 
including Soviet capability and intentions to assess their objective interpretation 
of the intelligence they received.  Finally, I conclude that President Kennedy and 
his advisor made an accurate assessment of the current situation based on the 
three independent variables in the study. 
 Chapter 4 is a case study of the Soviet War Scare of 1983.  Although this 
series of events is much less well known than the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet 
War Scare case illustrates how the Soviets harbored deep anxieties and what they 
perceived as legitimate fears of an imminent US/NATO nuclear attack against the 
Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact.  I use the same organizational structure and 
methodology as in the Cuban Missile Crisis case to systematically examine the 
quality of the warning intelligence the KGB, GRU, and their allied intelligence 
services provided the Soviet senior political and military leadership.  I discuss 
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Soviet leadership receptivity towards the body of intelligence they used to inform 
their decision during this crisis and importantly, how they interpreted and 
integrated that intelligence, based on their fear of the United States into their 
assessment of the current situation.  Each of these two case studies concludes with 
a section which examines whether senior military and political leaders developed 
an accurate picture of the current situation based on the three independent 
variables in this study. 
Chapter 5 describes contemporary Russian foreign and military strategy as 
articulated in their current national security and foreign policy strategy 
documents.  I also discuss trends in Russian nuclear strategy and force 
modernization.  I conclude this chapter using Anthony Barrett’s work for RAND 
on the potential for accidental nuclear conflict between the United States and 
Russia. 
The dissertation concludes with Chapter 6 where I summarize my 
argument based on the evidence from these two case studies.  I discuss the 
implications of this analysis for theory and for the relationship between 
intelligence professionals and policy makers moving forward.  The study provides 
information on how to improve intelligence warning, intelligence-policy maker 
relationships/interactions, and need for objective use of intelligence to gain clear, 
accurate current situation assessments.  This effort ultimately is designed to help 
senior leaders who are responsible for nuclear force employment decisions make 
more accurate situation assessments.
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CHAPTER 2 – WARNING INTELLIGENCE 
This chapter explains fundamental concepts of warning intelligence and 
explores the literatures of warning intelligence and intelligence-policymaker 
interaction.  It describes warning intelligence theory and methodology as used in 
the U.S. but the principles are also broadly applicable to the Soviet warning 
system developed under Operation RYAN in the 1980s for strategic and tactical 
warning of a US/NATO nuclear attack against the Soviet Union.14  The 
intelligence-policymaker relationship has also been the subject of much scholarly 
interest and is a factor in this study in terms of policymaker receptivity towards 
intelligence.  Receptivity is a key factor for leaders to formulate accurate situation 
assessments.  If decision makers do not believe in the seriousness of the threat, or 
fail to trust the intelligence community, its leaders, individual analysts, or the 
quality of the intelligence products they receive, they are unlikely to formulate a 
rich, clear, assessment of the current situation they are facing in a nuclear crisis.  
This chapter starts by reviewing the relevant literature on warning intelligence 
and continues by describing the various historical perspective on the relationship 
between intelligence professionals and senior government policymakers.   
Senior, national-level leaders are charged with maintaining the security of 
their state and people.  This is one of the most fundamental duties of statesmen.  
An element of performing this duty is avoiding surprise, specifically the 
avoidance of military surprise attack.  To that end senior leaders demand 
                                                 
14 Operation RYAN was a major Soviet effort to collect and analyze intelligence to provide 
warning of a US or NATO nuclear attack.  Please see the case study in Chapter 4 dealing with the 
Soviet War Scare of 1983 for detailed information on Operation RYAN. 
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specialized, finished intelligence products which support critical decisions 
regarding national security strategy and decision making.  The fate of the state 
rests with the ability of leaders to recognize potential threats and opportunities in 
the international environment, formulate policies which address those threats and 
opportunities, successfully execute policies to mitigate threats and capitalize on 
opportunities, and evaluate policy effectiveness.  Warning intelligence, a specific 
function of intelligence, provides national-level decision makers the critical time 
and information they need to formulate and execute effective national security 
policies to protect national interests.  Formerly known as Indications and Warning 
Intelligence, this activity aims to prevent strategic and tactical surprise and is a 
fundamental mission of US and foreign intelligence agencies.  Senior national 
leaders have a deep interest in receiving and properly interpreting warning 
intelligence.  The consequences of surprise can be devastating and threaten their 
most fundamental responsibility, protecting their citizens and the state from 
foreign attack.  National security decision makers seek to avoid surprise with 
foreknowledge that can avert or potentially reduce the consequences of enemy 
action.   
States have been concerned with their enemy’s capabilities and intentions 
since the beginning of the state system.  In the contemporary era, our warning 
intelligence effort is largely a result of:  1) The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
which brought the U.S. into World War II and 2) The ensuing Cold War struggle 
with the Soviet Union from 1945-1991.  Jack Davis (2007) highlights the 
importance of these historical events in focusing and shaping US intelligence 
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efforts, by summarizing, “The central mission of intelligence analysis since the 
post-World War II reorganization of national security structures has been to warn 
US officials about foreign threats to US security interests” (p. 174).  The National 
Security Act of 1947 established a permanent, centralized intelligence structure to 
provide leaders advanced warning of pending foreign threats to American national 
security.  A key goal regarding the intelligence aspects of this act was a stiff 
determination to avoid another Pearl Harbor-type surprise attack. 
 To better understand the various concepts involved in the specialized 
discipline of Warning Intelligence, we must start by defining some key terms.  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Dictionary of US Military Terms for Joint Usage serves 
as a basis for providing key terms of reference and defines Warning Intelligence 
as “Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive 
intelligence information on foreign developments that forewarn of hostile action 
or intentions against United States entities, partners, or interests.” (DoD 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2018, p. 247).  This intelligence 
methodology relies on indications of activity, the use of the word “indicate” is apt 
in that it implies less than certain knowledge of developing or pending events 
(Grabo, 2015, p. 9).  According to Cynthia Grabo (2015), a key warning 
intelligence thinker and practitioner who authored the definitive Defense 
Intelligence Agency indications and warning training manual, an indication is “a 
development of any kind.  It may be a confirmed fact, a possible fact, an absence 
of something, a fragment of information, an observation, a photograph, a 
propaganda broadcast, a diplomatic note, a call up of reservists, a deployment of 
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forces, a military alert, an agent report, or a hundred other things” (p. 10).  The 
main factor defining an indication is the ability for that piece of information to 
provide some insight into the enemy’s likely course of action (Grabo, 2015, p. 
10).  A final key term, as defined by Grabo (2015), is an indicator, which is a 
theoretical or known step “which an enemy should or may take in preparation for 
hostilities” (p. 10).  When discussing the difference between an indicator and an 
indication there is a key distinction to keep in mind.  Indicators deal with our 
conception of what an enemy should or must do to prepare but which the enemy 
has not yet implemented.  An indicator is activated and becomes an indication 
once the enemy has acted and fulfilled the indicator criteria.  This is a difference 
between expectation and reality. 
Warning Intelligence is central to national security policy planning, 
decision making, and policy execution.  But what, more specifically, do 
policymakers demand of intelligence professionals when formulating long- and 
short-term national security and foreign policies?  What do Warning Intelligence 
analysts provide senior policymakers?  While policymakers and the public have a 
strong desire for specific point predictions regarding future events, such precision 
is often elusive and not a fundamental goal of the Warning Intelligence system.  
The overarching objective is for intelligence analysts to provide policymakers 
information and insights into overall trends in the enemy’s operational posture for 
any given intelligence warning problem (Wirtz, 2017, p. 113).  While analysts 
certainly strive to provide fine-grained details when possible, their primary focus 
is to alert decision makers of important changes in threat levels in a timely 
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manner to facilitate the development of effective policies and military strategies 
to address the threat.  Sometimes, more specific warning has been possible, 
including the incredible intelligence success in alerting senior military leaders of 
the pending Japanese attack on Midway Island in World War II15 or the tactical 
warning provided regarding Soviet deployment of strategic offensive nuclear 
weapons in Cuba before they became operational.  This type of warning, although 
highly prized by decision makers and generally expected by the public, is 
exceedingly rare.  Successful warning of this type, detailing the time, place, and 
method of attack is certainly the exception, not the rule, and importantly, as Jack 
Davis argues, not the true objective of the Warning Intelligence enterprise.  
Detecting macro-level trends is the true desired objective.   
To provide timely intelligence for effective policy action, warning 
intelligence analysts seek to detect and monitor changes in the operational 
environment, specifically, changes in an enemy military’s operational force 
posture.  At the most basic level, this is accomplished by routinely and 
systemically observing steady-state, day-to-day military activities, and 
establishing an activity baseline known as the normal alert posture.  Changes in 
adversary military force alert postures create a series of observable actions which 
warning professionals analyze to provide context and meaning.  Based on 
observations taken over extended time periods, intelligence analysts catalog 
observable patterns of activity which are formalized as indicators.  Analysts 
                                                 
15 US signal intelligence professionals intercepted and decrypted secret Japanese radio 
transmissions which provided key information regarding Japan’s intent to strike US military 
forces stationed on Midway Island.  This is regarded as one of the great US military intelligence 
success of World War II which also marked a turning point in the war in the Pacific. 
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constantly monitor physical objects and changes in the physical environment, 
known as signatures, which are routinely observed using comprehensive, all-
source intelligence collection strategies.  All-source intelligence analysts interpret 
this intelligence to detect changes, departures from the operational baseline level 
of military activity.  These changes lead to activation of specific indicators.  The 
comprehensive evaluation of change or lack of change in various indicators 
allows analysts to make judgements regarding the overall threat level for a given 
intelligence warning problem. 
Warning Intelligence – Analytic Methodology 
As a major international power, the U.S. has national security interests 
which span the globe.  In the US warning system, a warning problem is 
conceptualized as a top-level security issue, at any point along the spectrum of 
conflict, which could impact the security interests of the U.S. or our allies.  As 
examples, warning problems include:  a North Korean attack against South Korea, 
a Russian nuclear attack against the U.S., an Arab coalition attack against Israel, 
or a terrorist attack against the U.S.   
Intelligence agencies must collect, process, exploit and analyze vast 
amounts of classified and open source data to perform the indications and warning 
mission.  Analysts use this information along with their own insights, based on 
their extensive experience and expertise working a given intelligence warning 
problem, to make analytic judgments on the likelihood of conflict for a given 
intelligence warning problem.  They use a well-defined analytic methodology that 
has been honed over decades of use to reach judgments in an environment of high 
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uncertainty.  Warning officers, monitoring current, international events, must 
continuously determine if conditions warrant alerting more senior military and 
political officials of emerging or growing dangers to national security.  The US 
Intelligence Community has outlined a formal framework for conducting this type 
of analysis, instituted training programs to teach warning methodology, and 
devoted tremendous human and physical resources to execute our warning 
intelligence strategy.  The following is a discussion of how the intelligence 
warning system in the U.S. is structured starting with general concepts such as 
warning problems and ending with the interaction of the intelligence community 
providing warning to senior government policymakers. 
Warning problems include areas in which conventional, force-on-force 
attacks are possible such as North Korea-South Korea, India-Pakistan, China-
India, or the Israel-Arab Confrontation States.  They also include potential 
scenarios in which strategic nuclear weapons may be used such as Russia-U.S., 
China-U.S., or North Korea-U.S.  Terrorist and other non-state actor activities can 
also be analyzed using this methodology, examples include the Kurdistan 
Workers Party (PKK) threat to Turkey. 
Once a warning problem is defined, analysts specify indicators based on a 
methodology consistent across most warning problems.  The warning 
methodology includes broad categories of indicators to systematically account for 
different types of key political, military, economic, and social activities.  
Categories include:  Political/military leadership, ground forces, air/air defense 
forces, naval forces, nuclear forces, intelligence, command and control, 
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communication, logistics, et cetera.  The idea is to conceptualize the necessary 
preparations an adversarial force would have to take to prepare for conflict, 
determine which of those activities can be observed, and how they could be 
targeted using technical or human intelligence collection capabilities.  The result 
of this analysis is a comprehensive indicator list, a list of activities which the 
intelligence community will routinely monitor (using standing intelligence 
collection strategies), assess, and report upon so analysts can formulate 
judgements regarding force capability, readiness, and intent.  The following are 
examples of the type of activities (indicator categories) intelligence warning 
officers monitor as indicators of potential foreign attack: 
Political/military leadership (Command and Control) – Senior 
leaders recalled to their nation’s capital, key leaders moving to and taking 
position in command and control facilities, activation of command and 
control facilities 
Ground forces – Stand-downs to perform equipment maintenance, 
movement of equipment from garrison locations to troop/equipment 
marshaling areas, increased exercise activity to mask force generation and 
improve readiness postures 
Air/air defense forces – Stand-downs to perform aircraft and air 
defense equipment maintenance, dispersal of aircraft and field deployment 
of air defense systems to ensure survivability, increased exercise activity 
to mask force generation and improve readiness postures 
43 
 
Naval forces – Stand-downs to perform ship, submarine, naval 
aircraft and air defense equipment maintenance, deployments of naval 
ships, submarines, and aircraft to ensure survivability, increased exercise 
activity to mask force generation and improve readiness postures 
Nuclear forces – Dispersal of nuclear capable aircraft to enhance 
survivability, movement of nuclear warheads from storage facilities to 
strategic/tactical aircraft and tactical missile units, field deployment of 
road mobile strategic and tactical nuclear missiles and warheads  
Intelligence – Increased airborne intelligence collection flight 
activity, increased communication activity between human intelligence 
case officers and agents, increased signal intelligence collection/reporting, 
deployment of tactical signal intelligence collection assets 
Communication – Changes in patterns of communication, changed 
encryption and/or codewords, increased/decreased in communication 
levels, activation of alternate or deactivation of normal communication 
networks 
Space – Measures to increase survivability of space-based 
communication, navigation, and intelligence collection assets; increased 
space surveillance activities; preparations for offensive anti-satellite 
weapons employment 
Logistics – Increased production and stockpiling of key materials 
such as petroleum, oils, and lubricants; food; medical supplies; weapons; 
munitions 
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Warning officers, in close cooperation with intelligence collection 
managers, develop comprehensive, all-source intelligence collection plans driven 
by intelligence indicators.  These plans must be effective in routinely collecting 
timely, relevant intelligence for the methodology to function properly.  Collection 
and exploitation resources are always limited; therefore, an efficient, effective, 
well-thought-out collection plan is an important element in overall success.  
Failure to collect key pieces of information can easily result in potentially 
dangerous intelligence judgments where analysts fail to see the true nature or 
scope of the threat or, conversely, fail to detect information which would mitigate 
the level or nature of threat warning to decision makers.   
Intelligence personnel, who man our nation’s intelligence watch centers, 
analyze raw intelligence, and using the indications and warning methodology, 
their historical knowledge, as well as their ever present and developing 
knowledge of the current situational context, make judgments regarding enemy 
departures from past or expected activities.  They issue reports to their higher 
headquarters and others involved in the warning intelligence enterprise to change 
the indicator status.  If the situation warrants, watch centers can also change or 
recommend changes to the overall Watch Condition for the specific warning 
problem they are charged with monitoring. 
In response to an escalating geopolitical situation and the consequent 
change in the Watch Condition, political and military leaders can take steps to 
meet the emerging challenge and take political or military actions to eliminate or 
mitigate the potential threat.  Such actions include but are not limited to:  
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increasing the readiness posture of friendly forces as a means of signaling and to 
ensure defensive readiness, implementing enhanced intelligence collection plans 
to gain further insights on enemy activity, or engage in diplomacy to diffuse 
tension. 
Strategic versus Tactical Warning 
 Warning Intelligence is designed to provide national security decision 
makers with both strategic and tactical warning.  This distinction is important 
because these two types of warning focus on different goals.  Tactical warning, 
according to Jack Davis (2007), “Focuses on specific incidents that endanger US 
security interests, such as military attack, terrorism, developments regarding 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), illicit transactions, and political crises 
abroad” (p. 175).  Tactical warning detects and deters specific, near-term attacks.  
The objective is to avoid incident-level surprise and prevent or mitigate damage 
(Davis, 2007, p. 173).   
It is important to note that tactical surprise can be reduced but never 
eliminated (Davis, 2007, p. 176).  Many intelligence failures are tactical warning 
failures vice strategic warning failures.  In contrast, strategic warning deals with 
perceived dangers which span longer time periods and cover a larger scope of 
issues/activities.  The objective of strategic warning is to inform policy decisions 
on general defense and security preparedness to prevent or limit future damage to 
US national interests (Davis, 2007, p. 173).  Strategic warning provides military 
and civilian defense leaders a sense of the geopolitical environment and enables 
them to formulate broad-scope, long-term defense strategy.  This type of warning 
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also assists policymakers with contingency planning and defensive preparedness 
measures, including planning for research and development of new defense 
technologies, new weapons systems, more efficient logistics systems, and more 
robust and hardened command, control, communications and intelligence 
systems.  Strategic warning intelligence: 
…aims for analytic perception and effective communication to policy 
officials of important changes in the character or level of security threats 
that therefore require re-evaluation of US readiness to deter, avert, or limit 
damage – well in advance of incident-specific indicators (Davis, 2007, p. 
175). 
In contrast with tactical warning, strategic warning deals with the broad 
scope, long-term issue of addressing changes in the probability that an adversary 
will strike or take other actions inimical to US interests by considering potential 
mechanisms for inflicting damage.  Strategic warning is characterized by 
inferential evidence to provide a general sense of the dangers facing the United 
States.  It is a critical component of any nation’s defense effort as a mechanism 
for ensuring limited resources dedicated towards national defense are efficiently 
and effectively used.  When effective, strategic warning allows states to develop, 
structure, and posture defense forces and develop diplomatic strategies well in 
advance of specific indications of danger (Davis, 2007, p. 174). 
The Strategic and Tactical Warning Relationship 
 Having established the difference between strategic and tactical warning, 
let us now explore how these warning concepts are related.   
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Effective strategic warning is required to enable tactical warning.  
Strategic warning and current intelligence products enable military commanders, 
civilian leaders, and intelligence professionals to decide how, when, and where to 
best employ limited intelligence collection assets, limited exploitation resources, 
and limited analytic capability to provide tactical warning to senior decision 
makers.  Jack Davis (2007) further makes the point, “Good strategic warning has 
the potential to enhance both the ability of intelligence analysis to provide tactical 
warning and the preparedness of government and society to avoid or blunt 
damage” (p. 176).  Effective strategic warning prompts leaders to take preemptive 
and defensive measures that mitigate the negative consequences of tactical 
surprise (Davis, 2007, p. 176).  Given the difficulties of specifically predicting the 
date, time, place, and location of an attack (the goals of tactical warning), 
strategic warning provides an intelligence and policy making backstop by 
allowing at least some measure of prepared defense against hostile actions by 
foreign powers.   
 While strategic warning is important to recognize and plan for future 
threats, significant issues exist which make effective warning challenging.  The 
national security operating environment is becoming increasingly complex.  This 
point can be made through a comparison of the current security environment with 
the Cold War Era.  During the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet forces were arrayed 
against each other most directly in Europe although other significant security 
threats existed between the U.S. and China, North and South Korea, and the 
various proxy wars the two superpowers fought to gain influence in other areas of 
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the world.  Despite periodic high-tension levels, both sides generally understood 
the strategy, doctrine, and operational patterns of their adversary.  From an 
indications and warning intelligence standpoint, this allowed the development and 
refinement of a robust set of indicators which formed the basis for systematic 
intelligence collection, exploitation, and analysis efforts.  In the nuclear arena, the 
fundamental similarities between the strategies, structures, and operational 
capabilities of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces aided in establishing an effective 
indications and warning system of Soviet strategic nuclear attack against the 
United States or our allies.  In contrast, today, in a world with rising great powers 
such as China, a more assertive Russia, and a very large number of diffuse threats 
from terrorist groups, rogue states seeking weapons of mass destruction, and 
individuals and groups (some state-sponsored and many not) wielding offensive 
cyber weapons, the number and complexity of threats which warning officers 
must monitor has significantly increased.  Such complexity and uncertainty 
present a constant potential for error in warning assessments regarding the 
character, likelihood, and timing of emerging threats (Davis, 2007, p. 174). 
Intelligence Challenges 
 Intelligence officers face countless challenges in providing effective 
warning for decision makers.  Adversaries, recognizing surprise as an important 
aspect of their strategy, work to maximize their own operational security and 
conceal their activities from intelligence collection.  They have active denial and 
deception campaigns to mask the true nature of their capabilities and intent from 
hostile intelligence services.  Intelligence officers contend with limited collection 
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resources and are faced with competition with other competing agencies and 
intelligence problems.  These limit collection of data or can limit or delay the 
processing and exploitation of that data into raw intelligence.  Conversely, these 
analysts may also experience information overload when intelligence systems 
produce more intelligence then can be reasonably reviewed, analyzed, and 
understood.   
Policymaker Challenges 
 Policymakers also face their own set of difficulties formulating national 
security policy.  Senior executive branch officials, especially those with little to 
no federal government or military experience, may have very limited knowledge 
of how the US Intelligence Community operates, may fail to understand the 
strengths and weakness or capabilities and limitations of intelligence, or distrust 
the agencies or the agencies leaders responsible for providing current intelligence, 
intelligence estimates, and warning products.  Time, especially in crisis scenarios, 
by definition, is limited.  This time constraint, along with the tremendous 
pressures exerted on senior decision makers in high-stakes situations (like nuclear 
crises or the initiation of large-scale, regional, conventional military conflict), 
makes effective, rational decision making difficult.  Cognitive factors which limit 
the processing of large volumes of complex, detailed information under duress 
pose a challenge.  Emotional factors such as surprise, anger, fear, or betrayal can 
also disrupt an otherwise boundedly rational approach to a national security crisis.  
Decision makers, in the midst of an international crisis, are faced with numerous 
other policy distractions.  Thus, attention becomes a key factor in maintaining 
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focus on the most pressing matters before government.  Senior government 
officials are challenged with overcoming normal human cognitive biases when 
dealing with high-stress, crisis situations.  They may not trust the quality of the 
intelligence presented, may not hold the presenter of critical information in high 
esteem, might distrust the intelligence agency providing the key intelligence 
assessment, or worse yet, have a very low opinion of the Intelligence Community 
writ large.  Senior leader understanding of major, historical intelligence failures or 
embarrassing intelligence failures which have occurred during a current 
administration’s term in office may significantly impact the credibility and 
therefore the degree of influence warning intelligence has on the policy process.  
Finally, responding to intelligence warning requires decision makers to take risks.  
Given varying levels of uncertainty in the intelligence warning assessment, 
leaders will be faced with the dilemma of taking action that could be considered 
either an under- or over-reaction.  Faulty intelligence can cause leaders to pursue 
courses of action which exacerbate the problem rather than mitigating or 
eliminating it.  There are always opportunity costs which must be factored in to 
any decision involving action against a perceived threat.  The material and 
opportunity costs of meeting an international security challenge can be quite high.  
In the face of such challenges, leaders may become paralyzed and fail to decide 
and act.  They may be pressured into making irrational decisions, may be unable 
to overcome their initial emotional response to the crisis, or they may rise to the 
challenge and exercise wise, disciplined, insightful decision making processes to 
make the best of a difficult, challenging situation. 
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A final dilemma, inherent in both strategic and tactical warning, but 
probably more of a problem with tactical warning is the “paradox of warning.”  
Intelligence professionals must warn decision makers far enough in advance of a 
pending threat (at the appropriate decision point) to allow time for decision 
makers to deliberate, decide, and act to take effective counter-measures.  The 
paradox involves the element of time.  The necessary time horizon decision 
makers rightly require increases the level of uncertainty in the estimates 
intelligence professionals provide.  If analysts wait to long for more conclusive 
evidence to arrive, it may be too late to provide decision makers the time to reach 
a defensive policy decision and implement that decision.  Jack Davis (2007) 
describes this dilemma, “Waiting for evidence that the enemy is at the gate 
usually fails the timeliness test; prediction of potential crises without hard 
evidence can fail the credibility test” (p. 174).  Additionally, if analysts are overly 
aggressive and warn decision makers too often of pending threats, leaders become 
desensitized to pending dangers and accuse intelligence agencies of “crying 
wolf”.  This is further exacerbated when events which were the subject of tactical 
warning do not materialize. 
Characteristics and Benefits of Effective Warning 
 Given the high costs and many challenge to effective warning it is 
important to point out the characteristics and many benefits of effective warning.  
James Wirtz (2017), in Understanding Intelligence Failures, argues, for warning 
intelligence to be effective, “analysts and policymakers must both understand the 
philosophy and methodology that animates indications and warning intelligence” 
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(p. 113).  It is not enough for intelligence professionals to be well versed in the 
warning intelligence process.  Decision makers also have a significant stake in 
effective warning and, therefore, have a duty to improve their knowledge of 
warning system capabilities and limitations.  “They (decision makers) not only 
have to comprehend its strengths and limitations, but they also must understand 
the part they have to play to best utilize indications and warning intelligence to 
deter or defend against an opponent’s pending initiatives” (Wirtz, 2017, p. 113).  
Effective warning intelligence allows friendly forces to operate at normal, steady-
state peacetime levels of readiness.  Normal operational tempos are facilitated 
when confidence in effective strategic and tactical warning is high.  Given the fact 
that heighten military readiness levels are expensive to maintain and not 
sustainable over long time periods, maintaining an effective, credible warning 
system allows military leaders to conduct education and training activities, 
perform routine equipment maintenance, grant leaves, and allow individuals to 
separate from military service and return to civilian life.  Absent an effective 
warning system, these and other routine, peacetime activities would either not be 
possible or would entail a much higher level of risk.  In terms of avoiding surprise 
and ensuring adequate defense, Davis highlights the benefits of warning by 
stating: 
The central analytic task is to peel back substantive uncertainty about the 
meaning of past developments and the prospects for both pending and 
future developments that could endanger US interests.  Prescient, timely, 
convincing analysis regarding imminent and potential dangers would then 
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be an important force multiplier for US officials by reducing the 
likelihood, first, of incident surprise and, second, of inadequate defensive 
preparedness for dealing effectively with high-impact potential threats. 
(Davis, 2007, p. 175) 
For this to work, the warning analysts and decision making relationship 
must be based on mutual trust.  Warning must be credible and intelligence 
professionals have the burden of effectively communicating, listening, and 
facilitating leadership decisions and actions to protect against emerging or 
imminent dangers.  
Indications and Warning Intelligence in the Cold War 
 During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union, along with 
their respective allies, devoted vast resources to the indications and warning 
mission.  Both sides dedicated personnel, collection systems, data processing, 
communications systems, and intellectual resources to improve warning 
capabilities and to perform the day-to-day monitoring mission.   
Compared with the intelligence warning challenges the United States faces 
today, the system was well-defined and well-understood.  U.S. and Soviet forces 
exhibited similar military operational capabilities.  The nature of the geostrategic 
competition between the two superpowers, although uncertain at the beginning of 
the Cold War, was increasingly evident and understood as the Cold War 
progressed.  Intelligence analysts, decision makers, and academics could 
conceptualize the most likely and most threatening conflict scenarios in the bi-
polar world of U.S. and Soviet ideological and political/military competition.  On 
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the conventional front, the clearest example of a key indications and warning 
problem involved Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces facing U.S. and NATO forces 
along the inter-German and German-Czechoslovak border in Central Europe.  
Both sides had a good understanding of each other’s capabilities in terms of 
military doctrine, force structure, equipment, and training/readiness levels.  On 
the nuclear front, Soviet nuclear planners built a force structure similar to the US 
structure comprised of a triad of manned strategic bombers, intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines 
(SSBNs).  There were some differences which developed over time (the Soviets 
placed more emphasis on ICBMs in their force structure and much less emphasis 
on their manned bomber program than the U.S., while the U.S. developed more 
advanced technologies in manned bombers and SSBNs), but overall, the 
similarities in force structure and nuclear strategy16 allowed both sides to 
effectively monitor and provide warning of nuclear threats.  Large conventional 
and nuclear force postures facilitated detection of even small changes to overall 
readiness (Wirtz, 2017, p. 117).   
Sustained intelligence collection and analysis over decades allowed 
analysts to develop a comprehensive understanding of routine operating patterns.  
Arms control agreements and confidence building measures which both sides 
adopted facilitated exchanges of military information which shed light on forces, 
doctrine, and standard operating procedures, increasing transparency.  Although 
                                                 
16 Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. eventually adopted a strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction 
(MAD) in which both sides maintained a second-strike capability to hold the other sides’ key, 
high-value targets at risk after an initial first-strike targeting military capabilities.  This “balance of 
fear” helped maintain nuclear peace between the two superpowers.  
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US and allied technology was superior to Soviet/Warsaw Pact military 
technology, the use of similar types of weapons systems helped set the parameters 
for monitoring and understanding each other’s military capabilities.   
Finally, US indications and warning methodologies improved over time 
thanks to sustained academic, intelligence, and policy debate over Soviet weapons 
system procurement decisions, alert postures, and doctrines (Wirtz, 2017, p. 117).  
Despite the stable and improving prospects for indications and warning 
intelligence during the Cold War, there were certainly unanswered questions 
regarding enemy intent and how the other side would react in any given 
political/military crisis scenario.  These questions remain a key challenge for 
warning officers and policymakers. 
Indications and Warning Intelligence Today 
 The current international security environment is very dynamic in the 
post-9/11 world and some intelligence professionals believe former warning 
methodologies may be obsolete in a world of increasingly prevalent and 
dangerous non-state actors and rogue states.  Despite the increasing number of 
diffuse threats facing the U.S. today, James Wirtz (2017) believes warning 
intelligence remains a relevant mission for our intelligence community (p. 122).  
Strategic Warning Intelligence serves to focus policymaker attention on the bigger 
picture, on the emerging threats that may materialize over the horizon.  Threats 
which the U.S. must act against today by developing strategies to face these future 
challenges.  This systematic focus on long-term study of emerging and existing 
strategic threats, allows the U.S. to better use all instruments of national power to 
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address major, international security concerns.  It allows decision makers 
opportunities to develop more flexible response options, as opposed to an “all or 
nothing” type response to security challenges.  Warning Intelligence focuses 
intelligence collection efforts and serves as a reminder the intelligence community 
must always seek to overcome deliberate foreign attempts at denial and deception 
as a mechanism for achieving strategic or tactical surprise against the U.S.  
Tactical warning intelligence remains valuable although more difficult to get 
right.  Tactical warning intelligence focuses intelligence collection, exploitation 
and analytic efforts on immediate threats and works well, as long as senior leaders 
and the American public realize just how difficult it is to accurately predict 
specific events which adversely impact national security.  Although the 
challenges of predicting specific, tactical-level events is extremely difficult, 
warning intelligence remains vitally important, as it was during the Cold War, as 
an analytic methodology for informing our senior political and military decision 
makers of growing threats of large-scale, conventional, force-on-force attack and 
nuclear conflict. 
The Interaction Between Intelligence Professionals and Policymakers 
 An effective interface between intelligence and policy is critical for 
national security planning and execution.  Arthur Hulnick (1987) believes 
“delivering intelligence to the policy system is in many respects as exciting and as 
important as any component of the intelligence process and therefore merits 
scholarly attention” (p. 129).  The earliest thinkers on this topic in the modern US 
intelligence system (dating from the establishment of the post-World War II 
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intelligence community with the National Security Act of 1947), included 
Sherman Kent, Roger Hilsman and Harry Howe Ransom, who were highly 
influential in setting the tone of the intelligence-policymaker relationship in the 
early days of the Central Intelligence Agency.  These individuals sought to define 
the role intelligence plays in the national security policy process (Hulnick, 1987, 
pp. 129-130).  These early intelligence leaders clearly recognized the dilemma 
intelligence professionals face working with policymakers:  intelligence 
professionals must be close to the policy community to understand the 
intelligence requirements necessary for effective decision making, but such a 
close relationship subjects them to being corrupted by that very process.  The key 
issue came down to defining the appropriate level of closeness, the appropriate 
professional relationship, between intelligence analysts and senior decision 
makers in government (Hulnick, 1987, p. 130). 
The “Traditionalist” School 
 The traditional view of the relationship between intelligence professionals 
and policymakers is one of hard separation.  Intelligence analysts pride 
themselves on being unbiased observers and analysts of events and developing 
issues.  They seek to remain above the political fray, to objectively evaluate the 
facts, free of political or ideological bias.  This school advanced the thinking that 
“…intelligence must distance itself from policy making, reach independent 
judgements about world events, and avoid tailoring intelligence judgements to 
satisfy the ideological drive or policy preferences of decision makers” (Hulnick, 
1987, p. 130).  General William “Wild Bill” Donovan, a key figure in the 
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establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency, was also an advocate for the 
clear separation of intelligence and policy.  According to Donovan, “intelligence 
must be independent of the people it serves so that the material it contains will not 
be slanted or distorted by the views of the people who direct operations.”   
Intelligence professionals must remain focused on their customers’ intelligence 
requirements but should not provide policy advice, recommendations on courses 
of action, or any type of foreign or defense policy prescriptions.  This can 
sometimes become problematic when objective intelligence seems to point 
towards limited policy latitude for a given international security problem or from 
a policy evaluation perspective, paints a dim picture for an existing policy 
outcome.  Such problems can lead analysts to tailor their assessments to curry 
favor with their political masters.  It can also prompt policymakers to exert 
pressure on analysts to produce intelligence which conforms to their ideological 
views or preferred policy outcomes, this is known as politicization of intelligence. 
 Sherman Kent (1972)17 advocated for a clear delineation between 
intelligence and policy.  He stressed the need for detached objectivity, “It is 
essential that policymakers get a straight story of how things are working out so 
that they can judge whether to continue on course or take a different track.”  
Despite his calls for unbiased assessments, Kent called upon analysts to remain 
knowledgeable of US interests and policy to best serve policymakers with high-
quality intelligence products.  “Without such knowledge, there is a lack of criteria 
for selection of developments and their meaningful interpretation.”  Kent (1949) 
                                                 
17 Sherman Kent was a legendary CIA analyst.  The CIA Center for Intelligence Analysis is named 
after Sherman Kent. 
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recognized the relationship with policymakers must be close enough, “to obtain 
guidance, but must maintain sufficient distance to protect the independence of 
judgements” (p. 180).  Intelligence producers do not have to agree with policy 
and, in fact, do not have to have an opinion at all, but they must be able to 
articulate foreign reactions to American policies to better provide insights to US 
policymakers (Kent, 1972).  Both Donovan and Kent were influential in 
establishing early analytic practices in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and 
its Directorate of Intelligence and followed this traditional approach in the early 
days of its existence (1947-1955) (Hulnick, 1987, p. 130). 
The “Activist” School 
With the passage of time, some intelligence professionals began to 
recognize the shortcoming of the traditional approach to the intelligence-
policymaker relationship.  This group believed a symbiotic relationship between 
these two groups could develop and would result in better intelligence support to 
decision making.  According to Anne Karalekas (1984), the rise of the activist 
movement among intelligence professionals in the late 1950s was driven by the 
CIAs concentration on current intelligence production at the expense of more in-
depth, long-range intelligence assessments and due to the lack of impact 
intelligence was having on national security policy making (p. 69).  A strong case 
can also be made that this philosophical change in the intelligence-policymaker 
relationship resulted in a stronger partnership between these two groups.  
According to the activist school, policymakers drive the intelligence cycle by 
stating their intelligence requirements as the first step in the process of producing 
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finished intelligence products which support decision making.  Without close 
interaction, intelligence officers are “shooting in the dark” concerning their 
superior’s intelligence needs.  This does not mean the intelligence output, the 
analytic judgements, need to be tainted by political or ideological bias.  Sherman 
Kent, an early advocate of the traditionalist school, came to advocate this 
approach based on his assessment that too great a distance in priorities and 
mindset had developed between intelligence professionals and policymakers 
(Davis, 2003, p. 2).  Roger Hilsman, another intelligence professional, advocated 
in the 1950s a much more radical position than the traditionalists.  Hilsman 
believed intelligence analysts should study and better understand the national 
security policy process as a means of better understanding the effects of their 
intelligence inputs.  Although this seems obvious, he advocated that intelligence 
should use resources to investigate issues that are meaningful to policymakers and 
that a feedback mechanism must be built into the system to improve intelligence 
support to policy making (Hulnick, 1987, p. 131).   
CIA Directorate of Intelligence official Carmen Medina argues 
intelligence and policymaker relationships must evolve to be productive in the 
21st century.  Medina (2002) argues, “Analytic detachment and neutrality are 
values bred of the Cold War, when foreign policy observers often compensated 
for lack of information with ideologically based assertions.  Intelligence analysts 
correctly tried not to do that—they were reliably objective.”  Contrary to the 
relationship model developed during the Cold War, analysts now need to become 
less independent and neutral and more sensitive to tailoring intelligence to 
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customer (policymaker) requirements.  She recognizes the evolving relationship 
focusing on policymaker needs has led to concern over the historical detachment 
from policymaking, but she rejects the notion that analysts can be both customer 
focused and produce neutral analysis.  Selecting analytic topics based on 
consumer interests and analyzing those aspects of various national security 
problems that are most relevant to policymakers means analysts will become less 
neutral.  She advocates moving away from analysis which focuses on events and 
developments at the expense of serving the needs of intelligence consumers.  
Medina believes analysts who act in a completely neutral and independent manner 
will lead to policymakers declaring intelligence as irrelevant.  This is not to say 
that the shift away from policy neutral analysis means compromising analytic 
integrity.  She believes intelligence must continue to raise issues which are 
uncomfortable for decision makers in the State or Defense Departments and 
present information and assessments that are not in sync with policymaker goals.  
She makes a hard distinction between distant neutrality and analytic integrity: 
Distance from the customer and some near mystical ability to parse the 
truth completely free from bias or prejudice.  Integrity, on the other hand, 
rests on professional standards and the willingness to provide the most 
complete answer to a customer’s question, even if it is not the answer he 
wants to hear. (Medina, 2002) 
Medina comes down clearly on the side of analysis which impacts policymaking 
as opposed to analytic detachment in the name of principled objectivity. 
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The response to Those Advocating a Closer Relationship 
With the passage of time and increasing experience, intelligence 
professionals came to see the need for a hybrid approach and recognized the need 
for closer relationships between intelligence and policy.  Steven Ward responded 
to Carmen Medina’s call for a more revolutionary change in intelligence analysis 
with his appeal for evolutionary change.  He does not dispute that policymakers 
benefit from intelligence tailored to their needs, which is not a new concept.  
However, Ward is skeptical that policymakers want a closer relationship with 
intelligence analysts, “Human nature being what it is, might they not become 
more jealous and aloof when dealing with policy-related ideas from analysts 
(secrecy and surprise being valued as much by policymakers in interagency 
battles as by generals in wartime)?”  Ward believes the traditional model in which 
analysts focus on events and developments directly serves customer needs for 
information and analysis and this has remained true in the post-9/11 era.  He 
contends that especially in crises driven environments, the need for current 
situation updates tips the balance, even if only temporarily, in favor of a focus on 
developments vice conceptual, policy-relevant intelligence products (Ward, 
2002). 
Impediments to Strong Intelligence-Policy Relationships 
 Strong intelligence-policy relationships are difficult to forge because 
intelligence professionals and political leaders are guided by different 
motivations.  Intelligence professionals pride themselves as being apolitical, 
objective, long-serving, subject matter experts.  Intelligence analysts aspire to 
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remain above the political fray and serve the elected leadership to the very best of 
their ability regardless of their personal political viewpoints.  As military 
personnel or civil servants, their career progression is fundamentally different 
than the political leaders they serve.  Political leaders, who are directly 
accountable to the voting public, are goal oriented, ideologically motivated, 
generally have limited time horizons, and are under immense pressure to succeed.  
These same traits can be found in the executive and legislative staffs who serve 
their political masters (Hulnick, 1987, p. 131).  Policymakers can form the 
following attitudes about intelligence: 
• Intelligence increases, rather than reduces uncertainty about the world.  
Intelligence judgements are often ambiguous.  Decision makers like clear-
cut, definitive intelligence which points them to the most logical, rational 
policy course of action. 
• Policymakers are often ignorant of the collection means, analytic 
techniques, or bureaucratic processes intelligence professionals use to 
produce intelligence and reach key analytic judgements. 
• Policymakers, may have a relationship with the individual presenting 
intelligence if they have established a routine intelligence briefing 
schedule which involves a limited number of intelligence briefers, but they 
do not know the many individuals involved in collecting, researching, and 
analyzing the data which go into the final intelligence product they 
receive.  This situation can lead to credibility gaps between intelligence 
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and political leaders, especially when the intelligence provided does not 
mesh with the policymakers’ pre-conceived ideas. 
• Decision makers are flooded with information and can suffer cognitive 
impairments due to information overload.  Many different agencies bring 
information to bear on any given national security problem and leaders 
must read, process, understand, and synthesize all this information to 
develop policy objectives and potential courses of action before arriving at 
a decision to move forward. 
Intelligence professionals have their own set of problems, which may 
impede a more positive, productive relationship with decision makers.  Ideally, 
intelligence analysts are objective, independent, nonpartisan, and nonideological 
(Hulnick, 1987, p. 132).  General Colin Powell (2012) provided intelligence 
professionals with the following advice, “Tell me what you know, what you don’t 
know, and tell me what you think…always distinguish which is which.”  
Intelligence officers pride themselves on staying outside the political debate, 
above the political fray.  This philosophy, although seemingly admirable in terms 
of preserving objectivity, may lead to the following problems in the intelligence-
policy relationship according to Hulnick: 
• Intelligence analysts (both the individual presenting the intelligence 
material in a briefing format, as well as intelligence analysts who must 
often answer written requests for intelligence support) often know very 
little about the nature and scope of the policy options policymakers are 
considering.  Thus, although aware of the general nature of the national 
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security problem, they do not have the full context of the situation and this 
limits the ability of intelligence professionals to fully support the decision 
making process. 
• Intelligence analysis, at its best, separates facts from judgments, makes 
that difference explicit, and communicates judgments or key findings in 
terms of confidence levels and/or probabilities.  Often, policymakers 
overlook these subtleties or do not understand the terminology involved in 
categorizing confidence or probability levels.  The intelligence community 
has recognized this problem and developed more standardized definitions 
for confidence levels and has worked to better educate policymakers on 
the meanings of those terms. 
• Intelligence products, delivered to customers in written and oral formats, 
are often produced using standardized templates.  These templates guide 
analysts who are producing the products and help supervisors reviewing 
the finished intelligence to ensure quality control.  Leadership decision 
making is facilitated by well-produced, standardized intelligence, designed 
to facilitate quick, efficient presentation of information.  Despite these 
positive attributes, standardization also means intelligence may not be 
tailored to the style of everyone with a stake in the decision making 
process.  The goal of intelligence is to produce information tailored to 
decision maker needs.  This may not always be possible given the large 
number of actors involved in the decision process. 
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• Since most intelligence is produced on a pre-determine time cycle, 
intelligence products may not be synchronized with decision cycles.  
Untimely intelligence is irrelevant.  Intelligence professionals, especially 
in the military, work to remain cognizant of the “battle rhythm” and 
deliberately design intelligence production cycles to ensure intelligence is 
developed to support specific decisions during the relevant decision 
window, before the key, pre-determined decision point is reached in the 
battle rhythm.  Although this decision cycle is highly structured, flexibility 
remains a key component of the intelligence-military leader relationship, 
as military commanders still demand near real-time intelligence updates 
when critical events necessitate.  Political decisions, in contrast, rarely 
follow such a pre-determined, disciplined cycle.  This complicates the 
ability of intelligence producers to provide intelligence in a timeframe 
which is most useful.   
Potential Solutions 
Given the challenges outlined above, the inherent tension between 
intelligence professionals and policy makers has probably always existed.  With 
the emergence of a greatly expanded, more centralized, professionalized corps of 
intelligence officers during the Cold War, the relationship between intelligence 
analysts and policy makers became a critical factor in the shaping of America’s 
national security policy and how the U.S. managed the many crises of that period.  
Today, the U.S. faces a myriad of diverse, challenging national security issues.  
The requirement for improved intelligence-policy maker relationships is greater 
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than ever.  Fortunately, the US Intelligence Community has made progress and is 
poised to continue improving its relationship with senior military and civilian 
decision makers.  To guide this effort, Arthur Hulnick outlined a series of 
potential solutions, based on his survey work of professionals in the CIA’s 
Directorate of Intelligence, and recommended the following: 
• Analysts should establish and develop close working relationships 
with their worker-level counterparts in the policy community.  This 
would allow each party to better understand the issues and challenges 
facing each community.  Policy staff members would gain increased 
respect for intelligence analysts.  Such interaction would allow 
intelligence analysts to further demonstrate their expertise which 
would contribute to their credibility in the eyes of policy staffers.  
Policy staff members could better explain the current state of flux in 
the policy development phase and the status of various issues which 
could guide improved intelligence analysis and allow for more tailored 
intelligence production to support decision maker needs. 
• Intelligence analysts should educate their policy counterparts on the 
benefits and limitations, capabilities and challenges of intelligence.  
The policy side could better educate intelligence analysts on how 
presentation formats could be improved and how to improve 
production/delivery timing to better integrate intelligence into the 
decision making process. 
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• Finally, a tighter network would facilitate better feedback, at lower 
levels, concerning the quality and timing of intelligence.  This would 
provide intelligence professionals greater insights on the value of the 
products they are providing which will aid in determining relevance 
and facilitate improvements in the intelligence input to policy. 
The Intelligence-Policy Relationship Today 
Over the past 30 years, intelligence professionals have adopted the 
recommendations Hulnick suggested.  Intelligence analysts work closely with 
their policy counterparts and members from other staff elements in military 
organizations.  This interaction has led to a better integration between intelligence 
and operation in the military or intelligence and policy when considering 
intelligence support to our civilian executive branch or political leadership.  
Formal intelligence processes, including the basic intelligence cycle, highlight the 
fact that intelligence is a consumer driven enterprise.  Intelligence is not an end in 
itself.  Its sole function is to support decision making.  The cycle itself starts with 
the identification of intelligence requirements derived through direct interaction 
between intelligence professionals and senior policymakers.  The final component 
of the never-ending intelligence cycle is feedback, which suggests intelligence 
professionals and policymakers, at least in theory, recognize the need for a 
continuous process which makes necessary, periodic course corrections.  In 
practice, leaders can be very vocal and are very willing to provide feedback 
concerning the quality of intelligence they receive.  Given the dynamic nature of 
national security problems, intelligence, and the fact that intelligence and policy 
69 
 
making are human endeavors, the potential will always exist for problems 
between these two communities. 
While the level of interaction between the two communities has improved 
with time, there are still many misunderstandings regarding what intelligence can 
and cannot provide in terms of capabilities.  Future, sustained, improvement 
requires active leadership in both the intelligence and policy making 
communities.  Intelligence and policy leaders must continuously develop and 
execute plans for improving the vital relationships which lead to successful policy 
implementation based on accurate, timely, relevant intelligence. 
 Positive interaction between intelligence analysis and decision makers is 
critical in ensuring accurate current situation assessments.  Productive 
relationships between these two communities allow intelligence professionals to 
better assess the information needs of policy makers and receive feedback on how 
they are fulfilling those needs.  On the policy side, positive interactions build trust 
in intelligence institutions and individual analysts.  Strong working relationships 
allow leaders to better understand the capabilities and limitations of intelligence, 
in what intelligence can provide and what it cannot.  Productive relationships 
improve leadership receptivity towards intelligence in general and intelligence 
warning more specifically.  These concepts are important in analyzing the case 
studies which follow in chapters 3 and 4.  The intersection between intelligence 
and policy making is the central focus of my theory of current situation 
assessment.  The analysis which follows in the two cases studies will seek to 
explain the relationship between quality intelligence, leadership receptivity to 
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intelligence, and interpretation of that intelligence to determine the quality of the 
current situation assessment leaders made during two Cold War nuclear crises.
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CHAPTER 3 – THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 
The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 represents the closest the two 
nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, came to nuclear 
war.  Fortunately for humanity, there was only one known casualty, Major Rudolf 
Anderson, Jr, a U-2 pilot shot down over Cuba while collecting imagery 
intelligence on Soviet military activities.  The Soviet move to place strategic 
nuclear weapons in Cuba represented a bold stroke by Soviet First Secretary 
Khrushchev to quickly and decisively upend the strategic balance of power 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.  The U.S. was aware of the possibility of this 
Soviet move but US strategic intelligence assessments downplayed this possibility 
and Soviet leaders denied their intention to place such weapons in Cuba.  The 
initial intelligence evidence of Soviet activities came therefore as a surprise to 
President Kennedy and his advisors.  Soviet leaders estimated the young president 
was inexperienced and could be forced into accepting the presence of Soviet 
nuclear weapons in Cuba under the pretext of providing defense against future US 
military operations designed to overthrow the communist government in power 
there since 1959.  The president felt betrayed when he initially heard the news of 
the Soviet missile deployments but expertly managed the crisis over 13 dangerous 
and tense days. 
 This chapter begins with a relatively brief description of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of 1962.  While countless, full-length books have been written 
about this crisis, it is important to provide readers with a short background to 
offer context for the analysis of warning intelligence, how receptive senior leaders 
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were towards that intelligence, and how they interpreted it.  It begins with Soviet 
plans to place strategic nuclear weapons in Cuba then follows with a description 
of how the Soviets accomplished that operation.  The next section presents and 
discusses the warning intelligence President Kennedy and his staff received in the 
run up to the crisis and during the crisis period from October 16-28, 1962.  I will 
also evaluate the quality of that intelligence based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) criteria explained in Chapter 1.  The chapter then turns to evaluating how 
receptive President Kennedy and members of the National Security Council 
Executive Committee (EXCOMM) were towards the intelligence warning they 
received.  I then discuss how the president and his top advisor evaluated the 
intelligence to investigate how bias may have influenced their consideration of the 
intelligence and determine to what degree their interpretation led them to an 
objective evaluation of the current situation.  Finally, in the concluding section, I 
will evaluate how all the factors mentioned above contributed to forming a clear, 
accurate assessment of the dire situation these senior leaders confronted. 
This chapter argues President Kennedy and the senior leaders assembled 
in the EXCOMM to manage this crisis made accurate situation assessments.  The 
US Intelligence Community provided quality tactical intelligence which allowed 
the president and the EXCOMM member to accurately assess the situation each 
day of the crisis, weigh the pros and cons, risks and benefits of various policy 
options, and ultimately decide how to proceed to force a Soviet withdrawal of 
their nuclear forces from Cuba.  The president and his senior political and military 
leaders were receptive towards the intelligence the Central Intelligence Agency 
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(CIA) and the rest of the US Intelligence Community provided.  These leaders 
interpreted intelligence to reach logical, objective conclusions.  Finally, based on 
all these factors, these senior leaders developed an accurate picture of the current 
situation which allowed them to successfully devise, select, implement, and 
monitor the U.S. response to this Soviet challenge.  This is not to say everything 
worked perfectly or the U.S. had a complete understanding of Soviet capabilities 
and intent.  We now know there were several points during the crisis when events 
at the tactical level came perilously close to immediate, direct confrontation 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 
Key Events 
The Cuba Missile Crisis placed President Kennedy and First Secretary 
Nikita Khrushchev in the unenviable position of making critical decisions on war 
and peace in the nuclear age with the fate of the world hanging in the balance.  
This is not hyperbole.  President Kennedy believed the odds of nuclear war 
between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were “between one-in three and even” and 
Khrushchev spoke of “the smell of burning in the air” (Allison, In The Secret 
Cuban Missile Crisis Documents, 1994).  This 13-day nuclear crisis, the most 
dangerous period of the Cold War confrontation between the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. started on Tuesday, October 16, 1962 when President Kennedy was 
first informed of the secret Soviet military buildup on Cuba.  This deployment 
consisted of the construction of missile sites for Soviet medium and intermediate 
range ballistic missiles capable of targeting the continental United States, Central 
America, and much of South America.  The Soviets had deployed these missiles 
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as well as strategic bombers and improved surface-to-air missile systems to guard 
against a potential US attack on these strategic nuclear sites.  The US Government 
learned of the Soviet deployment from imagery intelligence collected by the U-2 
high-altitude reconnaissance program which provided clear, convincing evidence 
of the Soviet deployment of 48 Medium-range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) (range 
1,100 nautical miles) and 24 Intermediate-range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMS) 
(range 2,200 nautical miles) at four deployment sites in Cuba.  This deployment 
surprised the US Government.  Up to that point, the Soviets had never stationed 
nuclear weapons outside the territory of the Soviet Union.  However, America’s 
senior leaders and the public realized the potential for such a deployment.  The 
threat of a Soviet military buildup in Cuba was an issue in the 1962 mid-term 
congressional elections and Kennedy declared the installation of a significant 
offensive capability, including missile systems, would be “unacceptable” 
(Allision, In The Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Documents, 1994). 
 Having discovered the secret Soviet activities in Cuba, the central question 
for President Kennedy and his most trusted advisors on the EXCOMM revolved 
around defining the US strategy for eliminating the Soviet nuclear threat based in 
Cuba without precipitating general nuclear war with the Soviet Union.  As the 
Soviets had yet to learn the US Government was aware of their secret operation, 
the president and his advisors had the benefit of one week to formulate and debate 
potential courses of action in secret before confronting the Soviets or making their 
activities in Cuba public.  This time proved critical for making sound, informed 
decisions in an environment, while certainly stressful, which was not subject to 
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the distractions and potential complications resulting from public or media 
pressure or additional complicating measures the Soviet could have employed.  
Initially, the most popular course of action favored by the president and his 
advisors was to launch precision air strikes targeting the Soviet strategic weapons.  
In the end, the president decided to use a naval quarantine to block further arms 
shipments and to pressure the Soviets to peacefully withdraw their missiles and 
strategic bombers from Cuba.  Based on a cost/benefit analysis of other options, 
President Kennedy and his advisors believed this option had the best chance of 
forcing the Soviet military withdrawal and reducing the likelihood of provoking 
war than other potential courses of action. 
 President Kennedy addressed the nation on the evening of Monday, 
October 22 to explain the current situation, the gravity of the threat to the United 
States and our Central/South American neighbors, and the naval quarantine 
strategy the U.S. would pursue to resolve the crisis.  The president increased the 
alert posture of military forces and warned the Soviets that any attack originating 
from Cuba would result in a “full retaliatory response” from the United States and 
unveiled the threat of US nuclear retaliation should the Soviet use any of their 
new weapons in Cuba. 
 Over the next week several public and private exchanges took place 
between President Kennedy and First Secretary Khrushchev to resolve the crisis.  
The US naval quarantine went into effect on Wednesday, October 24 and many 
feared war would quickly break out should Soviet ships try to run the blockade.  
Soviet ships did approach the quarantine demarcation line but stopped dead in the 
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water which averted an immediate escalation of tensions.  On Thursday, October 
25, the US Government received a letter from the Soviets proposing a Soviet 
withdrawal of its strategic forces in return for a US pledge to not invade Cuba in 
the future.  The U.S. received a second letter on Friday, October 26 which added 
an additional demand, for the U.S. to withdraw its Jupiter nuclear ballistic 
missiles from Turkey.  President Kennedy decided to respond to the first 
Khrushchev letter while ignoring the second letter.  The US Government was not 
willing to withdraw missiles from Turkey under the threat of Soviet blackmail.  
The crisis escalated on Saturday, October 27 when the Soviets fired a surface-to-
air missile from Cuba which downed a US U-2 flying an aerial imagery 
intelligence collection mission.  This event increased the pressure on President 
Kennedy within the EXCOMM to strike the extensive air defense system the 
Soviets had built on Cuba.  The president decided to raise the stakes and 
demanded Khrushchev immediately announce the withdrawal of Soviet nuclear 
missiles from Cuba or the U.S. was prepared to take military action to eliminate 
them by force.  Saturday, October 27 turned out to be the most frightening day of 
the crisis.  The next meeting for the EXCOMM was scheduled for the morning of 
Sunday, October28.  Most members of the EXCOMM expected Kennedy to 
authorize immediate air strikes against the Soviet air defense systems, nuclear 
capable missiles, and strategic bombers in Cuba.  The anticipated Soviet response 
was an attack against the Jupiter missiles in Turkey, a Soviet move against the 
western allies in Berlin, or aggression against a US ally in some other part of the 
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world.  Known as “Black Saturday” many of the EXCOMM officials doubted 
whether they and the rest of the world would survive the coming week. 
 As the crisis peaked, Khrushchev announced on Sunday, October 28 at 
09:00 a.m., via message from Radio Moscow, that the Soviet missiles would be 
withdrawn from Cuba. 
 The U.S. had to act cautiously during the crisis.  American intelligence 
was uncertain if the Soviets had delivered nuclear warheads to Cuba, a question 
not definitively answered until 1992 when Soviet sources confirmed nuclear 
warheads were in Cuba during the crises.18 
The Context 
To better understand this crisis, it is important to discuss the underlying 
context of the situation which allows greater insights into the motivation of the 
Soviets for placing missiles in Cuba and for the US response to this crisis.  The 
overarching context, of course, was the Cold War, but more specifically both the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union sought to regain the initiative in the strategic 
completion for power which both sides believed they had lost.  President Kennedy 
believed the U.S. had fallen behind the Soviets, especially in the late 1950s, based 
                                                 
18 Soviet nuclear weapons were in Cuba for 59 days from October 4 – December 1, 1962.  Eighty 
warheads were available for land-based cruises missiles, 12 for short-range FROG ballistic 
missiles, and 6 nuclear bombs for the IL-28 bombers.  Additionally, 36 warheads for the (SS-4/R-
12) missiles had arrived in Cuba on October 4 and were loaded for the return trip to the Soviet 
Union onto a Soviet ship (Aleksandrovsk) at Mariel between October 30-November 3 which 
departed Cuba on November 3, 1962. Twenty-four warheads from the SS-5/R-14) missiles arrived 
in Cuba on October 25 but were never unloaded from the Aleksandrovsk before the ship departed 
Cuba on November 3 for their return trip to the Soviet Union. (Last Nuclear Weapons Left Cuba 
in December 1962, 2013). 
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on Soviet triumphs in the space race.  The Soviets had tested the world’s first 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) in August 1957 and launched the 
world’s first satellite into orbit in October 1957.  Khrushchev repeatedly boasted 
his nation’s factories “were turning out missiles like sausages” (Thielmann, 
2011).  President Kennedy ran his 1960 presidential campaign partially based on 
the fear of a Soviet “bomber gap” and a “missile gap”, claiming erroneously the 
United States had fallen behind the Soviets in nuclear capability (Brugioni, 1991, 
pp. 9 and 54).19  The Soviets were actively subverting governments in Southeast 
Asia and in the Caribbean.  The new American president clearly signaled in his 
inaugural address that a new generation of Americans was prepared to take on the 
Soviet challenge in both the nuclear and unconventional warfare domains 
(Kennedy, 1961). 
 Khrushchev, for his part, was also working to gain strategic advantage 
over the United States.  He expressed his support for “wars of national liberation” 
as a means of spreading communist ideology,20 which Kennedy interpreted as a 
declaration of war in the third world.21  Although Castro had come to power in 
January 1959, under President Eisenhower’s watch, President Kennedy and his 
brother Robert saw the Cuban consolidation of power and its growing alliance 
                                                 
19 Additional information on the alleged bomber gap can be found in Brugioni, 1991, pp. 24, 32, 
and 51. 
20 Khrushchev outlined his views on wars of national liberation in a speech on January 6, 1961.  
See “Analysis of the Khrushchev Speech of January 6, 1961,” Hearing before the Subcommittee to 
Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Internal Security Law of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 87th Congress, First Session, June 10, 1961 at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1961-06-16.pdf, pp. 35, 38, 41, and 69. 
21 Kennedy addressed the Soviet threat in the Third World using soft power instruments of 
national power via initiatives such as the Peace Corps and his support for US military special 
operations forces. 
79 
 
with the Soviet Union as a direct threat to the U.S. which they could not tolerate.  
President Eisenhower had also shared this antipathy toward the new regime in 
Cuba and worked up a plan for Cuban exiles to invade the island to overthrow the 
new dictator, Fidel Castro.  President Kennedy inherited this flawed plan, and 
early into his presidency, in April 1961, decided to execute it to rid the Caribbean 
of the Soviet sponsored communist government.  After the failure of the Bay of 
Pigs Invasion, Kennedy continued his plan which focused on assassination plots 
against Fidel Castro and other acts of subversion against the communist 
government in Cuba (U.S. Department of State, The Bay of Pigs Invasion and its 
Aftermath, April 1961-October 1962). 
 Following Castro’s consolidation of power after the revolution, he turned 
to the Soviet Union to form a relationship which included political and military 
support.  President Eisenhower, and later President Kennedy, feared the Soviet 
Union might exploit Cuba’s geographic position near the US mainland as a future 
military base.  Seizing on the fall of Cuba to the communists and the perceived 
US scientific, technical, and strategic nuclear inferiority, the Kennedy campaign 
used these developments in the 1960 presidential campaign against republican 
nominee Richard Nixon.  With President Kennedy’s victory in the November 
1960 election and his January 1961 inauguration, the myth of the missile and 
bomber gap Kennedy claimed in the presidential election was quickly busted.  
The U.S. had been systematically collecting intelligence using the U-2 from July 
4, 1956 until May 1, 1960 and had launched the world’s first space-based imagery 
reconnaissance satellite, Corona, in August 1960 (Clausen & Miller, 2012, p. 1).  
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These two programs provided the Eisenhower Administration and now the 
Kennedy Administration, accurate, comprehensive intelligence assessments of the 
Soviet nuclear arsenal facing the United States and our allies.  In reality, the 
Soviets had only 44 operational intercontinental nuclear weapons poised to attack 
the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison, In The Secret Cuban 
Missile Crisis Documents, 1994).22  Kennedy learned Khrushchev had been 
routinely lying about Soviet nuclear capabilities as a means of masking their 
stark, relative weakness compared with US nuclear capabilities.  Despite clear 
nuclear superiority, President Kennedy further expanded the US nuclear arsenal 
which Eisenhower had rapidly grown under his nuclear strategy of “Massive 
Retaliation”.  According to Graham Allison, by late 1961, prior to the October 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. was deliberately communicating the fact that 
the Soviets were the ones facing a missile gap with the United States (Allision, In 
The Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Documents, 1994).  By late 1962, during the 
crisis, the U.S. possessed such overwhelming nuclear superiority, that it was 
capable of a “successful” nuclear first-strike against the Soviet Union while the 
Soviets were probably not capable of launching a counter-strike against the U.S. 
given their very limited nuclear capabilities. 
 A final component in detailing the strategic context of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis involves exploring Soviet intentions.  The EXCOMM explored this issue at 
                                                 
22 According to Graham Allision, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, US intelligence 
estimated the Soviets possessed 75 operational ICBMs.  Subsequent intelligence indicated the 
Soviets only had 44 operational ICBMs. More recent information suggests the Soviets were not 
confident in that small number of missiles (Allison, In The Secret Cuban Missile Crisis 
Documents,1994). 
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their first meeting and defined the following five hypotheses as an attempt to 
explain the Soviet offensive nuclear weapons deployment to Cuba:23 
• Bargaining Barter – The Soviets intended to use the removal of missiles 
from Cuba as a bargaining chip to trade for US withdrawal of nuclear 
missiles from Turkey, concessions regarding the allied occupation of West 
Berlin, or some other important international issue. 
• Diverting Trap – The Soviets were using the Cuban crisis as a diversion to 
draw US attention and divert US military power towards Cuba, which 
would then allow the Soviets to move against Berlin or some other area of 
concern.  There was precedent for this type of diversion.  While the U.S. 
and the West were focused in 1956 on the Suez Crisis, the Soviets and 
their Warsaw Pact allies invaded Hungary to put down the civil revolt 
against the communist government. 
• Cuban Defense – Fearing a follow-on invasion from the U.S. against 
Cuba, the Soviet Union decided to take concrete action to defend the 
Castro regime from future US aggression and preserve this bastion of 
communism in the Western Hemisphere in violation of the Monroe 
Doctrine. 
• Cold War Politics – The Soviets wanted to test the new US president’s 
resolve/determination.  If Kennedy failed the test to stand up to this Soviet 
challenge, they could exploit their success for propaganda purposes and 
                                                 
23 As summarized by Allison in his introduction to the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Documents, p. 
viii. 
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then go on to challenge U.S. and Western interests in other parts of the 
world to build upon their achievement in Cuba. 
• Missile Power – The Soviets, realizing the Americans had called their 
bluff regarding the non-existent “missile gap”, were placing nuclear 
weapons in Cuba to quickly and decisively correct the now clear nuclear 
imbalance between the Soviet Union and the U.S.  Additionally, Soviet 
missiles in Cuba posed immediate nuclear missile warning challenges for 
the U.S., significantly reducing the warning time available for the US 
president and other national leaders in a nuclear launch against the U.S. 
from Cuba. 
The EXCOMM analyzed each of these motivational hypotheses detailing 
the pros and cons of each approach based on the intelligence available at the time.   
 The EXCOMM rejected the Cuban Defense option because they believed 
the Soviet could have guaranteed Cuba’s territorial integrity and political 
sovereignty at a much lower risk than through the introduction of strategic nuclear 
weapons so close to the United States.  Conventional defense of the island by 
conventional means would have been possible at a much lower risk. 
 Khrushchev, in his memoirs, points to his belief the Americans were intent 
on making a second attempt to invade Cuba to topple Castro’s government.  
According to Allison, Soviet information points to many possible explanations 
regarding their motivation.  Soviet leaders who were close to Khrushchev 
believed his impulsive decision making style, which did not consider a full 
assessment of the risks associated with different courses of action, may have led 
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to his decision to deploy the missiles in Cuba.  Another Soviet theory details 
Khrushchev’s realization, during a trip to Crimea, that US nuclear missiles were 
stationed just across the Black Sea in Turkey, perilously close to Soviet territory.  
Khrushchev wanted to answer that provocation with a similar deployment to 
Cuba.  A final potential explanation suggests Khrushchev was heavily influenced 
by senior leaders of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces to undertake the Cuban 
missile deployment to shift the strategic nuclear equation in the Soviet’s favor. 
 President Kennedy and his EXCOMM advisors were not certain of 
Khrushchev’s motivation but, after initial debate, were resolved to remove this 
new threat to US and hemispheric security either diplomatically or by military 
force.  The president and the EXCOMM recognized the importance of current, 
tactical intelligence as they formulated policy and shaped the US reaction to the 
crisis.  The following section details the sources of US strategic and tactical 
intelligence on the Soviet nuclear deployment in Cuba and assesses the quality of 
warning intelligence the US Intelligence Community provided the president and 
the EXCOMM. 
Warning Intelligence Quality 
Intelligence Sources 
US intelligence on the Soviet offensive nuclear weapon deployment to 
Cuba was based on both human intelligence sources and technical collection 
systems.  Intelligence for human sources was often discounted as unreliable while 
intelligence from imagery sensors was regarded as more accurate and definitive.  
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Specifically, US intelligence on Soviet activities in Cuba came from four key 
sources:  shipping intelligence, refugees, agents within Cuba, and U-2 photo 
reconnaissance overflights (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p. 219).  Each of these 
sources will be explored in the following section. 
Shipping Intelligence - The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) 
systematically collected and analyzed intelligence on Soviet and Soviet Bloc ships 
transiting from the U.S.S.R. to Cuba.  The ONI catalogued the number of ships, 
their size, registry, and the fact that several large-hatch ships were being used to 
transport military equipment to Cuba.  The Soviets used large-hatch ships in their 
timber industry and re-purposed them to ship large, MRBM and IRBM24 missiles 
to Cuba.  The nature of their cargo was closely tracked and included electronic, 
transport, and construction equipment; surface-to-air missiles; MiG fighter jets; 
patrol boats; and Soviet technicians.  The US Navy routinely tracked and 
photographed these ships as part of the intelligence collection effort.  Photo 
interpreters who analyzed this imagery developed a new analytic technique, 
dubbed “crateology”, in which they could determine the type of equipment in 
each of the crates aboard a ship based on the crate’s size and unique shape 
(Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p. 220).  
Refugees - Refugees from Cuba were a second major source of 
intelligence.  The flow of refugee reporting was so great the intelligence 
community established an inter-agency debriefing center in Opa Locka, Florida 
                                                 
24 Medium-range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) and Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) 
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which collected and correlated refugee interrogation reporting.  This reporting 
was used to build a target set for later imagery reconnaissance collection but the 
value of the refuge reporting itself was deemed of marginal value given the large 
number of distorted, inaccurate reports.  Many of the reports included sightings of 
Soviet missiles but the US Intelligence Community assessed their validity as low 
(Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p. 220).   
Agents - The third source of intelligence was a CIA network of agents 
who passed the US Government intelligence based on their access to sensitive 
information in the Cuban government.  Cuban agents would obtain information, 
write up their reports using secret techniques to mask the information and their 
identities and then mail the reports to a third-country address outside Cuba and 
the United States.  The CIA would pick up the reports and send them back to 
Langley for processing and analysis.  Some of these reports proved valuable.  One 
described a large area in western Cuba under heavy Soviet guard and identified a 
specific location where missile work was in progress.  The date of information in 
the report was September 7, it was mailed on September 15, and CIA distributed 
it on September 18 (Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p. 220-221).  Another agent 
report concerned a conversation with Fidel Castro’s personal pilot.  The pilot 
detailed coastal defenses, radars, surface-to-air missile systems, and ballistic 
missile launch equipment.  This reporting was from an observation on September 
9 and was distributed by CIA on September 20.  This type of human intelligence 
reporting was valuable, and CIA used it to develop the imagery target list which 
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would ultimately lead to the discovery of missiles on the October 14 U-2 mission 
(Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p. 221). 
Photo Reconnaissance - Airborne photo reconnaissance was the most 
prolific and most reliable source of intelligence.  The development of the U-2 
aircraft was a true triumph of science and technology and a testament to the 
leadership of President Eisenhower and many in his administration who had the 
insight to see the need for such an extraordinary capability.  The U.S. began 
flying the U-2 in 1956, and at an altitude of 70,000 feet, the aircraft was safe from 
Soviet surface-to-air missile and jet fighter attack at that time.  The aircraft 
contained multiple, conventional, wet-film, high resolution cameras which could 
distinguish objects just a few feet apart from an altitude of 14 miles.  It could also 
image large swaths of territory using panoramic cameras up to 100 miles on each 
side of the aircraft to provide broad area coverage.  Each mission produced 
thousands of feet of film which CIA and US Air Force intelligence professionals 
processed, exploited, and reported on after each mission.  During the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, this work was largely done at the CIA’s National Photographic 
Intelligence Center (NPIC), directed by Arthur Lundahl, using a team of imagery 
analysts from several US Intelligence Community agencies.  The amount of film 
that required processing during peak periods of the crisis was staggering.  For 
example, on October 18, six U-2 missions were flown against Cuba which 
produced 28,000 linear feet (5.3 miles) of film.  NPIC analysts kept up with the 
flow and could interpret and report on that amount of data in about one day 
(Allison and Zelikow, 1999, p. 222).  Unfortunately, no U-2 flights were 
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undertaken over the western part of Cuba between September 5 and October 4 
and it took until October 14 for a U-2 to fly over that part of Cuba to discover 
Soviet offensive missiles.25 
Strategic Intelligence and Warning 
The September 1962 Special National Intelligence Estimate.  The 
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE),26 The Military Buildup in Cuba, of 
September 19, 1962 was written to “assess the strategic and political significance 
of the recent military buildup in Cuba and of the possible future development of 
additional military capabilities there” (CIA, Military Buildup in Cuba, 1962, p. 1).  
US Intelligence Community analysts believed the main Soviet interest in Cuba 
was political and the primary motivation of the Soviet Union in providing military 
assistance to Cuba was to fortify the government against US attempts to change 
the communist regime by force.  The Soviets were working to deter any repeat of 
prior US-sponsored military intervention to overthrow Castro.  The US 
intelligence estimate cautions that any Soviet attempts to turn Cuba into an 
offensive military base of operations might provoke US military intervention and 
defeat their purpose of supporting Castro.  This proved to be a grossly inaccurate 
assessment of Soviet intentions.  The first Soviet nuclear missiles had reached 
Cuba on September 8, 11 days before this assessment was published on 
September 19.  On a more accurate note, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 
                                                 
25 See McCone, February 27, 1963, Memorandum on U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 
14 October 1962 in The Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Documents, pp. 127-137 for additional 
information on the timing of U-2 overflights of Cuba. 
26 A National Intelligence Estimate is a strategic intelligence product coordinated across the US 
Intelligence Community and is a sophisticated, all-source, finished intelligence product the 
community produces for senior-level US Government decision makers. 
88 
 
did highlight as one of its five conclusions that Soviet use of Cuba for offensive 
strategic purposes was not out of the question.  The report stated, “The U.S.S.R. 
could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet 
medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the 
establishment of a Soviet submarine base there” (CIA, Military Buildup in Cuba, 
1962, p. 2).  The report cites a submarine base as being the most likely option.  
That proved to be untrue.  Although Khrushchev had a strong desire to build a 
Soviet nuclear submarine base in Cuba, he thought such a move, at such an early 
stage in the Soviet-Cuban relationship would be too difficult to conceal from 
American intelligence.  A key failure in this National Intelligence Estimate is in 
its assessment of Soviet intent.  The estimate states, “Either development 
(deployment of nuclear missiles or submarine base construction), however, would 
be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we 
presently estimate it” (CIA, Military Buildup in Cuba, 1962, p. 2).  While it was 
factually true the Soviets had never deployed nuclear missiles systems outside the 
Soviet Union prior to this crisis, this judgment represents a failure to creatively 
assess the various possible motivations the Soviet Union would have for making 
such a bold geopolitical move.  The estimate went on to highlight the level of risk 
such a move would entail.  “It would indicate a far great willingness to increase 
the level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the U.S.S.R. has display thus far” 
(CIA, Military Buildup in Cuba, 1962, p. 2).  This statement is certainly true and 
further demonstrates how US intelligence analysts discounted the possibility of a 
Soviet offensive nuclear deployment to Cuba.  Ironically, that is exactly what was 
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happening at the time this assessment was being written, completely unbeknownst 
to the authors. 
The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board report.  On 
February 4, 1963, three months after the crisis, the President’s Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) released a Top Secret assessment of 
intelligence regarding the Soviet military buildup in Cuba.  The PFIAB’s mission 
was to determine what lessons could be learned based on its assessment of how 
the various US foreign intelligence services performed prior to and during the 
crisis.  The report is organized into main sections beginning with the post-October 
14 phase (the date the U-2 first imaged the missile sites) and includes the period 
between missile discovery and the president’s televised address to the nation on 
October 22.  The much longer section of the report covered the pre-crisis phase 
prior to October 14.  Additionally, the PFIAB report is organized around three 
critical components of the US intelligence cycle:  intelligence collection, 
intelligence analysis, and production and dissemination of intelligence in support 
of policy formulation and operational requirements.   
 The PFIAB report is critical of US strategic intelligence warning efforts 
prior to the U-2 missile discovery on October 14, 1962.  The report criticizes the 
US Intelligence Community for not being more effective in collecting adequate, 
timely intelligence regarding the “nature and scope” of Soviet military activities 
in Cuba over the many months of their buildup prior to the crisis.  Additionally, 
the report cites the intelligence community’s failure to exploit existing 
intelligence which had been collected and using that data to better estimate Soviet 
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and Cuban plans and intentions (Killian, President’s Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board [PFIAB] Report, “Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba”, 1963, p. 2).   
Intelligence Collection.  The PFIAB reported two major areas of 
intelligence collection in which the US could have performed better work to 
provide strategic intelligence warning:  1) clandestine agent coverage, also known 
as human intelligence, and 2) aerial photographic surveillance, known as imagery 
intelligence (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 2).  In contrast to the overall 
positive appraisal of the role imagery intelligence played providing tactical 
warning during the actual crisis, the PFIAB determined the US Intelligence 
Community failed to full capitalize on US imagery intelligence capabilities to 
provide strategic warning during the critical Soviet buildup period in September 
and early October 1962.  The report conceded bad weather played a role in 
September in the cancellation of some U-2 missions but also cited a nine-day U-2 
stand down from September 8-16 which adversely impacted the ability to monitor 
Soviet military developments.  The stand down resulted from a decision to 
suspend the flights after a Taiwanese U-2 had gone down over mainland China on 
September 8.  After the suspension was lifted, the CIA failed to intensify U-2 
operations over Cuba in the face of mounting intelligence warning indicators 
pointing towards significantly increased Soviet military activity (Killian, PFIAB 
Report, 1963, p. 3).  These CIA and other intelligence community members 
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believed a policy had been put into place which prohibited the U-2 from 
overflying areas covered by Soviet SA-2 missile systems.27 
 A further complicating factor with the U-2 coverage of Cuba concerned 
State Department uneasiness regarding preservation of US international legal 
rights and the need to fly future reconnaissance missions in international airspace.  
This came to light when on September 10, the CIA proposed to the Special Group 
a U-2 mission which would collect intelligence in international airspace and 
directly overfly Cuba.  The Secretary of State objected to this proposal believing 
if the U-2 were lost over Cuban territory, it would jeopardize future US claims to 
conduct aerial reconnaissance in international airspace.  The Secretary of State 
proposed a compromise to break this single mission into four separate missions 
(two in international airspace and two overlying Cuban territory).  Further 
exacerbating the intelligence collection problem was a CIA weather constraint 
which allowed overflights only if the target area was less than 25 percent 
overcast.  These two issues (the requirement to fly four separate missions and the 
poor weather) further limited U-2 coverage of Cuba in September (Killian, PFIAB 
Report, 1963, p. 4).  The first successful mission was not flown until September 
26 (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 4).  The PFIAB criticized the fact that the 
Special Group was not made aware of these difficulties which might have enabled 
it to modify their policies regarding U-2 flights during this heighten period 
requiring additional imagery collection.   
                                                 
27 The SA-2 surface-to-air missile system was the same system the Soviets used to shot down the 
U-2 Francis Gary Powers was flying on May 1, 1960 over the Soviet Union. 
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The PFIAB report exonerated President Kennedy of any role in limiting 
the U-2 flights by stating, “The President granted authorization for all U-2 flights 
which were recommended to him by his policy advisers on the Special Group28 
having responsibility for such matters” (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 3).  
Likewise, the Special Group was also exonerated and did not limit U-2 
overflights; they approved every U-2 mission proposed (Killian, PFIAB Report, 
1963, p. 3).  Finally, the PFIAB could not find any evidence that a policy which 
prohibited U-2 flights over areas defended with SA-2s existed, despite beliefs 
within the US Intelligence Community to the contrary (Killian, PFIAB Report, 
1963, p. 4).   
 It took until October 3 for the US Intelligence Community to start pressing 
the Special Group for more robust U-2 imagery intelligence collection efforts.29  
Although the threat was increasing during the period prior to October 3 and the 
community’s ability to collect human intelligence (via returning travelers from 
Cuba, foreign diplomats, and refugees), and signals intelligence was inadequate, 
these factors were not enough to motivate US intelligence leaders to request 
                                                 
28 The Special Group was originally formed in the Eisenhower Administration as a mechanism for 
coordinating covert operations.  After the Bay of Pigs failure, this group evolved to include more 
senior-level national security officials with greater responsibility for planning and reviewing 
covert operations.  President Kennedy’s National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy chaired the 
meetings and the group included the Deputy Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The 
DCI was responsible for submitting CIA covert action proposals to the group.  President Kennedy 
also established Special Groups to coordinate activities related to overthrowing the Castro 
government (Operation Mongoose) and to prevent and combat subversive insurgencies against 
friendly governments (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XII, Note on 
U.S. Covert Actions). 
29 DIA took the lead in pressing for the additional U-2 coverage (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 
3).   
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increased imagery intelligence collection via the U-2 program (Killian, PFIAB 
Report, 1963, pp. 3-4). 
Regarding low-level tactical imagery collection, the Director of Central 
Intelligence, John McCone proposed low-level imagery reconnaissance in August 
and September.  When the Special Group considered this proposal on September 
14, the Secretary of Defense, probably concerned about the risk to US aircrew 
members and aircraft, indicated his desire to wait for the results of the U-2 
missions before undertaking the more dangerous tactical reconnaissance flights.  
The PFIAB credited the defense secretary with using this wise logic but criticized 
the Special Group for not reexamining the situation in light of the limited U-2 
coverage and not considering the low-level reconnaissance option to fill gaps in 
the limited U-2 collection.  No low-level flights were made over Cuba until 
October 23 (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 5). 
Intelligence Analysis.  The PFIAB cited the need for improved processes 
in producing National Intelligence Estimates and current intelligence analysis.  
The board was especially critical of the September 19, National Intelligence 
Estimate titled The Military Buildup in Cuba, and concluded “the President and 
policy-advisory officials were ill served by this assessment of Soviet intentions 
regarding Cuba.”  The key point of contention was the estimate’s conclusion that 
“the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in 
Cuba would be inconsistent with Soviet practices to date and with Soviet policy 
as the community then assessed it” (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 5).  The 
ultimate irony lies in the fact that the intelligence community arrived at this 
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wildly inaccurate conclusion at the very time the Soviet were installing their 
nuclear missile systems in Cuba.  The report cited three main reasons for this 
analytic judgment failure: 
1) The lack of adequate intelligence coverage of Cuba 
2) The rigor with which the view was held that the Soviet Union would not 
assume the risks entailed in establishing nuclear striking forces on Cuban 
soil 
3) The absence of an imaginative appraisal of the intelligence indicators 
which, although limited in number, were contained in reports disseminated 
by our intelligence agencies (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 5) 
 The board further criticized the intelligence community’s analytic effort 
prior to the crisis.  More specifically the board faulted the community in its 
analysis of intelligence indicators and production of current intelligence reports 
which failed to inform key US Government officials of the types of activities the 
Soviets were conducting on Cuba in the months prior to confirmation of missiles 
on October 15.  The report highlights the gravity of strategic surprise, the 
avoidance of which is the key mission of intelligence agencies, which befell the 
US senior leadership at the onset of this crisis. 
We believe that the near-total intelligence surprise experienced by the 
United States with respect to the introduction and deployment of Soviet 
strategic missiles in Cuba resulted in a large part from a malfunction of the 
analytic process by which intelligence indicators are assessed and 
reported.  This malfunction diminished the effectiveness of policy 
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advisers, national intelligence estimators, and civilian and military officers 
having command responsibilities. (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 6) 
The PFIAB study stated the way intelligence indicators were handled in 
the Cuba situation may have been the “most serious flaw in our intelligence 
system, and one which, if uncorrected, could lead to the gravest consequences” 
(Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 6).  The failure of the US indications and 
warning system had three major consequences from a policy maker perspective: 
1) The US Government was not provided the early warning of hostile 
intentions and capabilities which should have been derived from the 
indicators contained in the available intelligence. 
2) The President and his senior advisors were not provided meaningful, 
cumulative assessments of the available intelligence indicators.  If the 
intelligence community had systematically prepared and periodically 
presented compilations of accumulated indicators, policy makers could 
have considered appropriate courses of action in response to those 
developments.  The board faulted the intelligence community for 
providing select raw intelligence reporting to White House staff members 
vice finished analysis.  The significance of the increasingly alarming 
indicators was not communicated to the President. 
3) The intelligence community, despite the mounting shift in indicators 
regarding the Soviet military buildup in Cuba, failed to revise the 
erroneous National Intelligence Estimate of September 19 (Killian, PFIAB 
Report, 1963, pp. 6-7). 
96 
 
 Specifically, the board faulted US intelligence for failing to assess the 
nature of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba given the mounting intelligence 
which pointed to an increasingly threatening situation for the U.S.  US indications 
and warning analysts had intelligence which pointed to various aspects of the 
build-up including: 
• The presence in Cuba of high-ranking Soviet military officials who 
specialized in military construction, engineering, electronics, jet pilot 
training, surface-to-air missile defenses and Soviet long-range air and 
strategic strike forces 
• Soviet specialists in rocketry and atomic arms 
• Statements made by senior Castro regime officials about expectation of a 
nuclear delivery capability would be established in Cuba 
• Sightings by ground observers of offensive missiles deployed under strict 
Soviet control and constructed with great secrecy 
• The increasing scale of Soviet troops, arms, and military equipment and 
materiel in large volumes and maintained under strict secrecy 
• A significant increase in the amount of Soviet-bloc ships entering Cuba 
(from 30 arrivals/month from January-July 1962 to 67 arrivals in 
September 1962) (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, pp. 7-8). 
Despite this intelligence, US intelligence analysts failed to see how this 
information pointed to the induction of Soviet nuclear weapons systems in Cuba 
prior to obtaining definitive photographic evidence from the October 14, 1962 U-
2 mission.  The PFIAB recommended a “further and exhaustive examination” of 
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the complex task of assessing intelligence indicators, across the entire intelligence 
community (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 7). 
Intelligence Reporting.  The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board concluded restrictions placed on the publication and dissemination of 
reports were often “misinterpreted or misapplied” and this restricted the flow of 
important information (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 8). 
 The following is an example of a restriction based within the intelligence 
community that was a critical error that contributed to the strategic surprise the 
U.S. faced on October 15.  The CIA Director instructed his analysts, as of May 
1962, to verify order of battle information derived from human intelligence 
reporting using imagery intelligence from the NPIC.  The CIA Director did not 
have high confidence in the accuracy of reports from refugees and agents and 
sought to confirm the number and type of Soviet and Cuban military equipment 
using a more objective source, imagery intelligence.  CIA analysis interpreted this 
directive to mean order of battle information could not be reported unless it was 
verified via imagery from NPIC.  As increasing intelligence evidence mounted of 
the Soviet build-up in Cuba, CIA analysts did not publish that material, not even 
in the President’s Daily Checklist, his daily current intelligence summary, in the 
lead up to the crisis (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 8).  
 President Kennedy also contributed to this problem when he imposed his 
own restrictions on the publication of intelligence related to offensive weapons in 
Cuba on August 31.  The PFIAB report goes on to emphasize, “On October 9 
these instructions were reiterated by the President who emphasized the 
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importance of maintaining the tightest possible control of all information relating 
to offensive weapons” (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 8).  To further clarify the 
President’s instructions, he did not seek to impose limitations on the collection 
and analysis of offensive weapons in Cuba and he emphasized all such 
intelligence should be collected, analyzed, and quickly reported to officials with a 
need-to-know.  However, these instructions were interpreted to mean no 
intelligence assessment were allowed in print on this topic in any intelligence 
publication.  Although the Director of Central Intelligence exempted the 
President’s Intelligence Checklist from this prohibition, the source materials for 
this publication were subject to the restriction and thus the President’s Daily 
Checklist authors were choked off from reporting on the Soviet military buildup 
on Cuba (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, pp. 8-9). 
 The PFIAB’s conclusion on presidential involvement on restricting 
intelligence publication is generous to President Kennedy calling the decision 
“clearly wise, necessary and essential to the national interest” (Killian, PFIAB 
Report, 1963, p. 9).  However, it did concede that the misinterpretations of 
restrictions did endanger the necessary information flow and suggested that 
future, more secure lines of communication should be established to provide 
decision makers with critical, sensitive intelligence material (Killian, PFIAB 
Report, 1963, p. 9). 
Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone’s response to the 
PFIAB findings.  Based on what John Mc Cone perceived to be as excessive 
criticisms of the CIA, especially in the period prior to the discovery of the Soviet 
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missiles in Cuba, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) responded to the 
PFIAB’s findings in a memo he sent the president on February 28, 1963.  The 
DCI pointed out the reluctance of Special Group members to authorize overflight 
of Cuba after surface-to-air missiles were discovered.  This caution was fueled by 
memories of the Francis Gary Powers U-2 shootdown over the Soviet Union on 
May 1, 1960, the recent loss of a Taiwanese U-2 over mainland China, and a U-2 
incursion of Soviet airspace near Sakhalin Island in early September 1962 (J. 
McCone, Memorandum for the President, February 28, 1963, p. 1).  McCone 
pushed back against those who in retrospect believed the US Intelligence 
Community failed to move with the proper sense of urgency in stepping up U-2 
flights given the SA-2 threat on Cuba and the past incidents referenced above.   
Regarding the quality of analysis, the US Government provided during the 
crises, McCone believed that intelligence and other analysts were “so convinced 
that the Soviets would not accept the inevitable confrontation resulting from 
placement of offensive missiles in Cuba, that they were inclined to dismiss such 
evidence as there was to the contrary.”  McCone stated the intelligence 
community had been inundated with many reports of missiles in Cuba over the 
previous two years, all of which proved to be incorrect until September 20, 1963.  
The large number of reports may have de-sensitized the intelligence community 
and deepened skepticism among analysts toward the potential Soviet missile 
deployment.  Yet, McCone contended the US Intelligence Community performed 
well (J. McCone, Memorandum for the President, February 28, 1963, p. 2). 
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McCone performed his own after-action study, at President Kennedy’s 
request, on the performance of the US Intelligence Community which he made 
available to the PFIAB.  McCone stated he believed his study reflected “a more 
reasonable judgement of the performance of the intelligence community in the six 
months’ period prior to the October crisis” (J. McCone, Memorandum for the 
President, February 28, 1963, p. 2).  The following summarizes DCI McCone’s 
10 conclusions regarding intelligence quality, which he forwarded to President 
Kennedy as an attachment to his February 28, 1963 letter: 
1. Despite some need for improvement in intelligence collection and 
processing, the US Intelligence Community operated “extensively and 
well” during the Cuba Crisis.  “Every major weapon system introduced 
into Cuba by the Soviets was detected, identified, and reported (with 
respect to numbers, location and operational characteristics) before any 
one of these systems attained an operational capability.”  
2. There was a very narrow time gap between the introduction of strategic 
weapons in Cuba and the beginning of intelligence reporting on their 
presence.  The intelligence cycle moved quickly in response to this 
development. 
3. Existing US intelligence focus on Cuba contributed to the detection and 
analysis of Soviet activities on the island. 
4. Intelligence information was disseminated and used by decision makers. 
5. Airborne imagery collection was very effective and the best source for 
“establishing hard intelligence.” 
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6. Although restrictions hampered acquiring airborne imagery, the delay was 
not critical because imagery obtained before October 17 was insufficient 
in prompting action from our Western Hemisphere NATO allies. 
7. Human intelligence reporting was useful but did not provide significant 
information on offensive missiles until after mid-September.  At that point 
it was used to target airborne imagery collection of missile sites. 
8. Information dissemination restrictions were in place, but they did not 
necessarily affect analytic work or policymaker actions. 
9. Concerning the September 19 National Intelligence Estimate which 
downplayed the potential for a Soviet missile deployment in Cuba, 
McCone admitted analysts placed great weight on their belief concerning 
the improbability of such a development based on their mistaken 
assessment of Soviet intentions and risk tolerance and despite the physical 
indicators pointing towards a missile deployment. 
10. The October 19 estimate on probable Soviet reactions was correct. (J. 
McCone, Memorandum for the President, February 28, 1963, p. 3) 
Tactical Intelligence and Warning 
The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board report.  In 
contrast to the quality of strategic intelligence warning, the PFIAB report is much 
more laudatory towards the US Intelligence Community concerning tactical 
intelligence support to decision making during the period after the U-2 made the 
initial discovery of the missiles on October 14.  The definitive proof the Soviet 
missiles in Cuba was obtained through aerial U-2 imagery and the PFIAB credited 
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these and other low-level photo reconnaissance flights with success.  US imagery 
intelligence professionals promptly processed the conventional film and the 
resulting imagery interpretations were quickly submitted to the president “in time 
for decisive action before the Soviet MRBM and IRBM30 systems became fully 
operational” (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, pp. 1-2).  The report went on to state: 
Beginning with the President’s initial receipt of this crucial intelligence, 
there was an effective performance on the part of the U.S. intelligence 
community in providing the President and his top policy advisers promptly 
with the coordinated intelligence necessary to enable our Government to 
respond effectively to the offensive missile threat in Cuba. (Killian, 
PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 2) 
Imagery played a critical role in keeping the president informed of Soviet 
activities in Cuba, the PFIAB members cited “the skillful analysis of the data 
produced by photographic interpreters” (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 2).  They 
also highlighted “the use of intelligence previously obtained concerning strategic 
missile and air defense installations within the Soviet Union in determining the 
nature and extent of similar capabilities in Cuba” (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 
2).  This probably refers to the scientific and technical intelligence Soviet Colonel 
Oleg Penkovsky provided the U.S. which aided in assessing Soviet missile 
capabilities.31   
                                                 
30 MRBM – Medium-range Ballistic Missile and IRBM – Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile 
31 The KGB arrested Penkovsky in Moscow on October 22, 1963 during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
A Soviet court found him guilty of espionage and he was executed on May 16, 1963 in the 
Moscow KGB Lubyanka Prison (Central Intelligence Agency, “The Capture and Execution of 
Colonel Penkovsky, 1963”, 2010). 
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Warning Intelligence Assessment 
 This section provides an evaluation of quality of the warning intelligence 
President Kennedy and the EXCOMM received during the Cuban missile crisis 
based on the eight factors defining intelligence excellence in JCS Joint 
Publication 2.0, Joint Intelligence.  In many cases a distinction will be made 
between the strategic warning that was produced prior to the discovery of missiles 
in Cuba with the October 14 U-2 flight and tactical warning intelligence that was 
produced from October 14 until the end of the crisis on October 28.  An 
overarching theme of the discussion below revolves around Soviet success in 
achieving strategic surprise against the U.S., the very goal strategic warning is 
designed to prevent.  In contrast, US intelligence performed exceptionally well 
after the missiles were discovered on October 14 in providing tactical warning 
and supporting the president and the EXCOMM during the tensest days of the 
crisis.  According to the US JCS definition, quality intelligence is:  anticipatory, 
timely, accurate, usable, complete, relevent, objective, and available.  This 
analysis will address each of these factors to assess the overall quality of 
intelligence President Kennedy received to help him formulate current situation 
assessments. 
 Anticipatory – From a strategic warning perspective, the US Intelligence 
Community made the mistaken judgment that the Soviets would not take the risk 
of placing strategic weapons in Cuba and this false assumption was reinforced by 
the fact that the Soviets had never taken such action in the past.  US analysts were 
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aware of and reported on the Soviet military buildup on Cuba but characterized it 
as defensive in nature.   
 Timely – The US Intelligence Community did not provide the Kennedy 
administration timely strategic warning.  The Soviet Union introduced offensive 
nuclear weapons systems in Cuba on September 8 and it took the community until 
October 1532, 37 days, to detect those missiles.  In contrast, after the U.S. 
discovered the missiles, the US Intelligence Community collected, processed, 
interpreted, and reported imagery derived intelligence “to the President in time for 
decisive action before the Soviet MRBM and IRBM systems became fully 
operational” (Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, p. 1) 
 Accurate – The intelligence President Kennedy received concerning 
increased Soviet arms transfers and Soviet technical support to the Cuban armed 
forces was accurate.  The intelligence community assessment was consistent with 
Soviet statements emphasizing the defensive nature of those weapons transfers.  A 
critical pre-crisis inaccuracy, of course, was contained in the Special National 
Intelligence Estimate of September 19, 1962 in which the community downplayed 
the likelihood of the Soviets placing offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba, based on 
the lack of a historical precedent and the analytic assessment that the Soviets 
would not be so bold as to take that level of risk. 
 Usable – US intelligence analysts tailored reporting formats to President 
Kennedy’s information processing style.  In the lead up to the crisis, Kennedy’s 
                                                 
32 The U-2 mission was flown on October 14 and the imagery intelligence exploitation which 
discovered the missiles was conducted on October 15, 1962. 
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primary mechanism for receiving daily, current intelligence reporting was a 
written product, a digest of the most important issue, tailored specifically for him 
called the President’s Intelligence Checklist (PICL).  According to David Priess, 
who recently completed a book detailing the history and evolution of intelligence 
support to the office of the president from Kennedy to Obama, Kennedy made 
extensive use of this product containing short, crisp, hard-hitting articles and he 
read it daily to remain informed of current world events.  The PICL did contain 
articles on Cuba prior to the crises but did not contain any warning of strategic 
offensive weapons in Cuba.  During the crisis, the mode of providing intelligence 
to the president on Cuba shifted to daily briefings which CIA missile experts and 
imagery analysts from the National Photographic Intelligence Center.  This more 
direct, interactive format allowed President Kennedy to talk with the analysts, 
question their sources, better understand knowledge gaps, and get immediate 
answers to technical capability questions.  This adaptation clearly served the 
president and his advisor well and allowed for a faster-paced decision cycle than a 
written product could support.  CIA still produced the PICL during the crisis, but 
its authors/editors made the deliberate choice to not include Cuba-crisis related 
material in the document since Kennedy was receiving robust intelligence support 
through the briefing process.  The PICL did concentrate on keeping President 
Kennedy informed on other global issues outside Cuba. 
 Complete – Unfortunately, the intelligence picture reaching the president 
prior to the first photographic evidence of the missiles in Cuba which President 
Kennedy received on October 16, was not complete.  The fact that his 
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understanding of what was really happening in Cuba in September and the first 
half of October was not complete is one of the major factors which led to the 
strategic surprise which shocked the administration when it learned of the Soviet 
missile deployment in Cuba.  Although warning intelligence indicators were 
active, based on human intelligence reporting, which pointed to Soviet offensive 
activity in Cuba, the US Intelligence Community was unable to confirm that 
activity until the U-2 provided the photographic hard evidence.  The U-2 
operational stand down was a self-inflicted limitation which delayed the discovery 
of the Soviet weapons.  The internal CIA clampdown on intelligence production 
specifically related to Soviet offensive arms in Cuba may have also prevented 
more frequent and extensive coverage of that critical topic in the PICL since 
content for the president’s daily intelligence summary was derived from other 
CIA daily, current intelligence products subject to this gag order.  During the 
crises, these two factors were no longer in play.  U-2 flights had resumed and 
imagery collection from that platform as well as from low-level photo 
reconnaissance aircraft dramatically increased to provide a very robust flow of 
tactical warning intelligence.  Additionally, the president had a much more 
complete picture of the ground truth in Cuba during the crisis.  He had direct 
access in his intelligence briefings to senior, experienced intelligence analysts 
who prepared the briefing material.  The gag order did not impede any 
intelligence flow to the president during the actual crises period. 
 Relevant – The intelligence the president received on Cuba prior to the 
missile discovery was relevant and emphasized the commonly held view that the 
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Soviets were supporting their new communist client state in the Western 
Hemisphere with weapons designed to prevent any further attempts to overthrow 
the regime through armed force.   
 Objective – Overall, it appears the US intelligence community produced 
objective intelligence for President Kennedy prior to and during the crisis.  There 
is no evidence any of the intelligence was designed to push the president towards 
any specific policy direction or confine the president’s policy options.  However, 
the president’s sensitivity to republican charges of allowing a Soviet communist 
base of operations to exist and grow 90 miles off the Florida coast, and Kennedy’s 
public statements that the Soviets were not placing offensive weapons in Cuba led 
him to become highly sensitive concerning intelligence leaks about offensive 
weapons in Cuba.  The resulting internal CIA policies designed to limit 
intelligence analytic production, may have led to some self-censorship which 
would have damaged the overall analytic effort.33  One could argue the September 
1962 SNIE assessment that the Russian were unlikely to deploy offensive systems 
in Cuba might have resulted from an unintentional “mirror imaging” analytic bias.   
 Available – In general terms, President Kennedy had access to intelligence 
on Cuba and the PICL was the main conduit between CIA and the president prior 
                                                 
33 The February 1963 PFIAB study and DCI McCone’s February 28, 1963 response to that study 
both downplayed any adverse impact on President Kennedy’s intelligence dissemination 
restrictions.  The PFIAB stated, “The President’s directive restricting the publication of 
intelligence on offensive weapons was clearly wise, necessary, and essential to the national 
interest” (Killian, PFIAB Report, p. 9).  DCI McCone stated, “there is no indication that these 
restrictions necessarily affected analytical work or actions by policy-makers.” (J. McCone, 
Memorandum for the President, February 28, 1963, p. 4).  However, the PFIAB noted, “the 
misinterpretations of this directive endangered the necessary flow of information…” (Killian, 
PFIAB Report, p. 9).   
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to the crisis.  The president was interested and mentally engaged with his duty to 
stay abreast of fast-moving international events.  He would actively question the 
assessments in the PICL, would make margin notes with questions which his staff 
would than refer to CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence, and was known to 
surprise analysts in that office with his occasional direct phone calls to ask 
questions or seek clarification to an article he had read in the PICL (Priess, 2016, 
pp. 25-32).  Additionally, the president had periodic meetings with his Director of 
Central Intelligence, John McCone, which provided opportunities for the 
president to gain insights on intelligence issues.   
Despite the president’s interest and a routinize mechanism for providing 
him intelligence, the PFIAB report was highly critical of the failure of the US 
Intelligence Community to provide the president “at appropriate intervals with 
meaningful, cumulative assessments of the available intelligence indicators” 
(Killian, PFIAB Report, 1963, pp. 6-7).  The failure of the US Intelligence 
Community to provide comprehensive analytic assessments to the president based 
on the active warning indicators was one of the key strategic warning failures of 
this crisis. 
Warning Receptivity  
To gauge warning receptivity, two key questions come into play:  1) To 
what degree did senior leaders believe in the seriousness of the threat? and 2) To 
what extent did senior leaders trust the intelligence provided?  These questions 
largely hinge on the level of professional trust the president and his senior policy 
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advisors had in the intelligence community in general and in the leadership, 
primarily the DCI, who directs the US Intelligence Community.  In terms of his 
presidency, Kennedy’s professional relationship with the US Intelligence 
Community began with a series of briefing he received from DCI Allen Dulles as 
a candidate in the summer of 1960.  President Eisenhower wanted to extend 
access to US intelligence to both Kennedy and Nixon to continue the practice 
which President Truman offered him when he was running for president in 1952.  
After the election, DCI Dulles wanted to quickly establish that he and the US 
Intelligence Community were fully behind the new democratic president (A. 
Dulles, My Answer on the Bay of Pigs, unpublished draft, October 1965, as cited 
in Helgerson, 1996).  Both DCI Dulles and Kennedy were interested in 
developing a positive, professional relationship. 
 The relationship between senior decision makers and the intelligence 
professionals who provide them the key international security information they 
need to make decisions is an important part in how receptive leaders are to 
intelligence.  President Kennedy, by nature, was highly inquisitive, and especially 
after the Bay of Pigs failure, was determined to not be overly influenced by 
experts.  He had a drive to obtain, digest, and analyze information from a wide 
variety of sources.  McGeorge Bundy summarized Kennedy’s receptivity and 
need for information in an oral history interview from March 1964: 
…the simplest and most basic rule about my part of his affairs was his 
eagerness to know anything that he might have to or might wish to act on.  
So that one was most sharply sensitive…to the need to make sure that he 
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did hear either reports of events abroad, or differences of views 
developing within the government, or matters that would become public 
which are always important to any president….So, the first rule I would 
set is that you made sure that the President was informed. (M. Bundy Oral 
History Interview, JFK#1, 3/1964, p. 1) 
The New President’s Intelligence Immersion 
Kennedy was no stranger to intelligence upon entering office as president.  
He had access to key intelligence assessments, including National Intelligence 
Estimates, and intelligence briefings on the Soviet strategic nuclear missile 
program while serving on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  However, 
President Kennedy’s access to additional intelligence and a more fuller 
understanding of the complete array of US intelligence capabilities began after his 
nomination as the Democratic candidate for president in the summer of 1960.  
President Eisenhower sent telegrams on July 18, 1960 to both Kennedy and his 
running mate Lyndon Johnson offering them CIA intelligence.  Kennedy 
immediately accepted the offer and his first intelligence briefing was on Saturday, 
July 23 at the Kennedy vacation home in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts.  DCI 
Allen Dulles conducted the presentation, which lasted over two hours.  The CIA 
history of this first of several intelligence briefings to Kennedy recounts: 
In that first round of briefings, the DCI put heavy emphasis on Soviet 
issues, including Soviet progress in strategic delivery capabilities, 
missiles, and bombers, and discussed the nuclear testing issue.  He also 
reviewed Soviet statements on Berlin and Sino-Soviet cooperation.  Dulles 
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went over the latest intelligence on the Taiwan Straits situation; Middle 
East politics, particularly events in Iran; France's anticolonial problems in 
Algeria and Belgium's in the Congo and Cuba. (Helgerson, 1996) 
Dulles found Kennedy highly interested in the briefing topics and noted 
Kennedy wanted to learn more about potential foreign policy trouble spots which 
might emerge during the final phase of the presidential campaign.  It is insightful 
to learn what candidate Kennedy thought was most important and his level of 
interest in using the CIA to inform his view of potential crises and foreign policy 
problems.  At the end of his first intelligence briefing, Kennedy asked DCI Dulles 
to prepare information on the likelihood of a People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
attack against the offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits and about the status of 
international diplomatic efforts aimed at limiting nuclear testing.  More generally 
Kennedy requested information about all potential trouble spots.  Scheduling 
difficulties precluded Kennedy from receiving his next intelligence briefing for 
almost two months (Helgerson, 1996).  Kennedy also displayed an interest in 
learning more about the most advanced US intelligence collection capabilities.  
On September 25, 1960 Kennedy asked for information on intelligence 
capabilities to replace the suspended U-2 aerial reconnaissance program over the 
Soviet Union but DCI Dulles did not provide him with information about the new 
US “Corona” satellite imagery program which had its first successful launch in 
August and subsequently became fully operational in December 1960.  Kennedy 
received two more intelligence briefings as a presidential candidate on September 
19 and November 2 (Helgerson, 1996). 
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 After winning the election on November 8, Kennedy quickly announced 
his first two presidential appointments, keeping, J. Edgar Hoover as Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director and Allen Dulles as Director of Central 
Intelligence.  Dulles, having just served in the republican administration of 
President Eisenhower, moved quickly to establish the CIA as being fully 
supportive of the new president.  “We made it clear to him that from this time on, 
any information he desired was at his immediate disposal and would be willingly 
given" (Helgerson, 1996).  At the personal level, Allen Dulles was also working 
hard to solidify his personal standing with Kennedy.  The new president-elect 
received a more in-depth, sensitive CIA intelligence briefing on November 18 
which included information on CIA covert action programs.  As part of the 
approximately two-and-a-half-hour session, Kennedy received a 30-45-minute 
briefing on the Bay of Pigs operation the Eisenhower Administration had been 
planning.  Richard Bissell, the CIA Deputy Director for Plans (Operations), 
recalled Kennedy "was almost entirely a listener--although a very good listener.  
Kennedy had a number of questions that grew out of the briefing, but he had not 
prepared a list of questions ahead of time” (Helgerson, 1996).  Both Dulles and 
Bissel believed the new president had a favorable attitude towards CIA covert 
operations directed against Cuba and the CIA leaders continued agency planning 
for a potential CIA-sponsored Cuban invasion (Helgerson, 1996).   
 Demonstrating his interest and desire to learn more about US intelligence, 
president-elect Kennedy decided to visit CIA Headquarters on December 16, 
during the transition.  DCI Dulles planned a very ambitious agenda to impress and 
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further educate the incoming president on US intelligence.  He directed 
Huntington Sheldon, the Director of Current Intelligence, to develop a briefing 
book for the DCI with material he and other senior CIA officials should use in 
their upcoming discussions with Kennedy.  Presentation were scheduled to 
discuss the CIA mission, organization, budget, and legal authorities.  
Congressional relations, as well as the missions of the Watch Committee, the 
President’s Board of Consultants, and other members of the US Intelligence 
Community were also on the extensive agenda.  Unfortunately, Kennedy had to 
cancel this visit, but he was able to make it to CIA Headquarters for an 
abbreviated program after the inauguration on January 26, 1961.  The 90-minute, 
re-scheduled event was even further shortened when the new president took 
interest in a history of US intelligence exhibit with materials on loan from the 
Houghton Library at his alma mater, Harvard University (Helgerson, 1996).   
Bay of Pigs Effect on Intelligence Receptivity 
The relationship between President Kennedy and the CIA evolved 
between the Bay of Pigs disaster in April 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
October 1962.  Kennedy inherited the Bay of Pigs Cuban invasion plan from the 
Eisenhower Administration.  The new president went ahead with the plan based, 
in part, on the impressive reputation for covert action his inherited DCI Allen 
Dulles had earned during the Eisenhower Administration in Iran and Guatemala.  
Richard Bissel, the key CIA man in charge of this covert operation was also well 
respected as the father of the U-2 program who had studied economics with 
Kennedy’s National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy at Yale (May and 
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Zelikow, 1997, p. 25).  Kennedy emphasized to both Dulles and Bissel that under 
no circumstances would he approve the use of US military forces during the Bay 
of Pigs invasion.  When Castro’s forces were on the verge of crushing the US-
backed forces, Bissell pleaded with the president for US Navy and Air Force 
intervention, which Kennedy denied (May and Zelikow, 1997, p. 25).  Kennedy’s 
failure to use US military power in support of the Cuban exile invasion force led 
to anger and contempt from several senior military officers in the US Navy and 
Air Force as well as in the CIA’s Clandestine Service (May and Zelikow, 1997, p. 
26).  In the aftermath of the failed invasion, which embarrassed the president 
early in his term, Kennedy declined to publicly criticize the CIA.  Accepting full 
responsivity for the failure, Kennedy stated, “There’s an old saying that victory 
has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan….I am the responsible officer of 
this government” (May and Zelikow, 1997, pp. 25-26).  While Kennedy was 
publicly magnanimous, he later told both Dulles and Bissell they would have to 
leave his administration.  The president told them, “In a parliamentary system I 
would resign….In our system the President can’t and doesn’t.  So, you…must go” 
(May and Zelikow, 1997, p. 26).  According to Schlesinger, he, the president, and 
Vice-President Johnson discussed some of the lessons learned after the Bay of 
Pigs:  
The President said that he could not understand how men like Dulles and 
Bissell, so intelligent and so experienced, could have been so wrong, but 
added that nothing could be done about CIA immediately.  So long as he 
kept Dulles there, he said, the Republicans would be disinclined to attack 
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the administration over the Cuban failure.  The vice-president vigorously 
agreed. (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 290) 
While Kennedy took full responsibility publicly, privately he “deeply 
resented what he perceived as CIA mismanagement, and the following year he 
replaced both Allen W. Dulles, the CIA near-legendary director, and Richard 
Bissell, the head of its Clandestine Service” (Roberts, 2014, p. 20).  Kennedy 
lamented: 
I probably made a mistake in keeping Allen Dulles on.  It’s not that Dulles 
is not a man of great ability.  He is.  But I have never worked with him, 
and therefore I can’t estimate his meaning when he tells me 
things…Dulles is a legendary figure, and it’s hard to operate with 
legendary figures. (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 276)   
The president, realizing he needed to make a leadership change stating, 
“We will have to do something (referring to CIA)….I must have someone there 
with whom I can be in complete and intimate contact-someone from whom I 
know I will be getting the exact pitch.”  Regretting he had not placed his brother, 
Robert Kennedy in the job of DCI, the president confided,  
I made a mistake in putting Bobby in the Justice Department.  He is 
wasted there; Byron White could do that job perfectly well.  Bobby should 
be in CIA…It is a hell of a way to learn things, but I have learned one 
thing from this business-that is, that we will have to deal with CIA.  
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McNamara has dealt with Defense; Rusk has done a lot with State; but no 
one has dealt with CIA. (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 276) 
Seeking a replacement for Allen Dulles as DCI, the president found John 
McCone, a republican close to President Eisenhower as head of the Atomic 
Energy Commission.  President Kennedy, while in the US Senate, came to respect 
McCone for his leadership of the highly classified US nuclear weapons program 
and the candor in which he answered questions before Senate committees 
regarding sensitive nuclear test-ban issues (May and Zelikow, 1997, p. 27).  
Kennedy trusted McCone based on his experience while in the Senate.  
Additionally, McGeorge Bundy placed some veteran CIA officers on the White 
House staff and found other ways of working closely with the CIA.  Sixteen 
months after the disastrous Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy, Bundy, and the 
president’s most senior advisors “would have an understanding of intelligence not 
only far beyond what they had had in 1961 but well beyond that in most 
subsequent administrations” (May and Zelikow, 1997, p. 27).  The Bay of Pigs 
affair had taught the president to listen to a wide variety of advisors. 
The Kennedy-McCone Relationship 
Following the Bay of Pigs disaster early in his presidency, Kennedy 
decided he needed to make a change in the senior leadership of the intelligence 
community.  Kennedy sought out a conservative to give CIA some protection in 
Congress and found McCone, who he knew from his time in the Senate when 
McCone served as Director of the Atomic Energy Commission.  According to 
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Arthur Schlesinger (1965), McCone “had the reputation of rigid cold-warrior who 
viewed the world in moralistic stereotypes” (p. 429).   
President Kennedy made the formal announcement of McCone’s 
appointment on September 27, 1961 at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode 
Island.  President Kennedy was effusive in his praise for John McCone: 
We are both extremely pleased and satisfied that Mr. John McCone who 
has served his country in important position of responsibility as 
Undersecretary of the Air Force in the administration of President 
Truman, as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in the 
administration of President Eisenhower, has agreed to once more come 
and accept a position of high responsibility.  He has had broad experience.  
Coming once again to Washington represents a real sacrifice for him.  I 
know that all of us who are concerned with our present responsibilities are 
extremely happy to have his counsel, extremely happy to have him 
associated with us. (J. Kennedy, Remarks of the President Announcing the 
Appointment of John McCone as the Director of CIA, September 27, 
1961, p. 1) 
The president’s remarks at the ceremony thanking DCI Dulles for his long period 
of dedicated service to the United States were equally gracious,  
I would like to say one word about my very strong feelings of appreciation 
and regard for the present Director of Central Intelligence Agency.  He has 
a record almost unique—if not unique in the history of this country, he has 
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served under eight Presidents of the United States, beginning with 
President Wilson in World War One—Presidents of different Parties, 
serving during different times with different problems.  He has brought to 
their service on each occasion and in each administration a unique regard 
for the public interest.  I know of no man who is a more courageous, 
selfless public servant than Mr. Allen Dulles, and I therefore, in 
expressing pleasure at having secured the services of McCone, want to 
express my profound regret that at the age of 68, after ten years in this 
responsibility, that Mr. Dulles should be retiring.  He has agreed to 
continue to serve as a Consultant to me on Intelligence matters, and 
therefore his long experience will be available to the people of this 
country. (J. Kennedy, Remarks of the President Announcing the 
Appointment of John McCone as the Director of CIA, September 27, 
1961, p. 1) 
While these two statements may be regarded as normal, perfunctory 
statements made by presidents as they introduce new senior, cabinet-level 
officials, they also represent President Kennedy’s effort to highlight the 
importance of intelligence and demonstrate his desire to maintain a positive, 
productive, receptive relationship with his new senior intelligence leader.  These 
statements also sent a powerful message of support for the men and women, at the 
working level, who collected and analyzed intelligence in support of the 
president’s foreign and defense policies.  McCone, in response, signaled his 
dedication to the president, stating, “Mr. President, Admiral Allen:  I appreciate 
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very much your expression of confidence.  Mr. President, you mentioned 
sacrifice.  I wish to assure you that in my mind, the opportunity to serve my 
country in this capacity is a very definite privilege” (J. Kennedy, Remarks of the 
President Announcing the Appointment of John McCone as the Director of CIA, 
September 27, 1961, p. 1). 
President Kennedy sought to strengthen the role of the DCI in managing 
all agencies within the US Intelligence Community and empowered McCone to 
do just that by formally charging his new DCI with the following responsibilities 
in a memo dated January 16, 1962, charging Mr. McCone to: 
• Serve as the Government’s principal foreign intelligence officer – 
coordinate and provide effective guidance of the total US foreign 
intelligence effort 
• Assure proper coordination, correlation, and evaluation of 
intelligence from all sources and its prompt dissemination to the 
President and other recipients as appropriate 
• Work closely with heads of all departments and agencies with 
foreign intelligence responsibilities 
• Serve as Chairman, US Intelligence Board (USIB) – McCone’s 
deputy designated to represent CIA on this board 
• Develop policies and procedures to assure adequate coordination 
of foreign intelligence activities, as directed by the President and 
NSC with the advice and assistance of the USIB 
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• Assure efficiency and effectiveness in coordination with the heads 
of the departments and agencies engaged in foreign intelligence 
activities while avoiding undesirable duplication of effort 
• Exercise overall responsibility for CIA – primary responsibility is 
DCI with deputy director providing, to the extent necessary, 
direction to the CIA 
• Keep the President informed on implementation of this directive (J. 
Kennedy, Memorandum to John McCone, January 16, 1962).34 
Augmenting Kennedy’s cabinet with a conservative republican made good 
political sense but McCone had virtually no intelligence experience, yet he 
quickly went to work and successfully repaired CIA’s damaged moral in the wake 
of the Bay of Pigs.  He launched a study group to identify and refine the director’s 
key duties and to provide suggestions on agency reorganization.  He significantly 
expanded scientific and technical research and improved managerial effectiveness 
by developing cost-analysis processes and creating a new comptroller position in 
the agency (Roberts, 2014, p. 120).  He worked hard to keep himself out of the 
newspapers and improved relations with the State Department and Congress.  
Schlesinger characterized how McCone was able to win the confidence of his 
peers in the administration by, “Declining to allow his own views to prejudice the 
intelligence estimates, he showed a fair-mindedness which shamed some of us 
who had objected to his appointment” (Schlesinger, 1965, 429).  McCone 
                                                 
34 This outline of the DCI’s responsibilities is in line with the responsibilities of this office as 
outlined in the National Security Act of 1947.  President Kennedy probably sought to emphasize 
these points to better establish the primacy of the DCI within the US Intelligence Community. 
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appointed two key deputies, Richard Helms as the Deputy Director of Operations 
and Ray Cline as the Deputy Director of Intelligence.  The new DCI endeavored 
to shift CIA emphasis more towards intelligence analysis while placing less 
emphasis on covert operations, the real forte of his predecessor Allen Dulles.  
These changes transformed the CIA into a more consistently technical service 
(Schlesinger, 1965, p. 429).  Kennedy enhanced the authority of his new DCI by 
publicly announcing the new director would be responsible for developing 
policies and procedures across all levels of the US Intelligence Community.  This 
public display of support was important at that time as the PFIAB with State 
Department backing, had recently recommended breaking the CIA up to separate 
its covert operations and analytic functions (Roberts, 2014, p. 120). 
McCone’s Relationship with Others 
Some members of President Kennedy’s cabinet initially had serious 
reservations regarding McCone’s appointment as DCI.  However, with time and 
McCone’s demonstrated performance, he became more accepted as a trusted 
member of the Kennedy Administration.  Roger Hilsman, Director of the State 
Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
summed it up well in an oral history interview in 1970 responding to initial 
reactions to McCone’s appointment: 
Well, you see, everybody thought McCone was going to be a bad guy.  
And basically, he turned out to be a pretty good guy; that is, he was on the 
wrong side of some issues, but he never….  You know, here is a guy who 
has successfully sunk the test ban treaty in the Eisenhower administration, 
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who really, against his own President, Eisenhower, as AEC 
Commissioner, had coordinated with Scoop Jackson, a Democrat, and had 
sunk a number of things that Eisenhower wanted to do.  A real alley 
fighter, you know.  A very rich man, a very militant, anti-communist, 
Republican, you know….So, we thought, everybody thought on both 
Capitol Hill and in the administration, we were in for trouble. (R. Hilsman, 
Oral History Interview-JFK#1, August 14, 1970, p. 15). 
McCone’s ideas of asserting more control over other government agencies 
set the initial tone of the relationship.  According to Hilsman, McCone apparently 
wrote a letter of instructions to himself at the beginning of his tenure that 
provided CIA extensive powers which other cabinet agencies thought 
consolidated too much authority at CIA, “Then this letter comes along, and it 
seemed to confirm our worst fears because there was language in that letter that 
was giving McCone authority over almost everything.”35 (R. Hilsman Oral 
History Interview-JFK#1, August 14, 1970, p 16). 
As it turned out, these fears of Hilsman and others were overblown.  
Considering the contrast between how McCone and Dulles used intelligence, it 
became clear McCone used it to inform the policy process whereas Dulles used 
intelligence to make and implement foreign policy.  This shift, driven by the 
leadership differences between Dulles and McCone, helped McCone relieve some 
                                                 
35 This letter of instruction has never been published, at least not at time of this interview in 1970. 
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of the initial fear among his peers.  Hilsman pointed out this change was based on 
lack of interest and competence on McCone’s part, stating:  
I think the reason our fears didn’t materialize on the substantive side--this 
is the National Intelligence Estimates and so on and so forth, which Dulles 
was into up to his ears, and Dulles was….you see, Dulles was using the 
NIE’s as policy statements, then using his chiefs of mission to implement 
it, that is his contacts with foreign chiefs of state to implement it.  And I 
think the reason McCone didn’t use his position in that way was because 
he was neither interested nor very competent in the substance of foreign 
policy.  So therefore, he didn’t make the effort.  He didn’t have the 
knowledge and didn’t make the effort. (R. Hilsman Oral History 
Interview-JFK#1, August 14, 1970, p 16) 
In retrospect, Hilsman concluded: 
We worked out a very good relationship, McCone and I.  And it turned out 
that he wasn’t making the great bid for domination as we thought.  He did 
a few things.  The Cuban missile crisis he tried to manipulate to his 
advantage. (R. Hilsman Oral History Interview-JFK#1, August 14, 1970, p 
16) 
Intelligence Receptivity During the Cuban Missile Crisis 
 To analyze how the president viewed the threat of Soviet offensive nuclear 
weapons in Cuba, I have examined the interaction of President Kennedy with his 
Director of Central Intelligence, John A. McCone prior to and during the crisis 
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period.  It is clear from reading the various now declassified memos DCI McCone 
wrote about his interactions with the president, that President Kennedy was very 
much aware and concerned about the seriousness of the Soviet strategic nuclear 
threat to the U.S. in the months leading up to the formal crisis period in October 
1962.  In McCone’s August 23, 1962, Memorandum of Meeting with the 
President:  
The President requested a continuing analysis of the number and type of 
Soviet and Oriental personnel imported into Cuba; quantity and type of 
equipment and its probable use; all construction – particularly anxious to 
know whether construction involved SAM sites might differ from the 
ground sites.   
In response, DCI McCone directed the Board of National Estimates to 
work continuously on this analysis.  Mc Cone noted, President Kennedy 
“requested analysis of the danger to the United States and the effect on Latin 
America of missile installations.” The DCI directed the Deputy DCI to arrange for 
the preparation of these estimates. (J. McCone, Memorandum of Meeting with the 
President, August 23, 1962, pp. 1-2).  President Kennedy was even already 
thinking, as of at least August 23, of what the U.S. could do against Soviet missile 
sites in Cuba, should the U.S. discover such capabilities, questioning whether an 
air attack, a ground offensive, or a substantial guerilla effort would be necessary 
to negate the missiles. 
 From October 16, 1962 when President Kennedy was first informed of 
Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba to October 28, 1962 when Khrushchev agreed 
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the Soviets would withdrawal the missiles, the president was highly receptive to 
intelligence regarding the current situation in Cuba and potential Soviet reactions 
to the emerging US policy to rid Cuba of these weapons.  During the crisis the 
president received daily briefings, mainly from Arthur Lundahl, Director of the 
CIA National Photographic Intelligence Center which was analyzing the aerial 
imagery from the U-2 and Sidney Graybeal, Chief of the CIA Missile and Space 
Division.  These briefings were augmented with occasional presentations by DCI 
McCone and the CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, Ray Cline.  Reviewing the 
complete transcript of the Kennedy tape recordings of the various EXCOMM 
meetings and the written notes of sessions which were not taped,36 reveals 
President Kennedy was fully attentive to the intelligence presented, was actively 
engaged with the intelligence analysts presenting the information, and asked 
numerous, relevant questions.  His initial anger over being misled by the Soviets 
concerning their intentions on Cuba did not translate into any animosity towards 
the CIA, or loss of credibility or trust between Kennedy and the intelligence 
community.  The interactions between the president and the intelligence analysts 
and senior leaders charged with ensuring he remained aware of the current 
situation were professional and focused on the immediate issues at hand.  Given 
the gravity of the situation, the potential outbreak of nuclear war and the general 
threat to world peace, President Kennedy was highly focused and trusted the 
quality of intelligence he was provided.  This is probably best demonstrated by 
the fact that Kennedy and others, after their initial encounter with the 
                                                 
36 Consisting of 700 pages and found in May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes:  Inside the White 
House During the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1997, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 
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photographic evidence from the U-2, later admitted they personally could not 
identify objects in the various images as Soviet missiles.  At the onset of the crisis 
these senior national leaders had to completely trust the expertise of CIA’s 
imagery analysts in assessing the presence of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba.  
EXCOMM members asked questions to ensure there was no possibility of a 
misinterpretation of the imagery evidence concerning the type of missiles or their 
capability to deliver nuclear warheads.  There were also key questions which 
arose on the actual presence of nuclear warheads on the island.37  Throughout this 
tense period, President Kennedy was professional and remained receptive toward 
the intelligence provided.  He used that intelligence to formulate his strategy in 
successfully handling the crisis and bringing it to a peaceful resolution on US 
terms. 
 Immediately following the crisis, President Kennedy took the initiative to 
recognize the many key players in the US Intelligence Community who 
contributed to the successful outcome.  The president took the lead in seeking 
recognition for outstanding service during the Cuba missile crisis.  He directed his 
military aid, Major General Clifton to send a letter to DCI McCone on December 
3, 1962 asking him for advice on commendations/medals for CIA (C. Clifton, 
Memorandum to John McCone, December 3, 1962).  McCone responded on 
December 14 with a letter to Kennedy recommending the CIA Agency 
Intelligence Medal of Merit for US Air Force Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, 
                                                 
37 Intelligence analysts identified the construction of nuclear storage facilities during the crisis but 
could not confirm the presence of nuclear warheads for the MRBM or IRBM missiles in Cuba at 
that time.  Later, in 1992, the US learned the Soviets had delivered nuclear weapons to Cuba 
which were present during the crisis (Coleman, 2007, pp. 11-12). 
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Provisional (4th) which flew CIA missions in August and September 1962, a 
citation for the National Photographic Interpretation Center, a citation for the 
CIA, and the Intelligence Star to each of the seven U-2 pilots who flew Cuba 
missions (J. McCone, Memorandum for the President, Recognition of CIA Units 
and Individuals, December 14, 1962).  In a letter from the president to the DCI, in 
his capacity as Chairman of the US Intelligence Board,38 President Kennedy was 
effusive in his praise stating: 
I wish to express…my deep and sincere appreciation for your outstanding 
service to our Nation—and the Free World—during the recent 
international crisis.  In the course of the past few months, I have had 
occasion to again observe the extraordinary accomplishments of our 
intelligence community, and I have been singularly impressed with the 
overall professional excellence, selfless devotion to duty, resourcefulness 
and initiative manifested in the work of this group.  The fact that we had 
timely and accurate information, skillfully analyzed and clearly presented, 
to guide us in our judgements during this crisis is, I believe, the greatest 
tribute to the effectiveness of these individuals and agencies.  The 
magnitude of their contributions can be measured, in part, by the fact that 
the peace was sustained during a most critical time.  It is, of course, a great 
source of strength to me to know that we have such dedicated and skillful 
men and women in the service of our Nation in these times of peril.  
Although I cannot personally commend each member of the intelligence 
                                                 
38 The DCI was dual-hatted as the CIA Director and the Chairman of the US Intelligence Board. 
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community for their individual efforts, I would like you to convey to them, 
through the members of the United States Intelligence Board, my personal 
word of commendation, my deep admiration for their achievements, and 
the appreciation of a grateful Nation. (J. Kennedy, Letter to John McCone, 
January 9, 1963) 
The Kennedy-McCone Relationship after the Crisis 
 The relationship between Kennedy and McCone in the public sphere 
remained professional and positive in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.  
However, privately, especially as Congress became involved in investigating the 
crisis, private tension between McCone and the president increased.  It does not 
appear that this low point in the personal relationship between the president and 
the DCI affected the president’s receptivity towards intelligence in the aftermath 
of the crisis.  Intelligence remained important in monitoring Soviet compliance 
with their agreement to withdrawal offensive weapons from Cuba and to ensure 
such weapons were not re-introduced into Cuban surreptitiously after the crisis.   
 The source of the conflict between Kennedy and McCone after the crisis 
stemmed from the fact that McCone was the only prominent Kennedy official 
who accurately predicted the Soviets were possibly introducing offensive nuclear 
weapons into Cuba before they were discovered with the U-2 flight of October 14.  
In the public debate following the crisis and in the congressional hearings which 
followed, McCone vigorously defended his position and the work of the CIA 
during the crisis.  Kennedy believed the agency had done very well and was 
likewise highly supportive of the work the intelligence community had performed 
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in discovering the missiles and supporting his decision making through the 
EXCOMM.  Kennedy however, resented what he considered McCone’s public 
bragging about his prediction of Soviet missiles in Cuba.  McCone’s access to the 
president declined in the aftermath of the crisis based on the strained relationship 
(Roberts, 2014, p. 120). 
 President Kennedy, seeking to shape the story McCone would tell 
congressional committees investigating the crisis issued talking points to McCone 
to guide his testimony.  U.S. Senator Kenneth Keating (R-N.Y.) had been 
especially critical of the president’s handling of intelligence regarding the crisis 
claiming he knew of Soviet missiles in Cuba well before the administration.  His 
information was presumably based on Cuban refugee accounts.  President 
Kennedy challenged Keating to produce the evidence to help the US Intelligence 
Community to better track these systems, but Keating did not comply with that 
request.  The president, seeking to prevent any potential political fallout from 
information which might subject him to harsh criticism in his handling of the 
intelligence aspects of the crisis, instructed McCone to highlight the following in 
his meetings with Congress:   
• The President authorized every overflight requested 
• The acting DCI accepted for CIA responsibility for arranging necessary 
overflights 
• The intelligence community did not report any evidence of missiles to the 
President before the U-2 flight of October 14.  What the intelligence 
community had was a handful of reports, which were subjected to 
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photographic verification.  Hundreds of previous reports had been tested 
in the same way.  The difference is that this time the test proved positive 
• There was no report of concern because of weather delays to either the 
DCI or the White House 
• The President had obtained full reports on this whole matter from both Mr. 
McCone and from the Intelligence Advisory Board 
• Mr. McCone should be extremely careful in criticism of the Sec/State 
request for a rescheduling of September flights into four shorter ones.  
There was no reclama of this—and no report to anyone that it was leading 
to delay.  (J. Kennedy, Facts for John McCone to Emphasize from 
President’s Standpoint, March 4, 1963) 
 Following McCone’s congressional testimony in early March 1963, it is 
clear both the president and his brother Robert Kennedy were highly concerned 
with how McCone and the CIA were handling the congressional oversight and 
public relations aspects of the crisis.  Both the president and his brother were 
highly upset with press leaks out of the CIA, which sought to make the agency 
look good at the expense of the administration.  In a March 4, 1963 phone 
conversation between the president and Robert Kennedy, the president called 
McCone “a real bastard…He’s stupid himself.  Everybody’s saying he’s a horse’s 
ass” (in response to questions about the number of Cuban insurgents trained and 
active against Cuba) (J. Kennedy & R. Kennedy, Telephone Conversation 
Transcript, March 4, 1963, p. 13).   
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Seeking his brother’s assistance in “counseling” McCone, the president 
stated: 
All the press are saying that they’re pouring out a lot of stuff to try to 
make, you know, the CIA or McCone look good at the expense of the 
administration, that there’s a lot of talk about it on the Hill and everything.  
I’d like to have John know about that.  So maybe he’d then decide it 
wasn’t so wise. (J. Kennedy & R. Kennedy, Telephone Conversation 
Transcript, March 4, 1963, p. 15)   
Roger Hilsman, the Director of the State Department Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research during the crisis, recalled in a 1970 oral history 
interview the resentment many in the administration felt towards McCone based 
on his interaction with Congress following the crisis.  According to Hilsman, 
“McCone is busy all over Capitol Hill saying, “Oh, I said that I didn’t trust those 
communists.  I said there were going to be missiles in Cuba” (R. Hilsman Oral 
History Interview-JFK#1, August 14, 1970, p 35).  McGeorge Bundy, the 
president’s National Security Advisor, also noted difficulties in working with 
McCone.  In a phone conversation on March 4, 1963, Bundy and the president 
discussed their view on how McCone has become paranoid about people in 
Kennedy’s circle who were out to get him.  These rumors were spread by US 
senators.  Bundy advised the president in the phone conversation to say something 
nice about McCone in an upcoming press conference, which Kennedy agreed to 
do (J. Kennedy & R. Kennedy, Telephone Conversation Transcript, March 4, 
1963, pp. 3-5).  The president did make a positive statement about McCone at his 
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March 6, 1963 press conference (J. Kennedy, Presidential Press Conference, 
March 6, 1963).  
 Despite this private criticism, President Kennedy stood by a fact-based, 
vice rumor driven approach toward verification of the Soviet withdrawal.  
Kennedy remained receptive to the intelligence he received and effectively used it 
in his public statements to reassure the American people and members of 
Congress of Soviet compliance with the agreements which resolved the crisis in 
October 1962.  Reviewing the president’s press statements through the end of 
March 1963 one concludes the president remained fully informed of the relevant 
intelligence in Cuba.  Kennedy publicly stated his belief in US intelligence 
verification of Soviet withdrawal as being effective: 
We will continue to use our own method of verification, which we believe 
gives us assurance against a re-introduction of these weapons into Cuba, 
and I think that the methods we are using to determine the status of 
military activity in Cuba are very effective and are being used frequently. 
(J. Kennedy, Presidential Press Conference, December 12, 1962) 
 Despite the president’s continue assurances, the press and several 
members of Congress remained skeptical and continued to assert the Soviet were 
maintaining offensive nuclear weapons, potentially hidden in tunnels, in Cuba.  
There was also an extensive debate about residual Soviet military troop strength 
in Cuba.  President Kennedy consistently emphasized in his public statements that 
he was making his decisions based on hard intelligence on not on rumors from 
congressmen or refugee reports.  His February 7, 1963 public statement is a good 
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example of his support for the use of intelligence reporting.  Kennedy challenged 
anyone who possessed information on offensive weapons in Cuba to turn it over 
to General Carroll, the DIA Director.  The president stated: 
Now, we get hundreds of reports every month, and we try to check them 
out.  A good many of them are just rumors or reports, and even some of 
the members of Congress who have come forward either refuse to say 
where they heard the information or provide us with reports which do not 
have substance to them. (J. Kennedy, Presidential Press Conference, 
February 7, 1963) 
Referring to the need for hard intelligence, Kennedy stated:  
But to take the United States to that path (towards another confrontation 
with the U.S.S.R.), to persuade our allies to come with us, to hazard our 
allies as well as the security of the free world, as well as the peace of the 
free world, we have to move with hard intelligence.  We have to know 
what we are talking about.  We cannot base the issue of war and peace on 
a rumor or report, which is not substantiated, or which some member of 
Congress refuses to tell us where he heard it. (J. Kennedy, Presidential 
Press Conference, February 7, 1963) 
Continuing to make his point, Kennedy emphasized, “…we are taking the greatest 
pains to try to be accurate, but we have to deal with facts as we know them, and 
not merely rumors and speculation.” (J. Kennedy, Presidential Press Conference, 
February 7, 1963). 
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In the final analysis, President Kennedy expressed his gratitude toward the 
US intelligence professionals.  He rejected the politically based charges coming 
from Congress in the aftermath of the crisis and cited the outstanding work of the 
intelligence community, the Defense Department, and specifically the DCI, John 
McCone.  Addressing charges of failure in US intelligence on March 6, 1963 at a 
press conference, Kennedy made a clear statement of support for the hard and 
successful work of the intelligence community during the crisis.  Responding to 
press questions that his administration was deliberately withholding information 
on the crisis and that McCone knew of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba 
prior to October 14, 1962, Kennedy responded with high praise for the US 
Intelligence Community, stating: 
No, I have seen charges of all kinds, one day a distinguished Republican 
charges that it is all the CIA’s fault, and the next day it is the Defense 
Department’s fault, and the next day the CIA is being made a scapegoat by 
another distinguished leader.  So that we could not possibly answer these 
charges, which come so fast and so furiously.  I think in hindsight, I 
suppose we could have always perhaps picked up these missile bases a 
few days earlier, but not very many days earlier, because the missiles 
didn’t come in, at least in hindsight it now appears, until sometime around 
the middle of September.  The installation began at a later date.  They 
were very fast, and I think the photography on the same areas, if we had 
known that missiles were going in, 10 days before might not have picked 
up anything.  The week before might have picked up something.  In the 
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pictures taken October 14th were only obvious to the most sophisticated 
expert.  It was not until the pictures taken really the 16th and 17th that you 
have pictures that would be generally acceptable.  So, this was a very 
clandestine and fast operation.  So, I feel the intelligence services did a 
very good job.  When you think that the job was done, the missiles were 
discovered, the missiles were removed, the bombers were discovered, the 
bombers were removed, I don’t think that anybody should feel anything 
but a good job was done.  But I think we can always improve, and 
particularly with the advantage of hindsight.  I am satisfied with Mr. 
McCone, the intelligence community, the Defense Department and the job 
they did in those days particularly taken in totality. (J. Kennedy, 
Presidential Press Conference, March 6, 1963) 
 After the crisis concluded, DCI McCone wrote a memo on October 31 
which detailed the timing of his various warnings about Soviet offensive missiles 
in Cuba.  He recalled he had briefing Secretary of State Dean Rusk on August 21, 
in Rusk’s office, about definite information on surface-to-air missiles and 
speculated again on the probability of medium range ballistic missiles in Cuba (J. 
McCone, Memorandum for Record, Soviet MRBMs in Cuba, October 31, 1962, 
p. 1).  McCone also recalled on the evening of August 22, that he provided the 
same information to President Kennedy, adding certain details about the number 
of Soviet and Chinese personnel entering Cuba (J. McCone, Memorandum for 
Record, Soviet MRBMs in Cuba, October 31, 1962, p.1).  McCone noted 
President Kennedy “was quite familiar with the situation” and that “The President 
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expressed concern” (J. McCone, Memorandum of the Meeting with the President 
at 6:00 p.m., August 22, 1962, p.2).  The president requested this policy matter to 
be addressed at the Principals meeting at the White House on August 23. 
 Summarizing the relationship between President Kennedy and the DCI, 
John McCone, McGeorge Bundy described the president’s treatment of the 
leaders and advisors in his administration was based of strict professionalism.  
According to Bundy, in an oral history interview in 1965 on Kennedy’s 
relationships with and among members of his administration: 
We didn’t talk much about whether he was or wasn’t happy with any one 
of his Cabinet officers, or indeed with anybody on his staff because he 
didn’t do business that way.  He never encouraged people to complain 
about anyone else, and his clear intent was to manage his own 
administration his own way, and to have everybody stay on board and be, 
at least publicly, in the in-government sense-at least in the conduct of 
normal business-comfortable with one another and not waring publicly.  
His determination on that point was so self-evident that the question never 
came up.  The two officers that he and I at least, fussed about (in the sense 
of how to organize and manage his relationship to them) were John 
McCone and Adlai Stevenson, and to a lesser degree Chet Bowles….The 
President was always on edge about Mc Cone. (M. Bundy, Oral History 
Interview, JFK#1, March 1964, p. 18) 
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The following excerpt from the Bundy oral history interview highlights why 
Kennedy appointed McCone and a few of the misgivings the president developed 
regarding his DCI: 
He wanted very much to have a man who was strong on the Hill, strong 
with conservative opinion, who wouldn’t expose him to any risk of 
criticism from that flank.  He could take the heat from liberals who didn’t 
like McCone, and he got a little of it privately before he went ahead with 
it.  The President never much enjoyed being told not to do something he 
decided to do, so he didn’t waste much time on it, but I remember the 
phones jangling….The reason he became wary about John McCone was 
simply that John McCone showed himself in two or three sensitive cases 
more concerned about McCone than he was about Kennedy.  The 
President valued people who would take heat on his behalf, and not people 
who were insulating themselves from the general fire. (M. Bundy Oral 
History Interview, JFK#1, March 1964, p. 18) 
 Bundy also alluded to his own feelings about McCone, independent of the 
president’s view.  In answering the question why Kennedy ever appointed 
McCone, Bundy stated, “You’d better ask the Attorney General-I think that’s his 
crime.  Allen Dulles was involved in it too” (M. Bundy Oral History Interview, 
JFK#1, March 1964, p. 18).  Apparently, McCone was very sensitive and 
seemingly jealous of other administration leaders’ access and influence over the 
president.  Bundy recalled in 1965, McCone seemed to have felt slighted if the 
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president had conversations with the secretary of defense or secretary of state or 
both and he wasn’t invited.  According to Bundy: 
I have spent a great many phone calls in the last three years explaining to 
John McCone that it really isn’t a personal affront to the Central 
Intelligence Agency, if the President had a talk with the Secretary of State 
or the Secretary of Defense, or, still more offensive, both, and doesn’t 
even once include the Director of Central Intelligence.  And surprisingly, 
people keep pressing you as to the requirement that their agency or they 
themselves be there in order to maintain the morale of their agencies. (M. 
Bundy Oral History Interview, JFK#1, March 1964, p. 176) 
Bundy, as National Security Advisor, spent a great deal of effort 
managing McCone’s relationship with the president. 
Leadership Interpretation of Warning 
 President Kennedy interpreted Cuban Missile Crisis related intelligence 
based on his worldview and assumptions about the motivations of Soviet 
behavior.  At the tactical intelligence level, the information Kennedy received 
during the crisis period allowed him to make decisions regarding diplomatic and 
military policies which through the naval quarantine brought the crisis to a 
peaceful end on US terms.  The president interpreted this tactical intelligence 
objectively.  Concerning the more strategic issue of what motivated the Soviet 
Union to deploy and offensive nuclear capability to Cuba, both the US 
Intelligence Community and President Kennedy may have made cognitive and 
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motivational errors which influenced their assessment of Soviet motivations.  This 
is an important point as it fundamentally influenced how Kennedy assessed the 
current situation based on the initial intelligence warning he received on October 
16, 1962.  This situation assessment ultimately influenced Kennedy’s chosen 
course of action to implement a naval quarantine.  Had the president assessed the 
situation differently, he may have decided to choose a different policy, including 
one of living with the Soviet missiles in Cuba.  The remainder of this section will 
concentrate on assessing how President Kennedy interpreted the warning 
intelligence he received to determine if certain biases may have influenced his 
interpretation of intelligence warning. 
 President Kennedy’s interpretation of intelligence is based on 
psychological factors discussed below.  To better understand, how the president, 
interpreted intelligence, it is reasonable to look closely at how he assessed the 
Soviet motivation for their deployment of offensive strategic nuclear weapons in 
Cuba.  Fundamentally, did the president interpret the intelligence to mean the 
Soviets were deploying these systems for offensive or defensive purposes?  His 
view towards this key question would influence his assessment of the current 
situation and ultimately his chosen course of action to resolve the crisis.  Would 
the president take decisive action to eliminate the missiles threat, force the Soviets 
to withdrawal the missiles, or would he simply make an accommodation and learn 
to live with this new development?  These key assessment and policy questions 
turned, in part, on Kennedy’s interpretation of the intelligence he received during 
the crisis. 
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 Soviet motivation for their Cuban offensive buildup was discussed in the 
first EXCOMM meeting (Allison, In Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Documents, p. 
iv).  The offensive arguments suggested the Soviet action was designed to test 
American credibility and fortitude (Fischer, Beth, 1998, p. 160).  Kennedy was 
highly concerned about the future status of Berlin as Khrushchev had threatened 
additional action, foreshadowing a crisis, following the upcoming mid-term 
elections in November 1962.  Kennedy believed Soviet actions in Cuba were 
designed to distract the Americans from the Berlin problem, that the Soviet 
missiles could be used as leverage to militarily threaten the U.S. and force the 
Western allies out of Berlin.  Soviet missiles in Cuba could thus serve as a 
bargaining chip to force the allies out of Berlin in exchange for Soviet withdrawal 
of offensive weapons from Cuba.  An additional potential Soviet offensive 
motivation included the fear the Soviets could use the Cuba crisis as a diversion to 
launch an aggressive military campaign elsewhere to challenge the West. 
Several potential arguments can be made suggesting Soviet motivations 
were defensive in nature.  The Soviet deployment may have been designed to 
deter the U.S. from a future military attack against Cuba to depose the communist 
regime or the Soviets sought to quickly rectify their then completely apparent 
strategic nuclear inferiority with the United States.  Initial CIA intelligence 
assessments in the earliest days of the crisis on October 16 and 17 discussed the 
possibility of Soviet defensive motivations and discussed the deployment in terms 
of deterring a future US military attack against Cuba.  The Special National 
Intelligence Estimate the CIA produced at the beginning of the crisis on October 
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19 did not discuss deterrent motivations but did highlight the Soviet nuclear 
deployment may have been designed to seek parity after the missile gap myth was 
exposed (Fischer, Beth, 1998, p. 159).  Subsequent CIA assessments and 
intelligence briefings to the president stressed Soviet offensive motivations for 
their deployment, including Khrushchev’s assumed desire to enhance nuclear 
strike capabilities against the U.S.  Formal intelligence assessments the CIA 
provided to the EXCOMM did not include analysis concerning Soviet motivation 
to protect Cuba from attack against the U.S. or discuss the symbolic significance 
Cuba had to Soviet leaders as the first bastion of communism in the Western 
Hemisphere (Fischer, Beth, 1998, p. 160). 
Cognitive Factors 
Kennedy’s experience with Soviet leaders, his views concerning the nature 
and level of the Soviet threat, and the motivations which guided their foreign and 
military policy potentially affected his interpretation of the intelligence provided 
during the crisis.  This is certainly not meant as a criticism but rather an 
acknowledgement that all humans interpret information through a lens which 
influences their interpretation of information, which naturally also includes 
intelligence information.  Beth Fischer has researched both cognitive and 
motivational factors which may have adversely impacted intelligence produced 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  She identified several potential cognitive and 
motivational errors based on either interpreting Soviet actions in an offensive or 
defensive context.  The same problems may have also affected President Kennedy 
as he interpreted the information the US Intelligence Community provided during 
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the crisis.  The following is a systematic discussion of key assumptions and the 
potentially negative cognitive effects these interpretations may have had on 
President Kennedy, many of his advisors, and many Americans.  These biases 
may have influenced the president’s interpretation of intelligence. 
 Assumption 1 – The Soviet Union was an aggressive world power 
seeking to expand its influence on a global scale. 
Potential negative cognitive effect:  US senior officials, including 
President Kennedy, were more attentive to information confirming that 
assumption and less sensitive to information which challenged it.  This led him to 
favor intelligence which confirmed his view that the Soviets had an offensive 
motivation for deploying missiles to Cuba vice a defensive motive. 
Assumption 2 – The Soviet Union was an opportunistic aggressor. 
Potential negative cognitive effect:  This line of thinking may have 
blinded the president to the Soviet’s need to redress the strategic nuclear 
imbalance.  Like assumption 1 above, this assumption would also have biased 
Kennedy’s interpretation of intelligence to support the view that the Soviets 
wanted to rectify the strategic nuclear balance (offensive motivation) and were 
not simply trying to use nuclear weapons in Cuba to deter a future US attack. 
Assumption 3 – Because the United States maintained a self-image as 
“freedom-loving defenders of democracy” the United States was not and could 
not be, a ‘threat’ to the Soviet Union, because US motivations were defensive and 
benign (Fischer, Beth, 1998, p. 160). 
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Potential negative cognitive effect:  The Soviets had no need to take such 
a highly provocative action as to station nuclear missiles in Cuba, just 90 miles 
from the U.S. – the U.S. had no intent of using nuclear weapons against the 
U.S.S.R. and thus was not a serious threat to the Soviet Union.  This is a 
fundamental attribution error in which one believes the negative actions of others 
is based on defects in their opponent’s personalities or disposition, instead of 
viewing them as consequences of situational factors their opponents face. 
Assumption 4 – Although the U.S.S.R. was an opportunistic expansionist 
aggressor it was risk-averse – the CIA made that conclusion in their September 
19, 1962 NIE (Fischer, Beth, 1998, pp.160-161). 
Potential negative cognitive effect:  the U.S. failed to analyze 
Khrushchev’s past propensity towards risk, (exposing Stalin crimes, instigating 
Berlin crises, incidents of nuclear saber rattling).  The U.S. failed to integrate past 
Khrushchev behavior into analytic judgements (Fischer, Beth, 1998, p. 161). 
Assumption 5 – The CIA assessed a Soviet offensive nuclear deployment 
would not occur in Cuba. 
Potential negative cognitive effect:  The CIA was insensitive to vast 
amounts of human intelligence (refugee reporting) coming out of Cuba suggesting 
a possible deployment.  Confirmation bias may have been at play as the CIA 
dismissed numerous refugee reports of missiles to conform with their assessment 
that a Soviet nuclear deployment outside the U.S.S.R. had never been undertaken 
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and the Soviets would not take such a bold risk by deploying nuclear missiles so 
close to the United States.39 
Motivational Factors 
Motivational errors may have also contributed to problems in the 
president’s interpretation of intelligence.  Following the Bay of Pigs failure, 
President Kennedy placed a portion of the blame for that debacle on the CIA.40  
Based on motivational theory, both the CIA and the president may have required a 
higher “burden of proof” based on that negative experience to convince the 
president of a Soviet effort to place missiles in Cuba.  Fischer believes this is 
probably less of a factor than the cognitive issues detailed above.  Her logic for 
this conclusion revolves around the assumption that if the CIA believed they 
needed to pass a higher bar to convince the president that Soviet offensive 
weapons were in Cuba, they would have been more vigorous in their effort to 
collect intelligence to confirm that hypothesis, which they were not. 
Beth Fischer contends that theory-driven thinking may have contributed to 
the failure of the U.S. to detect Soviet missiles in Cuba earlier than it did.  If 
President Kennedy and the US Intelligence Community thought the deployment 
of such systems was more likely, the administration would have been more 
attentive to that possibility and ordered a more intensive intelligence collection 
and analytic effort against this intelligence problem.  The prevailing US view, 
                                                 
39 The CIA could not definitively determine if the missiles the refugees were reporting were 
offensive nuclear missiles or defensive, conventional surface-to-air missiles. 
40 The President reserved much of his disdain for the Joint Staff with a consequent loss of trust in 
the advice of that institution. 
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which President Kennedy shared, that the Soviets were expansionist aggressors, 
blinded them to Moscow’s feeling of increasing strategic nuclear vulnerability.  
The US failure to understand or appreciate this Soviet vulnerability led the 
president and his senior advisors to underestimate the probability that Khrushchev 
would take the bold risk of deploying nuclear weapons to Cuba.  Based on 
Fischer’s explanation of the biases that a theory-driven approach to intelligence 
interpretation yielded in the Cuban missile crisis, a more data-driven, bottom-up, 
inductive approach may have provided earlier strategic warning of the Soviet 
offensive military buildup in Cuba. 
In summary, based on my review of the record, I have yet to find evidence 
of overt bias, fear, or any other factors that caused President Kennedy to 
misinterpret the intelligence the US Intelligence Community provided him.  
Certainly he, like all human beings, were subject to the hidden, psychological 
biases as detailed above.  These biases, if they were a factor at all, would more 
likely have affected the intelligence as it was being produced by the US 
Intelligence Community, which is an important factor.  The tone and substance of 
CIA finished intelligence products certainly did fit with President Kennedy’s 
existing view of the Soviets and therefore reinforced (potentially biased) that 
view.  However, the impact that had on strategic warning was probably minimal.  
Other factors, such as weather and the desire to avoid a repeat of the Gary Powers 
U-2 shootdown incident over the Soviet Union were the main factors that 
precluded more aggressive photo reconnaissance efforts needed to confirm the 
presence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba.  Any biases which would have 
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affected President Kennedy’s interpretation of intelligence would not have had a 
significant impact on the timeline regarding initial discovery of missiles in Cuba.  
Concerning tactical intelligence, the president used his daily intelligence updates 
during the crisis to formulate and tweak the US Government’s strategy to respond 
to the crisis and no evidence I have discovered suggests the president deliberately 
or accidentally misunderstood, misapplied, or politicized the intelligence 
provided. 
Conclusion – Current Situation Assessment 
Harkening back to the theory presented in chapter 1, accurate situation 
assessment is a function of quality intelligence, leadership receptivity, and 
objective interpretation of intelligence.  Overall President Kennedy and his 
advisors were highly successful in building and maintaining a relatively accurate 
assessment of the current situation during the Cuban Missile Crisis.   
Intelligence Quality – The US Intelligence Community provided the 
administration with high quality intelligence which supported the EXCOMM’s 
key decision making functions.  This was especially true in terms of accurately 
depicting Soviet military capabilities on the ground in Cuba.  The intelligence 
community provided President Kennedy with a very accurate picture of actual 
Soviet military capabilities and assessments regarding the Soviet deployment 
timeline which allowed Kennedy time to deliberate and select the best policy 
option moving forward.  A key question which was not answered at the time 
concerned the presence of Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba.  The US Intelligence 
147 
 
Community was unable to answer that question, but Kennedy assumed the worst, 
that the Soviets had a nuclear capability.  Thirty years later, he was proven 
correct. 
Receptivity – Kennedy was receptive of intelligence.  He was a voracious 
consumer of information in general and was highly engaged with the intelligence 
professionals who provided him Cuba-related intelligence both prior to the Crisis 
via his daily President’s Intelligence Checklist and during the crisis taking 
detailed current intelligence briefings from expert analysts from the National 
Photographic Interpretation Center and CIA’s Missile and Space Division.  The 
president was also highly reliant on intelligence and counsel from senior 
intelligence leaders, primarily the DCI John McCone during the crisis.  Despite 
the potential problems in receptivity based on lack of trust generated by the Bay 
of Pigs disaster just 16 months earlier, Kennedy’s replacement of the CIA’s key 
leadership and McCone’s efforts to reform his agency and earn the trust of the 
president and his colleagues prior to the crisis paid dividends in terms of the 
president’s receptivity towards intelligence.  The level of professionalism, 
responsiveness to the president’s intelligence needs, and attention to detail 
exhibited in the intelligence briefings also helped build trust and thus improved 
receptivity towards the intelligence the US Intelligence Community presented to 
the president and the EXCOMM. 
Interpretation – Kennedy accurately interpreted the intelligence on Soviet 
military capabilities in Cuba.  He took briefings from intelligence analysts at the 
beginning of each EXCOMM meeting and used that information in the policy 
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debates that ensued.  Key questions during the crisis period involved when would 
Soviet MRBM/IRBM missiles become operational and did the Soviets possess 
nuclear warheads in Cuba?  The US Intelligence Community answered the first 
question and had to assume the worst based on lack of information on the second 
question.  In theory, questions regarding Soviet military capabilities in Cuba 
might be subject to less interpretation errors/bias given the more concrete nature 
of analyzing order of battle intelligence and the intuitive, convincing nature of 
imagery intelligence which served as the primary confirmation source for 
capability-based intelligence assessments.  The president correctly interpreted the 
fact that the Soviets were placing nuclear weapons in Cuba.   
More complex, less clear, and certainly subject to more potential bias, was 
his interpretation of Soviet motivations for the deployment, their intent.  
Kennedy’s pre-existing views of the Soviet Union may have skewed his 
interpretation of intelligence regarding Soviet motivations for the deployment.  
Kennedy, along with many other EXCOMM members and other Americans 
viewed the Soviets as an aggressive, expansionist power.  This led him to believe 
the Soviets were placing missiles in Cuba to gain an offensive advantage over the 
U.S. (to leverage the allies out of Berlin or gain the international political 
initiative over the U.S.).  This interpretation is fundamentally different from one 
which assessed the Soviet motivation was for defensive purposes (defending Cuba 
from a future US attack or rectifying the strategic nuclear imbalance).  This drove 
Kennedy to conclude that Soviet missiles must be eliminated from Cuba either 
through a quarantine or through military action.  Anything less would signal a 
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weakening of American prestige, loss of trust with our allies, and emboldening 
the Soviet Union to take advantage of the situation in Berlin, Laos, the Taiwan 
Straits, or other trouble spots.  According to Raymond Garthoff, one of the 
foremost scholars on the Cuban Missile Crisis, material from Soviet archival and 
memoir sources now shed some light on the facts regarding Soviet motivation for 
the deployment, yet questions remain.  We now know that Khrushchev had three 
primary motivations:   
1) “a need to shore up the strategic balance with the United States,  
2) a perceived need to deter an attack by the United States on Cuba and 
 3) a belief that a successful missile deployment in Cuba analogous to US 
deployments around the Soviet Union would give the United States a dose of its 
own medicine and would have a powerful positive impact on world politic as 
reinforcing Soviet attempts to gain political parity with the United States.” 
(Garthoff, 1998, p. 24)   
Kennedy, DCI McCone, and the National Intelligence Estimates placed 
their greatest emphasis on the Soviet’s desire to enhance their strategic nuclear 
position vis-a-vis the United States and strengthen their international political 
standing.  Kennedy’s prior views regarding Soviet motivations may have biased 
his interpretation of intelligence and led him to discount the possibility the Soviets 
also had defensive motivations, which indeed they did (Garthoff, 1998, p. 24).  
Had Kennedy placed greater weight on Khrushchev’s defensive motivation it 
could have led the president to the same conclusion held by Secretary of Defense 
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McNamara, that the Soviet deployment did not radically shift the strategic nuclear 
balance.  That conclusion could have led Kennedy to an accommodation with the 
Soviet which may have left the offensive nuclear weapons in place in Cuba.   
In summary, strategic warning was less than ideal in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis case; a series of factors came together which precluded more advanced 
intelligence warning to the president of Soviet offensive nuclear weapons in 
Cuba.  However, tactical intelligence provided during the crisis enabled President 
Kennedy to develop alternate potential courses of action and helped him decide 
the appropriate US response.  Kennedy was highly receptive towards the 
intelligence he received based on the overall professional relationship with the 
intelligence community and its leadership and the gravity of the situation at hand.  
Kennedy’s potential biases may have influenced his interpretation of intelligence, 
but his interpretation of Soviet motivations was partially correct and was not 
flawed to the extent that it prevented him from adopting an effective policy to 
counter the Soviet missile deployment and bring the crisis to a peaceful end on 
terms favorable to the United States.
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CHAPTER 4 – THE SOVIET WAR SCARE OF 1983 
The 1983 Soviet War Scare refers to a series of events which culminated 
during North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Exercise Able Archer 83 
between November 7-11, 1983.  This exercise and a series of events leading up to 
this training event caused the Soviet Union to become very concerned the United 
States and its NATO allies were preparing to launch a preemptive nuclear war 
against the U.S.S.R. and its Warsaw Pact allies.  This is the backdrop for the 
second case study. 
This case examines what is perhaps the closest the Soviets came to 
launching a nuclear attack against the West based on their intelligence assessment 
of Western capabilities and intentions.  Additionally, new information has 
recently been revealed in the now declassified 1990 President’s Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) study which sheds more light on NATO 
Exercise Able Archer 83, a central event in understanding the Soviet War Scare of 
1983.  Nate Jones from the National Security Archive was instrumental in 
working to declassify this key document through the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) process and the subsequent national press coverage renewed interest in 
this interesting period of Cold War nuclear history.  The National Security 
Archive and the Wilson Center have taken the lead in providing researchers and 
the public numerous primary source documents on this crisis.  These documents 
tell the story of how Soviet fear of an imminent US/NATO nuclear attack 
continued to build in the early 1980s.  Fueled by a combination of factors 
including:  a renewed US commitment to defeat Soviet Communism, the 
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deployment of new nuclear weapons in Europe, the Soviet’s realization that the 
“correlation of forces” was turning against them, and their historic fear of western 
domination, Soviet senior leaders, notably General Secretary Yuri Andropov, the 
former Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) Chairman, became 
increasingly frightened of the US/NATO threat.41  Many senior Soviet leaders 
truly believed the U.S. and NATO were capable and looking for opportunities to 
conduct a debilitating nuclear first-strike against the Soviet Union.  Based on this 
profound and growing fear, the Soviet Union launched a special high-priority, 
resources-intensive, indications and warning intelligence program called 
Operation RYAN.42  The mission of this special program was to gain a better 
understanding of the threat through systematic monitoring of US/NATO political 
and military activities to avoid potentially catastrophic surprise (Hoffman, 2009, 
p. 36).  Perhaps most troubling in reviewing this case was the lack of US 
understanding of the depth and seriousness of Soviet fear.  US leaders at the time 
had absolutely no intention of launching a bolt-out-of-the-blue surprise nuclear 
attack and the very thought seemed so farfetched that they never contemplated the 
Soviets would fear an unprovoked, surprise US nuclear attack.  This situation 
made it easy for US leaders to quickly dismiss reports of Soviet concerns as mere 
propaganda.  Only later, through information provided by Soviet KGB defector 
                                                 
41 Please see the section titled “Sources of Soviet Anxiety” later in this chapter for a detailed 
discussion of both the long-term, strategic as well as the short-term, situational factors which 
contributed to Soviet fear of a pending US/NATO nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. 
42 Operation RYAN was a special, high-priority Soviet/Warsaw Pact intelligence collection and 
analysis program to provide senior Soviet military and political leaders warning of a pending 
US/NATO nuclear missile attack against the Soviet Union.  The Russian-language acronym 
RYAN or VYRAN are short for the Russian words vnezapnoe raketno yadernoye napadeniye – 
translated as sudden or surprise nuclear missile attack. 
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Oleg Gordievsky, did President Reagan learn of the deep fear the Soviet 
leadership was experiencing.  To his credit, President Reagan modified his 
rhetoric and policies to better account for the genuine fear the Soviets were 
experiencing and moved the world away from the dangerous precipice of nuclear 
confrontation in the early 1980s. 
This chapter argues General Secretary Andropov and his senior advisors 
failed to make accurate situation assessments during the November 1983 NATO 
Able Archer Exercise.  The KGB, the GRU,43 and the intelligence services of 
their Warsaw Pact allies did not provide quality intelligence to Soviet leaders due 
to an overly politicized system which demanded intelligence that conformed with 
senior political and military leader’s threat perceptions.  The Soviet leadership 
was highly receptive toward intelligence.  The senior Soviet leader, Yuri 
Andropov, was a career KGB officer and rose to lead that organization before 
assuming the role of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union.  He was in a very unique position of having great insight into the strengths 
and weaknesses of that organization and was very familiar with its sources and 
methods for collecting and analyzing intelligence on Western nuclear capabilities 
and intentions.  This familiarity led Andropov to trust in his intelligence services 
and in the intelligence products they provided the senior Soviet leadership.  The 
Soviets also failed to objectively evaluate their intelligence.  Their historical, 
deep-seated fear of the West; combined with US/NATO deployments of advanced 
nuclear weapons, capable of decapitating the Soviet leadership in 10-12 minutes; 
                                                 
43 The GRU (Glavnoye razvedyvatel'noye upravleniye) is the acronym for Soviet military 
intelligence (subordinate to the Soviet General Staff). 
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President Reagan’s strident anti-Soviet rhetoric; and a series of destabilizing 
events in 1983 led the Soviets to the point where fear, as opposed to rational 
analysis, drove their threat assessment of the U.S. and NATO.  This final factor 
contributed to other failures which resulted in the Soviet misperception of NATO 
intentions.  This situation led the world perilously close to nuclear conflict in 
1983.  Catastrophe was averted through the enlightened leadership of President 
Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and others who finally realized just how dangerous 
the situation had become. 
This chapter is organized as follows:  first, I provide an overview of the 
1983 NATO Able Archer exercise, the high point in a series of events in 1983 on 
the road to potential nuclear conflict.  While far less has been written about this 
series of events than the Cuban Missile Crisis, there is a growing body of 
literature, especially since the 2015 declassification of the 1990 President’s 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) study, on this crisis.44  An 
emerging body of literature is growing as scholars study the decisions and actions 
of both the US and Soviet governments during this period and the implications for 
nuclear crisis management in the future.  Following a brief introduction to this 
crisis, I will provide some additional context which will help the reader better 
understand the climate of fear the Soviet leadership was operating under when 
they received warning intelligence and made situation assessments based on that 
intelligence.  The next section characterizes the quality of the warning intelligence 
                                                 
44 The PFIAB study is considered the definitive study of the Soviet War Scare based on hundreds 
of all-source intelligence documents and over 75 interviews with US and British officials.  It is the 
only study written by authors with access to all US intelligence and the Soviet response to Able 
Archer 83 (Jones, 2016, p. 44).   
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used to inform decisions in reaction to US and NATO activities.  I then discuss 
how Soviet leaders interpreted the intelligence they received to determine if they 
used the information in an objective way to make situation assessment or if other 
factors biased their judgement of the intelligence.  Finally, the chapter concludes 
with an overall analysis concerning whether the Soviets made an accurate current 
situation assessment regarding the events surrounding NATO Exercise Able 
Archer 83. 
Key Events 
The events of 1983 brought the United States and the Soviet Union closer 
to nuclear confrontation than at any other time except the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis.  Fall 1983 was a period of increased tension as demonstrated through 
inflamed rhetoric and specific, provocative incidents.  NATO Exercise Able 
Archer 83 was a high point of the crisis in which the Soviets believed NATO was 
preparing to launch a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union.  The five-day 
exercise ran from November 7-11, 1983 and was part of a series of NATO 
military exercises known as Autumn Forge.  The goal of Exercise Able Archer 
was to practice command and control procedures required to release nuclear 
weapons in a wartime environment.  The exercise scenario followed the usual 
escalatory formulation in which Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces had invaded a NATO 
ally (Norway in this scenario) followed by wide-scale air and naval attacks 
against NATO bases in Europe.  The simulated conflict quickly escalated into a 
theater-level war across the European continent.  NATO forces initially resisted 
Soviet aggression which led the Soviets to escalate the conflict using chemical 
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weapons.  NATO forces quickly responded in kind to this new phase of the 
conflict by using chemical weapons in retaliation (Jones, 2016, p. 2).  As the 
simulated conflict continued, NATO forces were no longer able to maintain the 
defense and NATO’s senior military commander requested permission for initial, 
limited use of nuclear weapons against pre-selected fixed targets.  NATO’s 
political leaders granted the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) 
permission to destroy Eastern European cities with NATO nuclear weapons to 
halt the Soviet invasion of Western Europe.  Although the scenario was fictitious 
and designed as a backdrop to test and train tactical nuclear weapon release 
procedures, the Soviets believed the exercise was merely cover for NATO 
preparations for an actual nuclear attack on the Soviet Union and/or their Warsaw 
Pact allies.  The Soviet reactions to this exercise included increased intelligence 
activity to monitor the exercise from an indications and warning perspective as 
well as increased force readiness levels at select military bases (President’s 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Report [PFIAB Report], The Soviet War 
Scare, 1990, p. 70).  The Soviet concern with this exercise was also fueled by 
variations from previous years’ exercise patterns.  In 1983, NATO tested new 
procedures and moved simulated fielded nuclear forces from the Normal Alert 
stage up to General Alert, whereas in the past the exercise started in the General 
Alert phase (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 70).  The 
combination of the scripted command post exercise plus actual physical activity 
related to NATO nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons handling and field 
deployment of nuclear-equipped military units) further heighted Soviet fear that 
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the US/NATO were indeed preparing an actual attack.  The Soviets also knew 
launching such an attack under the guise of a routine military exercise was a real 
possibility as it was a component of their own military doctrine.   
The Context 
The Soviet War Scare was in many ways the culmination of deteriorating 
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union resulting from the end 
of détente.  President Carter, had taken many steps in response to the December 
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to increase pressure on the Soviet Union 
including, imposing a grain embargo, increasing US defense spending, boycotting 
the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and withdrawing the SALT II Treaty from Senate 
ratification (Jones, 2016, p. 4).  President Reagan ran his 1980 campaign against 
Carter premised on the notion the United States had fallen behind the Soviet 
Union militarily and the Soviets were using every opportunity to take advantage 
of the United States (Jones, 2016, p. 6).  President Reagan entered office in 
January 1981 publicly decrying both the Soviet military threat and the moral 
bankruptcy of the Soviet Communist movement while at the same time privately 
corresponding with Soviet leaders about his desire for peace, highlighting both 
nations’ responsibilities for global stability.  The contradictory public and private 
statements from the President baffled Soviet leaders who called for summit 
meetings which President Reagan initially rejected.  Another seeming paradox 
quickly emerged in Reagan’s private calls for nuclear arms reductions and 
disarmament in his private letters to Soviet leaders while at the same time 
embarking on one of the largest US military buildups in history (Jones, 2016, p. 
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7-9).45  These contradictions confounded Soviet thinking about the new President 
but Reagan was pursuing a new strategy, one aimed at not just accommodating 
the Soviet Union as had been the norm under détente, but in actively developing 
and executing a plan to reduce the danger of nuclear war and eventually to defeat 
the Soviet Union. 
A great deal of what we know today about the Soviet War Scare of 1983 
comes from the recently declassified President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board study of 1990.  Nate Jones at the National Security Archive aggressively 
pursued the declassification process to provide scholars access to this key 
document summarizing this dangerous Cold War period.  This PFIAB study 
reveals that while the Reagan administration was publicly warning about growing 
Soviet strategic nuclear superiority and taking concrete measures to rapidly 
enhance US military strength, including nuclear capabilities, the Soviets believed 
their nuclear defenses where inferior and deeply feared a US surprise attack.   
Vulnerability of Soviet Nuclear Forces to a US/NATO Nuclear Surprise 
Attack 
Soviet leaders in the early 1980s, despite their rhetoric which highlighted 
the superiority of Soviet Communism, fully realized the strategic nuclear balance 
was not favorable for the Soviet Union.  Three major factors contributed to this 
Soviet problem:  1) deficiencies in their early warning network, 2) highly 
centralized command and control, and 3) strategic nuclear forces that were never 
a full readiness levels (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 38).  The 
                                                 
45 President Reagan proposed a $2.7 trillion defense budget for 1982-1989, including a 18.1% 
increase in the 1983 defense budget. 
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Soviet had grown used to these shortfalls and seemed to tolerate them based on 
their belief, up to the late 1970s, in the unlikelihood of a US surprise attack 
(PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 38).  Additionally, Soviet 
doctrine, like US doctrine, held that a nuclear conflict probably would not result 
from a bolt-out-of-the-blue type scenario, but would follow a somewhat 
predictable chain of events.  Both sides believed a nuclear war would occur based 
on a degeneration of the political/military situation which progressed over time 
resulting in multiple stages of escalation.  The conflict would start with a major 
political crisis, leading to a conventional military conflict, then to theater-level 
nuclear war,46 and finally to a full-exchange of intercontinental, strategic nuclear 
weapons.  Soviet belief in the quality and capabilities of their intelligence system 
and the generally open nature of Western democracies may have also contributed 
to their prior tolerance of strategic nuclear vulnerability (PFIAB Report, The 
Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 38).  This is not to say the Soviets were complacent.  
They built, deployed, and maintained silo-based strategic nuclear weapons 
systems47 and ensured Soviet nuclear forces maintained high readiness levels to 
deter a US nuclear strike. 
Recognizing serious problems with their early warning network in the late 
1970s, the Soviets engaged in an ambitious program to close that critical 
vulnerability.  Prior to the early 1980s, Soviet leaders could only expect 
approximately 13 minutes of warning time of a US intercontinental ballistic 
                                                 
46 Which would probably also involve the initial use of chemical weapons by the Soviets and 
possibly by the US in retaliation. 
47 In addition to their manned-bomber and submarine-launched ballistic missile forces. 
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missile (ICBM) attack and between 5-15 minutes of warning for a submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) attack (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 
1990, p. 39).  In response to this unacceptable situation, the Soviets built and 
fielded new ballistic missile early warning radars and two new over-the-horizon 
radars (which were completed in 1981) to enhance their ground-based early 
warning coverage (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 39).  
Additionally, by 1983 the Soviets further enhanced their warning capabilities by 
launching a series of space-based, infrared, launch detection satellites which 
covered ICBM launch sites in the continental United States.  These improvements 
increased warning times from 13 to 30 minutes for US ICBMs and from 5-15 
minutes to a little more than 15 minutes against US SLBMs (PFIAB Report, The 
Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 39).  These gains in warning time and subsequent 
decision making time were quickly reversed with the deployment of US Pershing 
II missiles systems in late 1983.  This reduced first-strike warning time against the 
Soviet leadership in Moscow to approximately 8-10 minutes (PFIAB Report, The 
Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 39).   
In the early 1980s, the Soviets also became extremely concerned about 
their ability to effectively command and control their nuclear forces given the 
extremely tight decision making timelines that would be at play and the extreme 
duress their leaders would face resulting from compressed decision timelines.  
Deterrence in peacetime and operational warfighting in conflict depends on 
having a credible, reliable means for launching nuclear weapons should the need 
arise.  Given the centralization of nuclear release authority in both the United 
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States and the Soviet Union, leadership survivability and decision making 
performance are two key aspects of effective command and control.  During this 
period of increasing Soviet vulnerability, both elements came into question.  The 
United States assessed nuclear release authority during the Soviet War Scare 
period probably rested in the hands of the General Secretary of the Communist 
Party and the Minister of Defense.  In scenarios with extremely limited decision 
making time, the General Secretary was the sole nuclear release authority (PFIAB 
Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 40).  Recognizing the importance of 
leadership survival, the Soviets undertook a decades-long program to build a wide 
array of hardened and deeply buried command and control facilities in the Soviet 
Union, many near Moscow, to protect the senior leadership during a nuclear 
crisis/attack.  In a real-life scenario, after the US Pershing II deployment to 
Germany in late 1983, Soviet leaders would have only had 8 minutes to move to 
an underground command post near Moscow (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War 
Scare, 1990, p. 39).48  During this period, the senior Soviet leadership would need 
to consult with advisors, including military officials, agree on the appropriate 
response, and communicate nuclear attack orders to the General Staff.  Effectively 
executing such a series of movements and decisions would certainly have been 
challenging.  Failure would mean the Soviet nuclear arsenal would remain idle, 
vulnerable to attack.  On the positive side, from a Soviet perspective, their nuclear 
                                                 
48 The US Army Pershing II missile had an 1800 km range and would not have reached Moscow 
from its deployment sites in West Germany.  However, Soviet intelligence believed this system 
had a range of 2500 km, an accuracy of 30 meters, and an earth-penetrating warhead.  With these 
capabilities the Soviets believed it was designed to strike command and control targets in the 
Moscow area with little to no warning (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 39). 
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weapons were secured using encrypted codes and they had made improvements to 
communications systems to ensure launch orders would move quickly and 
reliably to fielded forces once the Soviet nuclear command authority made the 
nuclear launch decision.   
The PFIAB concluded that a critical weakness in the Soviet nuclear 
command and control system resulted from the relatively rapid succession of aged 
Soviet leaders between 1980-1984 (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, 
p. 41).  Three aged, ailing, Soviet General Secretaries died over a three-year 
period.49   Several senior Soviet military officers doubted whether the political 
leadership could make such momentous decisions due to their advanced age and 
ill health.  The PFIAB study cites three public occasions in which Marshal 
Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff, raised such concerns during the terms of 
General Secretaries Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko (PFIAB Report, The 
Soviet War Scare, 1990, pp. 41-42).   
Soviet leaders during this period realized many components of their 
nuclear arsenal were highly vulnerable to a debilitating first-strike.  The one 
element of the Soviet nuclear arsenal which provided a credible deterrent was 
their silo-based ICBM force operated by the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF).  This 
force had demonstrated their capability to launch nuclear missiles under exercise 
conditions prior to simulated US nuclear weapon impacting their silos, however 
                                                 
49 General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, 75, died on November 10, 1982, Yuri Andropov served 
from November 10, 1982 to February 9, 1984 and died at age 69, and finally Konstantin 
Chernenko served from February 9, 1984 to March 10, 1985 and died at 73.  All three leaders died 
in office. 
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their performance would probably not be as impressive under more challenging 
wartime conditions.   
The Soviets used their SRF forces to compensate for significant 
vulnerabilies in other areas of their strategic nuclear triad and tactical nuclear 
systems.  Surprisingly, Soviet strategic bombers, maintained and operated by 
Soviet Air Force Long Range Aviation units were kept at low states of readiness.  
Unlike their B-52 counterparts in the United States, Soviet Tu-95 BEAR bombers 
were not kept on strip alert.  US intelligence estimated it would take from hours to 
days to ready this part of the Soviet nuclear force for combat.  The Soviets must 
have believed their entire manned bomber force would have been wiped out in a 
US surprise nuclear strike (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 42).   
Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile forces were also highly 
vulnerable.  The Soviets deployed only about 1 in 6 of these boats at any given 
time and kept the vast bulk of their remaining SLBM force in port, vulnerable to 
US surprise attack.  Even the submarines that were on patrol, while in a much 
better defensive position than their counterparts in port, where susceptible to US 
attack given the high level of effort and expertise the US Navy developed to hunt 
and attack Soviet nuclear submarines.  The Soviets were well aware of the 
effectiveness of that effort based on the Jonathan Walker and Jerry Whitworth 
espionage efforts the Soviets had orchestrated (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War 
Scare, 1990, pp. 42-43). 
Soviet theater nuclear forces directed against NATO units in Europe were 
also dangerously susceptible to US first-strike attack which would have 
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neutralized their capability prior to employment.  Field deploying Soviet short- 
and intermediate-range nuclear missile units and artillery units supplied with 
nuclear weapons would have required significant logistic and security support.  
The time-consuming process of readying these systems for operational use was 
much longer than the time period for US forces to engage these units while they 
were still in garrison, thus leaving them highly vulnerable targets for a US first-
strike. 
US and NATO actions, in response to the Soviet SS-20 nuclear missile 
deployment in the late 1970s, further exacerbated Soviet nuclear vulnerability 
fears.  An early part of Reagan’s plan to more aggressively confront the Soviets 
included the “zero option”, an effort to seek negotiations with the Soviet 
regarding eliminating their SS-20 intermediate range nuclear missiles which 
threatened US allies and troops in Europe in exchange for cancelling pending 
deployment of US Pershing II and Gryphon Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles 
(GLCMs).  The Soviets refused that offer and President Reagan, despite a 
significant popular opposition in Europe, responded by continuing the planned 
deployment of these two nuclear systems to US bases in Germany (Pershing II 
and GLCM) as well as to bases in Italy, the UK, Belgium, and the Netherlands 
(GLCM).  The Soviet KGB and East German intelligence tracked the deployment 
and closely monitored the operational status of these missiles as a top collection 
and analysis priority. 
While macro-level forces were at work such as the end of détente, 
President Reagan’s increasingly firm anti-Soviet rhetoric and massive defensive 
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buildup, and increasing Soviet realization of their strategic nuclear vulnerability, 
specific events also contributed to Soviet fears of an imminent US nuclear attack 
leading up to the 1983 NATO Exercise Able Archer.  Specifically, the Soviet 
shootdown of South Korean Airlines KAL 007 on September 1, 1983, a major 
incident involving erroneous US nuclear launch warnings on September 26, and 
Andropov’s rapidly deteriorating health situation in October 1983 contributed to 
Soviet fear of an imminent US/NATO nuclear attack. 
 The Soviet Shootdown of KAL 007 
The fall of 1983 was one of the tensest periods in US-Soviet relations.  On 
September 1, 1983, the Soviet Air Force shot down South Korean Airlines flight 
KAL 007 over Sakhalin Island50 killing all passengers and crewmembers on 
board.  Although it quickly became clear to the U.S. that the Soviets had 
misidentified the civilian Boeing 747 airliner51 for a U.S. Air Force RC-135 
which was flying an intelligence collection mission in international airspace near 
the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Reagan Administration seized upon this Soviet 
error to further depict the Soviet Union as an evil, despotic regime.  The Reagan 
Administration publicly portrayed this as just the latest incident in a long 
                                                 
50 KAL 007 ultimately crashed into the Pacific Ocean 9-11 nautical miles from the Sakhalin Island 
coast, according to KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov (Kryuchkov & Mielke, September 19, 
1983, p. 1-19). 
51 KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov in a personal meeting with East German Minister for State 
Security Mielke on September 19, 1983 discussed how the Soviets did not know the aircraft was a 
civilian airliner and thought it was a military reconnaissance aircraft.  Kryuchkov explained, “We 
did not know that the downed plane was a civilian airliner. Our pilots were not aware of that. We 
were convinced that it was a military aircraft. When the regional ground command issued its 
orders, it did not know it was a civilian airliner. We are not going to make this public, but this was 
just how it was. We were convinced that this was a special aircraft on a specific reconnaissance 
mission” (Kryuchkov & Mielke, September 19, 1983, p. 1-19). 
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campaign which revealed the Soviets’ wanton disregard for human life.  The 
Soviets compounded the seriousness of the situation by their reaction in which 
they accused the United States of using the civilian airliner as cover to collect 
intelligence and deliberately overflying Soviet territory.  In the days following the 
incident, US Government officials sought to capitalize on the tragedy, whipping 
up anti-Soviet feeling.  The US Government was working to embarrass Soviet 
officials and challenge their lies regarding the specific events connected with this 
unfortunate disaster.  Soviet leaders saw the incident as a direct provocation 
(Hoffman, 2009, p. 86).  On September 27, Deputy DCI Robert Gates provided 
Secretary of State Schultz with an intelligence assessment that stated US-Soviet 
relations were as “pervasively bleak” as at any time since Stalin’s death in 1953.  
Gates recognized the Soviets feared the Reagan Administration more than any 
other presidential administration in history (Hoffman, 2009, p. 86). 
On September 28, 1983, General Secretary Andropov issued what David 
Hoffman, author of The Dead Hand, characterizes as one of the “harshest 
condemnations ever of the United States” (Hoffman, 2009, pp. 86-87).  
Andropov’s statement was published in Pravda and Izvestia and read on the 
evening television news broadcast.  Andropov characterized the Reagan 
Administration as on “a militarist course that represents a serious threat to peace 
(Hoffman, 2009, pp. 86-87).  “If anyone had any illusion about the possibility of 
an evolution to the better in the policy of the present American administration, 
these illusions are completely dispelled now” (Dobrynin, 1995, p. 540).  Soviet 
Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin said, “The Soviet leadership 
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had collectively arrived at the conclusion that any agreement with Reagan was 
impossible” (Hoffman, 2009, p. 87 as cited in Gates, 1996, p. 290).   
The Serpukhaov-15 Early Warning Launch Incident 
September 26, 1983 would prove to be an eventful and dangerous day in 
the long history of the Cold War and a contributor to the crisis situation which 
was developing in the months leading up to the NATO Exercise Able Archer 83.  
The world came much closer to nuclear war that day based on an erroneous 
launch indication.  David Hoffman lays out the details of this fascinating incident 
in his book, The Dead Hand.  The key figure in this amazing story is 44-year old 
Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, the senior watch officer on duty at the top-
secret Serpukhov-15 missile attack early warning center south of Moscow.  Lt Col 
Petrov was not a line watch officer, but a systems engineer, whose day-to-day job 
was to monitor and improve the computer systems which processed sensor data 
from a series of Soviet infrared (IR) “Oko” satellites which monitored US ICBM 
fields.  On this night, he would serve as the senior watch officer responsible for 
providing Soviet leaders the warning time they needed to formulate a response to 
a nuclear missile attack from the U.S.  The center relied on data from seven 
orbiting satellites and contained the most advanced supercomputer in the Soviet 
Union which processed the IR satellite sensor data on-site (Hoffman, 2009, p. 7).  
The M-10 supercomputer processed the constantly streaming, incoming data 
using signature analysis to detect potential missile launches.  The system was also 
designed with a backup optical camera which allowed ground-based operators at 
the warning site to visually verify US missile launch activity (Hoffman, 2009, p. 
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8).  Lt Col Petrov was a veteran officer having worked at the center for 11 years, 
however, the satellite system was new, had been hastily rushed into service in late 
1982, and the men working the system were told to work out any potential 
problems as they became more familiar with the system (Hoffman, 2009, p. 8).  
The ballistic missile early warning system, which had been in development since 
the early 1970s, was plagued with problems.  Only 7 of the first 13 satellites 
launched from 1972-1979 worked for more than 100 days (Podvig, 2002, p. 31 as 
cited in Hoffman, 2009, p. 10).  The Soviets were in a race to increase their early 
warning time over the 7-10 minutes their existing ground-based early warning 
radars could provide.  The US already had a space-based IR warning constellation 
in orbit and the Soviets had rushed to build an equivalent system. 
Lt Col Petrov was highly attuned to the political atmosphere in which he 
operated.  He was aware of the increasing fear which had griped the Soviet 
political and military leadership.  He knew the importance of his mission, to 
provide Soviet leaders the warning time they needed to assess the current 
situation, make decisions, and launch a nuclear counter-attack against the US 
should he provide a valid missile warning.  He also believed the likelihood of a 
nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers was remote, given the 
enormous destruction that would result (Hoffman, 2009, p. 9).   
The most significant event in Lt Col Petrov’s military career occurred at 
0015, in the middle of the night, when suddenly the bright red letters “LAUNCH” 
appeared flashing on the panel across the top of the room on the watch floor.  
According to Hoffman’s account, a siren wailed, a light indicating the US launch 
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base lit up, and other electronic panels indicated a missile launch and a validity 
assessment: “high reliability”.  This series of events had never happened before, 
and the warning team was stunned.  Petrov immediately exercised command and 
ordered his technicians and operators to quickly start checking the system for 
anomalies to determine if this was merely a bug in the computer system or a real 
US ICBM launch.  Petrov personally worked hard to quickly review the incoming 
streams of data to assess the launch validity.  The system operators monitoring the 
optical camera on the satellite could not confirm a valid launch.  Petrov believed 
it was highly unlikely the Americans would start World War III with the launch of 
a single ICBM and continued to work diligently to figure out what was 
happening.  Under time pressure, Petrov called his supervisors and reported a 
“false alarm” although at that point he was not sure that was true.  In the middle 
of that phone call, the panel lit up again with a second missile launch, then a third, 
a fourth, and a fifth launch.  The flashing alert had changed from “LAUNCH” to 
“MISSILE ATTACK” which triggered an automated message to senior Soviet 
military officers.  Without any additional information, Lt Col Petrov again told 
the duty officer at his higher headquarters this was all a false alarm.  That “false 
alarm” message from one sensible, Soviet military officer saved the US from a 
retaliatory nuclear strike (Hoffman, 2009, p. 11).  After initial praise from Soviet 
authorities for his calm leadership, he was criticized for failing to record key 
event details in his logbook.  The Soviet investigation into the incident faulted Lt 
Col Petrov and he received a reprimand.52  Sunlight, reflecting from the top of 
                                                 
52 Lt Col Petrov died in May 2017. 
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clouds, caused the false alarm.  The Soviets re-wrote the computer software to 
account for this natural phenomenon to prevent a recurrence of this type of false 
alarm (Chan, 2017).   
The dangerous strategic political and military situation in the fall of 1983 
and Soviet assessments of trends in the correlation of forces moving into the mid-
1980s and beyond, characterized by the increasing vulnerability of Soviet nuclear 
forces, incidents such as the Soviet shootdown of KAL 007, the Serpukhaov-15 
early warning incident, and rapid turnover in the Soviet’s senior-most political 
leadership, provide the context for analyzing this case study.  These negative 
trends and provocative incidents provide a backdrop to better understand how the 
KGB/GRU formulated intelligence warning, how receptive Soviet leaders were to 
intelligence, and how they interpreted intelligence to formulate situation 
assessments.  The remainder of this chapter evaluates each of these elements to 
determine the accuracy of Soviet situational assessments prior to and during 
NATO Exercise Able Archer. 
Warning Intelligence Quality 
Intelligence Sources 
The Soviet Union developed a strategic indications and warning system 
which focused on a US/NATO nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union as a 
primary intelligence warning problem.  They called this system RYAN.  The 
history of this intelligence warning system is fascinating.  Nate Jones, from the 
National Security Archive, has written the definitive book on NATO Exercise 
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Able Archer 83 and RYAN53 is a prominent feature in his analysis.  Additionally, 
the 1990 PFIAB study and David Hoffman’s book, Dead Hand, describe how this 
system was designed to provide senior Soviet leaders strategic warning of a US 
surprise nuclear attack.  Operation RYAN began when the KGB’s First Chief 
Directorate54 and the Institute for Intelligence started working in 1979 on 
developing new concepts to provide the Soviet Union warning of nuclear attack 
(Jones, 2016, pp. 12-13).   
The result of this initial conceptual work was rolled out at a major KGB 
conference in Moscow in May 1981 in which General Secretary Brezhnev and 
KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov warned the conference attendees that the US was 
“actively preparing for nuclear war” (Jones, 2016, p. 13).  The KGB began in 
earnest in 1981 and 1982 to collect and analyze intelligence in the context of this 
new strategic warning framework (Jones, 2016, p. 13).  The Soviets tasked their 
Warsaw Pact allies to also collect and forward intelligence reporting based on 
Operation RYAN indicators to KGB headquarters in Moscow (Wolf, 1997, p. 
246).  The KGB valued the Czechoslovak intelligence service and cited it as the 
second-best effort (behind the KGB, of course) in fulfilling RYAN’s intelligence 
requirements (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, pp. 82-83).  The East 
German intelligence service, the Ministry for State Security’s foreign intelligence 
directorate (MfS-HVA)55 was also a key player in this effort.  This directorate, led 
                                                 
53 Different documents refer to this special intelligence warning effort as either RYAN or VYRAN 
which is an acronym for the Russian words vnezapnoe raketno yadernoye napadeniye – meaning 
sudden or surprise nuclear missile attack. 
54 The KGB First Chief Directorate was tasked with collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence 
including against the “main enemy”, the United States. 
55 This was the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) in the East German Ministry for State 
Security.   
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by Markus Wolf, was well-positioned to collect and analyze information on US 
deployment of Pershing II and GLCM missiles in West Germany based on its 
extensive human intelligence network, and active, effective signal intelligence 
collection efforts against those intelligence targets in West Germany.56  Wolf took 
on the KGB-directed task and established a special staff and a situation center to 
coordinate this collection and analysis effort (Wolf, 1997, p. 264).  Wolf 
discussed the East German contribution to the KGB-led operation in his 1997 
memoir, Man Without a Face, and voiced his skepticism of Operation RYAN, 
which he makes clear, was ordered from above by his KGB masters and not open 
for debate.  Wolf’s doubt stemmed from his skepticism about the probability of 
nuclear war in Europe, but he did recognize the increasing intensity in the global 
competition between the US and the Soviet Union (Wolf, 1997, p. 247). 
One of the more intriguing aspects of this operation was the Soviet attempt 
to build and operate a complex computer system designed to evaluate the 
“correlation of forces” based on collected RYAN data which the KGB used to 
objectively calculate the relative standing of the Soviet Union to the United States 
and warn their senior leaders of trends which the computer calculated could lead 
to a US nuclear first-strike against their country.  The KGB operated under the 
assumption that “if the U.S. obtained decisive, overall superiority, it might be 
included to launch a surprise attack on the Soviet Union” (PFIAB Report, The 
Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 44).  The system was designed to “warn when Soviet 
                                                 
56 The author reviewed many signal intelligence and finished intelligence reports on the US 
Pershing II and GLCM deployment and operational status in the MfS archive in Berlin in 
November 2017. 
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relative strength had declined to the point that a preemptive Soviet attack might 
be justified” (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. vi).  The Soviet 
programmed the computer to quantitatively determine the relative level of US 
superiority and Soviet intelligence analysts believed the quantitative nature of the 
system would provide accurate strategic warning (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War 
Scare, 1990, p. 44). 
The 1990 PFIAB report on the Soviet war scare details how this computer 
system functioned.  Soviet military and economic specialists built the computer 
model consisting of 40,000 weighted elements.  Software continuously processed 
and evaluated economic, political, and military data elements the Soviets assessed 
were important based on their experience in World War II (PFIAB Report, The 
Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 44).  The Soviets inserted data, not just foreign 
intelligence information, but also data about the Soviet Union, to allow the 
computer to make relative evaluations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.  It is 
clear this was a high priority effort that extended beyond just the KGB into other 
areas of the Soviet government.  A special organization in the KGB, consisting of 
approximately 200 employees, was responsible for data input and given the poor 
state of Soviet computing technology, one can assume the cost of building and 
operating such a computer system must have been quite high (PFIAB Report, The 
Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 44).   
The way the computer model calculated the relative strength of the Soviet 
Union versus the United States is intriguing.  The U.S. was given a fixed score of 
100 and the computer would then use economic, political, and military data inputs 
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to calculate the relative strength of the Soviet Union.  At any value of 60 or 
above, Soviet leaders deemed the situation as safe, but they desired to maintain a 
level of at least 70 to provide a more comfortable margin.  Data was continuously 
fed into the computer and thus a relative assessment could be made at any time.  
The Soviet Politburo received reports from the RYAN computer monthly (PFIAB 
Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, pp. 44-45).  By 1984, after the Able Archer 
exercise, the RYAN computer assessed relative Soviet power with a score of 45, 
which was nearing the predetermined threshold of 40 which the KGB viewed as 
critical.  A score under 40 would prompt the KGB and the Soviet military 
leadership to inform their political leadership that the nation’s security was in 
jeopardy at which point the Soviets would begin preparations for a preemptive 
attack against the United States and/or NATO within a few weeks (PFIAB 
Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 45).   
Much of what we now know about Operation RYAN comes from former 
KGB Colonel Oleg Gordievsky, based on extensive debriefings after his defection 
to the West in July 1985.  Soviet double agent Gordievsky passed along 
information about this computer system to his British case officers.  He also 
detailed how Soviet leaders had come to believe the US was achieving a strategic 
advantage over the Soviet Union and how they believed US leaders were more 
willing to use nuclear weapons much earlier in a crisis than previously thought 
(PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 22). 
The impetus for developing the RYAN computer model was the KGB’s 
increasing concern that, given the ever-more complex nature of the Western 
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scientific and technological advances and the US-Soviet relationship, future 
assessment of the strategic balance was becoming extremely difficult.  The KGB 
raised these concerns to the Soviet Politburo in the late 1970s, and the Politburo 
approved of the RYAN operational concept as a means for addressing this 
intelligence problem. 
The East German Intelligence Service Role in Operation RYAN 
 Operation RYAN, the Soviet/Warsaw Pact effort to detect a surprise 
nuclear attack, was the top intelligence priority for the Soviet KGB in the early 
1980s.  The Soviets also tasked their Eastern European allies with collecting and 
forwarding intelligence in support of this massive collection initiative.  The East 
German and Czechoslovakian intelligence services were the most highly valued 
contributors to the overall Soviet effort.  Although RYAN had become 
operational in May 1981, the East German program was still in its infancy during 
the Able Archer exercise in November 1983.  East German participation in the 
RYAN effort did not begin until January 1983.  Senior KGB intelligence leaders, 
such as Chairman Chebrikov, met with East German Minister for State Security 
Erik Mielke to share conceptual thinking and operational details of the program.  
The KGB had provided the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS) with 
their indicators list, which Mielke called the “catalog with the surprise criteria.”57  
On February 9, 1983, Mielke indicated to his KGB counterpart, Chairman 
Viktor Chebrikov, that the MfS had read the document and was looking forward 
                                                 
57 Mielke thanked KGB Chairman Chebrikov for providing the indicators list during a meeting in 
Moscow on February 9, 1983 (Chebrikov & Mielke, February 9, 1983, p. 1-3). 
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to further work with Soviet intelligence specialists to refine the indicators.  
Chebrikov acknowledged in the meeting the indicators list was not finalized, it 
was a work in progress (Chebrikov & Mielke, February 9,1983).  Later in 1983, 
the KGB passed along their thanks to their East German counterparts for their 
intelligence work on Operation RYAN in a meeting between Minister Mielke and 
KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov on September 19, 1983 and stated General 
Secretary Andropov was reading the material the KGB and MfS provided 
(Kryuchkov & Mielke, September 19, 1983, pp. 1-19).   
Initially, the East German intelligence service had questions for the KGB 
regarding intelligence indicator lists, the organizational structure necessary to 
effectively operate, which organization within their respective intelligence 
services would be primarily responsible for RYAN operations, and how this 
intelligence would be shared across the Warsaw Pact, among other questions 
(Ministry for State Security, Issues to Discuss with the Leadership of the KGB of 
the USSR, January 14,1983, pp. 33-34).  As of early October 1983, Kryuchkov 
didn’t have answers to those questions.  He believed the First Chief Directorate 
had an important role to play but stated, “Foreign intelligence cannot shoulder this 
responsibility.  The problem is way too broad and serious” (Kryuchkov & Wolf, 
November 7, 1983, pp. 1-7).  He also recognized the complexity of the problem, 
“Chekist foreign intelligence has to deal with the studying of war preparations, 
this is to determine characteristics, phenomena, and indicators, analyze them, and 
assess whether a war can start in half a year or in a year.  For this there exists 
thousands of characteristics” (Kryuchkov & Wolf, November 7, 1983, pp. 1-7).  
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Kryuchkov acknowledged the First Main Directorate and the KGB Institute for 
Research of Operative Problems had made significant progress in conceptualizing 
indicators but stated it had not been decided yet organizationally where the 
intelligence assessment center should be located.  The prevailing thought in the 
KGB was the new watch center should be directly subordinated to the KGB 
Chairman.  Admitting the limited scope of the field effort he stated, “So far, 
foreign intelligence has submitted a few assignments to some KGB Resident 
agents abroad who have to report on them every two weeks (Bonn is among 
them)” (Kryuchkov & Wolf, November 7, 1983, pp. 3-4).58  The amount of MfS 
documentation prior to Exercise Able Archer 83 is very limited.  However, later 
documentation reveals, Operation RYAN continued well past the darkest days of 
the US-Soviet relationship in 1983.  The MfS issued Order Number 1/85 on 
February 15, 1985 with a much more comprehensive set of indicators compared 
with the 1983 version Gordievsky outlined.59  Despite the change in Soviet 
leadership and steps President Reagan, Prime Minister Thatcher, and General 
Secretary Gorbachev took to reduce tensions, Operation RYAN continued, 
probably based on bureaucratic inertia, nearly until the end of the Cold War.  
Based on reports exchanged between the KGB and the MfS, Operation RYAN 
continued until at least April 1989.60 
                                                 
58 Kryuchkov’s assessment of the status of intelligence collection may not have considered the 
level of collection the GRU was engaged in up to that time. 
59 See the Gordievsky indicator list below 
60 Based on MfS Operation Ryan reporting found at the Wilson Center Digital Archive at:  
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/224/project-ryan 
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Dr. Bernd Schaefer, who, along with Nate Jones and Ben Fischer, have 
published articles for the Wilson Center based on their study of the MfS’s role in 
Operation RYAN, assesses the MfS was a very willing and productive partner 
although he detects a tone of skepticism in the documentation: 
Many Stasi61 documents on RYAN read like overbearing bureaucratic 
exercises, aimed at comprehensiveness and perfection on paper, but 
unattainable in practice.  Phrasing in some of the MfS materials implies 
that there probably was some skepticism in higher MfS echelons about the 
program’s effectiveness and the Soviet approach (though it did not deter 
the MfS from contributing more substantive efforts than any other 
fraternal socialist intelligence service towards identifying indicators). 
(Schaefer, 2014, Forecasting Nuclear War) 
Dr. Schaefer’s assessment is confirmed in Marcus Wolf’s view of 
Operation RYAN: 
With the U.S. rearmament program and the advent of the aggressive 
Reagan administration, our Soviet partners had become obsessed with the 
danger of a nuclear missile attack, which they referred to by an acronym, 
RYAN….The HVA62 was ordered to uncover any Western plans for such 
a surprise attack, and we formed a special staff and situation center, as 
well as emergency command centers to do this.  The personnel had to 
undergo military training and participate in alarm drills.  Like most 
                                                 
61 Stasi is the colloquial name for the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS), the 
Ministerium für Staatssicherheit der DDR 
62 Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung – East German foreign intelligence service in the Ministry for 
State Security 
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intelligence people, I found these war games a burdensome waste of time, 
but these orders were no more open to discussion than other orders from 
above.  I no longer believed in the possibility of nuclear war in Europe…. 
(Wolf, 1997, pp. 246-247) 
Strategic Intelligence Warning 
The quality of strategic warning intelligence can be assessed, in part on 
the quality of the indicators in the Operation RYAN warning system.  Fortunately 
for this analysis, this secret indicator list is available.  KGB defector Oleg 
Gordievsky who along with Christopher Andrew published the indicator list in 
their 1991 book, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions:  Top Secret Files on KGB 
Foreign Operations, 1975-1985.  The KGB headquarters in Moscow sent a Top 
Secret telegram to their Residencies in Europe tasking them with a “Permanent 
Operational Assignment” to collect warning intelligence related to US/NATO 
preparations for a surprise nuclear attack against the Soviet Union.  The February 
17, 1983 memo to the KGB Residency in London, from which Gordievsky was 
operating, sheds light on the specific intelligence collection requirements the 
Soviets were interested in to provide strategic warning to the Soviet senior 
leadership of a potential nuclear attack.  The directive lists seven immediate tasks 
and 13 potential areas for collecting intelligence to support Operation RYAN.  It 
also requests field agents to make suggestions on how to accomplish the primary 
collection tasks to cover the stated indicators.  The immediate tasks included: 
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• Location of Government Officials - Collecting information about 
evacuation facilities for government officials and their families, including 
routes and evacuation methods. 
• Nuclear Fallout Shelters - Identifying civil defense shelter locations and 
the state of preparedness to accommodate the general population.  
Immediate reporting to KGB HQ is required if shelters are being readied 
for use. 
• Blood Banks – Identifying increased blood purchases from donor and the 
prices paid for blood donations.63  Determining how blood donor reception 
centers operate. 
• Civil Defense – Proposing plans for monitoring individual civil defense 
installations. 
• Leisure Areas – Identifying locations frequently visited by officials during 
non-working hours by individuals responsible for making and 
implementing nuclear attack decisions. 
• Key installations – Monitoring the most important government 
institutions, headquarters, and other installations involved in preparations 
for s surprise nuclear attack.64 
                                                 
63 This indicator is based on the Soviet assessment that burns are the most widespread injury in a 
nuclear explosion and medical treatment would require widespread blood transfusions. 
64 Interestingly, the KGB provided very specific instructions on how this collection task should be 
accomplished.  The KGB directed a normal, activity baseline should be established by counting 
the number of cars at facilities during the daytime and nighttime, the number of lighted windows 
during the daytime and nighttime, and activity levels on non-working days.  Comparing increased 
numbers of cars, occupied offices, and general activity levels between the baseline and heightened 
levels would be an indicator of potential attack.  This would allow analysts to detect increased 
activity. 
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• Host Nation Activity Against Soviet Citizens and Institutions – Reporting 
changes in police or intelligence activity relative to Soviet citizens and 
institutions65 which may be associated with a surprise nuclear attack 
(Andrew & Gordievsky, 1993, pp. 71-72). 
According to the PFIAB report, the following items constituted the top 
intelligence collection requirements to support Operation RYAN throughout the 
early 1980s.  These were the most urgent collection requirements for the KGB, 
GRU, and the intelligence services of their Warsaw Pact allies: 
• Plans and measures of the United States, other NATO countries, Japan, 
and China directed at the preparation for and unleashing of war against the 
“socialist” countries, as well as the preparation for and unleashing of 
armed conflicts in various other regions of the world. 
• Plans for hostile operational deployments and mobilizations. 
• Plans for hostile operations in the initial stage of war; primarily operations 
to deliver nuclear strikes and for assessments of aftereffects. 
• Plans indicating the preparation for and adoption and implement of 
decision by the NATO political and military leadership dealing with the 
unleashing of a nuclear war and other armed conflicts (PFIAB Report, The 
Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 58). 
Specific tasking directed against the United States: 
                                                 
65 This probably includes additional surveillance, questioning, or detention of Soviet citizens in the 
host country. 
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• Any information on President Reagan’s “flying headquarters”66 including 
individual airfields and logistic data. 
• Succession and matters of state leadership, to include attention to the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
• Information from the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary on up at the 
Department of State 
• Monitoring of activities of the National Security Council and the Vice 
President’s crisis staff 
• Monitoring of the flow of money and gold on Wall Street as well as the 
movement of high-grade jewelry, collections of rare paintings, and similar 
items (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 58). (This was 
regarded as useful geostrategic information) 
Soviet intelligence personnel were also ordered to monitor US military 
and civilian installations for indications of military mobilization or other actions 
which could indicate a potential hostile move against the Soviet Union (PFIAB 
Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 59). 
It is important to note that Soviet intelligence leaders stationed in the field, 
who had a working knowledge of the political, cultural, economic, and military 
environment were extremely skeptical that NATO would launch a first strike 
attack.  Oleg Gordievsky, a senior KGB officer in the London embassy; Oleg 
Kalugin, a career KGB officer now living in the United States; and Marcus Wolf, 
                                                 
66 Referring to the National Emergency Airborne Command Post, a Boeing E-4 which would serve 
as an airborne command post for the US National Command Authority during a nuclear 
contingency. 
183 
 
head of foreign intelligence in the East German intelligence service, all believed 
NATO did not intend to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the Soviet 
Union.  According to Gordievsky, the more isolated Soviet leaders, in Moscow, 
including General Secretary Andropov, Defense Minister Ustinov, and Chief of 
the KGB foreign intelligence directorate, Vladimir Kryuchkov were the main 
drivers of the RYAN warning effort (Jones, 2016, p. 22).  However, the 
skepticism of those operating abroad did not preclude them from following their 
orders (Andrew & Gordievsky, 1993, p. 69). 
The field operatives continued to send raw intelligence reports on 
US/NATO activities back to KGB headquarters.  Their RYAN indications and 
warning system orders called for them to only report their raw observations, 
without context or assessment to give meaning to what they had observed.  This 
missed opportunity to obtain insights from field agents resulted in a critical flaw 
in the Soviet’s strategic intelligence warning system.  According to Nate Jones, 
who has extensively researched the Soviet War Scare of 1983, this flaw “played a 
key role in exacerbating the Soviet leadership’s fear of a U.S. nuclear strike” 
(Jones, 2016, p. 22).   
Following Exercise Able Archer 83, Soviet and East German intelligence 
leaders were aware of the flaws in their RYAN indications and warning system.  
The East German MfS remained skeptical of the effectiveness of RYAN.  On 
August 24, 1984, Lev Shapkin,67 deputy KGB Chief for Foreign Intelligence met 
                                                 
67 Lev Shapkin previously headed the KGB Institute for the Research of Operative Problems, 
which studied and led the development of warning concepts and indicators (Kryuchkov & Wolf, 
November 7, 1983). 
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Marcus Wolf, Chief of the MfS Foreign Intelligence Directorate.  The two 
discussed necessary changes to the Operation RYAN indications and warning 
system.  Both were concerned that faulty reporting concerning preparation for a 
NATO nuclear first strike could lead to Soviet miscalculation.  Shapkin told Wolf 
that RYAN indicators were part of a creative process that must be made more 
comprehensive, changeable, and more precise (Wolf, August 29,1984, p. 3) and 
cautioned against being misled by a relatively large number of enemy measures 
and indicators (Wolf, August 29,1984, p. 4).  
Wolf also stressed the requirement to always know the “current situation”, 
implying a need to understand the current situation in the larger context, outside 
the confines of the RYAN indications and warning system.  Wolf noted, 
“Continuing assessments must be made to determine if certain developments 
suggest a crisis or not.  Conditions must be constantly analyzed to determine if a 
conflict is emerging or is already apparent” (Wolf, August 29,1984, p. 13). 
Tactical Intelligence Warning 
Soviet intelligence services were well aware of the Able Archer 83 
exercise and their human intelligence collection network “underwent a major 
mobilization to collect against it” (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 
70).  The KGB and GRU alerted its staff in residencies in NATO countries to 
report on the increased alert levels at US military bases across Europe (PFIAB 
Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 70).  This tasking order instructed Soviet 
intelligence personnel to collect and report back any information related to an 
impending nuclear attack against the Soviet Union (PFIAB Report, The Soviet 
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War Scare, 1990, p. 70).  Moscow’s Warsaw Pact allies were also tasked with this 
urgent intelligence collection requirement during the exercise.  The collection 
effort was not limited to human intelligence.  Following an all-source intelligence 
collection strategy, the Soviets augmented their human intelligence (HUMINT) 
capabilities with increased technical collection.  They conducted over 36 
intelligence collection flights, “significantly more than previous Able Archers” 
(PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 70).  To determine if the US 
Navy was moving closer to the Soviet Union as part of the exercise or as a 
prelude to a nuclear attack, the Soviets flew strategic and naval aviation 
reconnaissance missions in the Norwegian, North, Baltic, and Barents Seas 
(PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 70).   
 Soviet intelligence closely monitored NATO Exercise Able Archer 83 and 
tasked their KGB residences on November 5 with collecting intelligence on the 
exercises which started on November 7.  KGB Headquarters in Moscow sent a 
message alerting its London Resident of possible NATO nuclear attack 
preparations in conjunction with the exercise.  Presumably, this message also 
went to other KGB residences in other NATO member states.  The message 
reminded the KGB field agents: 
Surprise is the key element in the main adversary’s plans and preparations 
for war in today’s conditions.  As a result, it can be assumed that the 
period of time from the moment when the preliminary decision for RYaN 
is taken, up to the order to deliver the strike will be of very short duration, 
possibly 7-10 days. (Jones, 2016, p. 31)   
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The KGB tasked the Residencies with collecting intelligence to support 
several indicators including:  leadership contacts between the US-UK 
governments, increased alert status at military bases in the UK, and use of new 
communication channels (Jones, 2016, p. 31-32).  NATO did in fact conduct these 
activities as part of Exercise Able Archer and the Soviets had intelligence 
indicators and collection capabilities to monitor these activities.  More 
specifically, Soviet human and technical collection assets were in position to 
collect information which would have activated indicators of pending nuclear 
attack based on the exercise scenario.  Oleg Gordievsky recalled on November 8 
or 9, the KGB and GRU residencies in Western Europe received a flash message 
reporting “an alert on U.S. bases.”  He believed the telegrams “clearly implied 
that one of several possible explanations for the (non-existent alert was that the 
countdown to a nuclear first strike had actual begun” (Jones, 2016, p. 32).  
Demonstrating Soviet intelligence penetration of NATO, this intelligence directly 
corresponded with the exercise events, as the NATO Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR) had requested authority for “initial limited use of nuclear 
weapons against pre-selected fixed targets.”  Exercise simulation cells in the U.S. 
and U.K. approved the requested nuclear use and the weapons were used in the 
exercise scenario on November 9 (Jones, 2016, p. 32).  Other indicators of 
pending attack which raised Soviet fears included simulated: 
• Flying 170 aircraft in a strategic airlift of 19,000 US reinforcement troops 
from the continental U.S. to Europe 
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• Transferring NATO’s war headquarters from its primary to its alternate 
location 
• Using new nuclear weapons release procedures 
• Moving through all US Defense Conditions (DEFCONs) to general alert 
• Uploading simulated nuclear weapons on fighter aircraft 
• Transmitting radio message referring to B-52 nuclear strike missions (real-
world, not simulated) (7th Air Force after action report and PFAIB study as 
cited in Jones, 2016, p. 32) 
The exercise was not confined to simply command post simulations.  Real, 
observable, fielded US and NATO forces also participated in the exercise.  US 
Pershing II missile units were field deployed (without nuclear warheads) to 
dispersal sites in Ulm, Schwäbisch Gmünd, and Heilbronn.  Given the extremely 
high priority for collection of this type of activity, the Soviet and East German 
intelligence services probably monitored this deployment via their Military 
Liaison Mission (human intelligence collection) and through signal intelligence 
collection of the US units’ command and control radio channels.68 Intelligence 
reporting of this activity could have further led the Soviets to believe the 
deployment, which corresponded with their indicators for pending nuclear attack, 
was in preparation for a nuclear attack (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare as 
cited in Jones, 2016, p. 33). 
                                                 
68 The author reviewed extensive documentation at the MfS archive in Berlin of East German 
signal intelligence reporting of Pershing II unit activities based on radio intercepts of US nuclear 
command, control, communication networks. 
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Warning Intelligence Assessment 
 This section provided an evaluation of the quality of the warning 
intelligence Yuri Andropov and other senior Soviet leaders presumably received 
during the Able Archer Exercise based on the same eight factors defining 
intelligence excellence used to evaluated intelligence quality for the previous 
Cuban Missile Crisis case.  Unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis case, this assessment 
is not based on direct evaluation of Soviet intelligence products since those 
products are not available from the KGB archive.  However, it is based on 
primary source evidence from Oleg Gordievsky, a senior KGB agent (Deputy 
Resident) at the London Residency during the Able Archer 83 exercise who is 
probably the West’s most authoritative Soviet source of information on the day-
to-day workings of Operation RYAN.  Additionally, the 1990 PFIAB report on 
the 1983 Soviet War Scare and the Able Archer 83 exercise provide a declassified 
view of Soviet intelligence activities based on highly classified, all-source US 
intelligence.  The following provides a systematic evaluation of the quality of 
Soviet Warning intelligence using the characteristics of quality intelligence as 
articulated in JCS Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence. 
Anticipatory – From a strategic intelligence warning perspective, Soviet 
intelligence anticipated the increased US/NATO nuclear threat and developed an 
indications and warning system designed, in theory, to provide Soviet leaders 
strategic and tactical warning of pending nuclear attack.  The Soviet leadership 
recognized US/NATO capability to do harm and planned and implemented an 
intelligence warning system (albeit flawed in an operational sense) in direct 
response to this threat.  At the tactical level, the Soviets knew about the Able 
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Archer exercise and provided raw warning intelligence reporting from their KGB 
Residencies to KGB Center.  KGB Center used that intelligence in their 
assessments for senior Soviet political/military leaders.  Soviet intelligence 
anticipated threats and was active to provide intelligence warning. 
Timely – Based on Soviet military reactions to the NATO exercise, it 
appears as if Soviet leaders were receiving intelligence concerning Able Archer in 
a timely manner and acting upon that intelligence.  The Soviet military took 
immediate measures to collect additional intelligence, ensure force readiness, and 
improve survivability in response to Soviet intelligence reporting on the NATO 
exercise.69  Additionally, the Soviets had established reliable, encrypted, 
communication networks to receive timely field reporting from KGB and GRU 
intelligence units monitoring US/NATO political figures and military forces prior 
to the NATO exercise. 
Accurate – Much of the intelligence derived from Operation RYAN was 
inaccurate.  Soviet intelligence agents in the field, operating out of embassies in 
Western countries, were well placed to gain perspectives and insights on 
US/NATO military capabilities and intent.  However, their reporting which 
revolved around raw intelligence, driven by indicators sent down from KGB 
Headquarters, did not include nuanced assessments or much assessment at all 
which would have helped Soviet leaders in Moscow develop a clear, more 
                                                 
69 The PFIAB report highlighted the unusual Soviet military reaction to NATO Exercise Able 
Archer.  “Although past Able Archer exercises were monitored by Soviet intelligence, the reaction 
by Warsaw Pact military forces and intelligence services to the 1983 exercise was unprecedented.”  
Air armies in East Germany and Poland were placed on alert.  The Soviets also significantly 
increased the number of reconnaissance flights over previous years (PFIAB Report, The Soviet 
War Scare, 1990, p. 7). 
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comprehensive picture of the current situation.  Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet 
Ambassador to Moscow, referring to RYAN intelligence reporting in the 
following quote to the KGB Resident in Washington, stated “We both remained 
skeptical, but he forwarded what he could get (mostly rumors and guesses) to 
Moscow” (Dobrynin, 1995, p. 523).70 
Usable – It seems as if some of the intelligence must have proven usable 
in that it did prompt the Soviets to take defensive measures.  Additionally, the 
reporting formats the KGB and GRU used were likely well established and well 
known to the senior leaders receiving the information. 
Complete – Significant intelligence gaps existed in covering the 
US/NATO nuclear attack intelligence problem.  Most importantly, the Soviets did 
not have well placed, high-level human intelligence agents who would have been 
able to provide information on the intentions of senior US/NATO political 
leaders.  This type of intelligence is sometimes also available via communications 
intelligence.  It is conceivable the cryptographic materials Soviet agent John 
Walker and other agents may have allowed Soviet intelligence to gain access to 
sensitive US/NATO military communications.  Based on Soviet criticism in their 
KGB 1984 Work Plan, it seems apparent the KGB was not satisfied with their 
level of knowledge of US/NATO intent based on HUMINT reporting (Andrew & 
Gordievsky, 1993, p. 14-22). 
Relevant – Based on an assessment of the known indicators, some of the 
intelligence provided was relevant and some of it was highly irrelevant.  
                                                 
70 See the “Objective” section below for further details regarding why much of the Operation 
RYAN intelligence was inaccurate and misleading. 
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Intelligence on the location of senior Western political leaders; civil defense 
activities, including the status of nuclear fallout shelters; and activity at key 
military installations would have been relevant indicators.  Increased activity at 
blood banks, the price paid for blood at donation centers, the location of off-duty 
locations frequently visited by senior leaders, and the activities of bankers and 
church religious leaders were examples of poor indicators of nuclear attack 
(Andrew & Gordievsky, 1990, p. 589).  The indicator list the KGB sent to London 
in February 1983 demonstrated a gap in knowledge regarding the preparations the 
U.S. or the British would take before launching nuclear attack.  The Soviets built 
their initial indicator lists based on their own concept of nuclear war, what they 
would do to prepare an offensive nuclear attack.  In August 1983, the KGB 
further exasperated this problem by including additional indicators based on their 
own war plan which included:  increase in disinformation campaigns; infiltration 
of sabotage teams armed with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; increase 
in “repressive measures by the punitive authorities”; and expanding the network 
of subversion-training schools (Andrew & Gordievsky, 1990, p. 593).  KGB 
assumptions that the British would implement such measures were absurd.  This 
was clearly a bad case of mirror-imaging.  In January 1984, the KGB Center 
further refined the indicator list.  KGB field operatives were to also monitor 
banks, post offices, and slaughterhouses for increased or unusual activity.  This 
strange set of requirements was also probably the result of mirror imaging 
(Andrew & Gordievsky, 1993, p. 88 and Andrew & Gordievsky, 1990, pp. 601-
602). 
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Objective – One of the most high-impact problems which plagued 
Operation RYAN intelligence was its lack of objectivity.  Oleg Gordievsky 
recounted, “Residencies were, in effect, required to report alarming information 
even if they themselves were skeptical of it.  The Center was duly alarmed by 
what they reported and demanded more” (Andrew & Gordievsky, 1990, p. 585).  
The PFIAB report also included references to erroneous field reporting.  Some 
KGB field agents felt their reporting was partly to blame for the increase anxiety 
Moscow felt regarding nuclear war with the United States.  According to the 
PFIAB report “it (the Residencies) had, willy-nilly, submitted alarmist reports on 
the West’s military preparations, intensified ideological struggle, and similar 
themes to try to satiate Moscow’s demands for VRYAN71 reporting.” (PFIAB 
Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 64).  Christopher Andrew, a well-respect 
intelligence historian, also included this information in his book with KGB 
archivist Vasili Mitrokhin, “The alarmist RYAN reports obediently provided by 
KGB residencies were merely an extreme example of Line PR’s72 habitual 
tendency to tell Moscow what it wanted to hear.”  One political intelligence 
officer later admitted: “In order to please our superiors, we sent in falsified and 
biased information, acting on the principle:  Blame everything on the Americans 
and everything will be OK.  That’s not intelligence, it’s self-deception!” (Andrew 
& Mitrokhin, 1999, p. 214).   
                                                 
71 VRYAN is a variation of the RYAN acronym 
72 Line PR is the political, economic, and military, strategic intelligence and active measures 
section in a KGB Residency (Andrew & Gordievsky, 1993, p. xvii). 
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Available – Given the high-level political and military positions of the 
senior Soviet leadership, they would have had priority access to any existing, 
relevant intelligence.  Additionally, all the players would have had the security 
clearances to access the necessary intelligence information.  Raw intelligence 
produced via technical collection such as Soviet satellite reconnaissance and 
ground-based signals intelligence would have been available to KGB and GRU 
analysts.  However, one of the major flaws in the Soviet Operation RYAN 
intelligence system was their provision of raw, unevaluated, non-contextualized 
intelligence reporting to their senior leaders, vice finished, all-source warning 
intelligence products. 
Warning Receptivity 
To effectively make accurate current situation assessments senior leaders 
must be receptive to intelligence.  Leaders must remain critical thinkers but their 
ability to incorporate key facts into their thinking is based, in part, on the level of 
receptivity to the information intelligence professionals work hard to provide.  
This section analyzes the level of intelligence receptivity of Yuri Andropov and 
key senior Soviet leaders prior to and during the War Scare of 1983 which 
culminated during the November 1983 NATO Able Archer exercise.  It will 
examine key factors which influenced receptivity including:  Andropov’s prior 
intelligence experience, the effect of catastrophic failure on receptivity, the 
Andropov-Chebrikov relationship, and intelligence during and after the Able 
Archer exercise.   
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Andropov’s Intelligence Background 
Yuri Andropov, upon his ascent as General Secretary73 following 
Brezhnev’s death on November 10, 1982, was unique in that he was the first and 
only KGB Chairman to serve as General Secretary.  Prior to his long, 15-year 
tenure as KGB Chairman (1967-1982), Andropov served in various Communist 
Party and government positions.  Notably, he was the Soviet Ambassador to 
Hungary in 1956 and witnessed first-hand the Hungarian Revolution against the 
communist system which Soviet/Warsaw Pact troops brutally suppressed.  His 
experience in Hungary had a lasting impact and he became a hardline supporter of 
the Brezhnev Doctrine.  Such hardline, uncompromising attitudes would 
characterize Andropov’s beliefs and approach to the West in which he became 
increasingly paranoid about the US and NATO threat. 
Later, Yuri Andropov served as KGB Chairman from May 1967 to May 
1982.  As the longest serving Chairman, Andropov was a key player in many of 
the most important events of the Cold War, including the 1968 Soviet/Warsaw 
Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and 
the 1981 Polish Crisis.  He also presided over an internal security apparatus 
responsible for mass domestic political repression.  Entering the most senior 
leadership post in the Soviet Union as General Secretary, Andropov was an expert 
on Soviet intelligence, aware of its capabilities and limitations, and fully 
convinced of the critical need to use intelligence to protect the Soviet Union from 
US and NATO subversion or outright military attack. 
                                                 
73 The formal title is:  General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. 
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Andropov, based on his long experience as KGB Chairman and the father 
of Operation RYAN, was highly receptive to intelligence in general and more 
specifically to the intelligence RYAN produced.  In fact, one could probably not 
find someone more receptive of Operation RYAN intelligence than Yuri 
Andropov.  According to Raymond Garthoff, in his book Soviet Leaders and 
Intelligence, KGB Chairman Andropov and Defense Minister Ustinov presented 
the Soviet Politburo a plan sometime between March-May 1981 to initiate 
Operation RYAN (Garthoff, 2015, pp. 61-62).  With Politburo approval, 
Andropov proudly announced the unprecedented intelligence collection and 
analysis effort in May 1981 at a secret conference of senior KGB officers.  The 
presence of General Secretary Brezhnev at this meeting certainly lent a sense of 
importance and urgency to Andropov’s message: 
The most dramatic speech however, was given by Yuri Andropov, the 
Chairman of the KGB, who was to succeed Brezhnev as General Secretary 
eighteen months later.  The new American administration, he declared, 
was actively preparing for nuclear war.  To the astonishment of most of 
his audience, Andropov then announced that, by a decision of the 
Politburo, the KGB and GRU (Soviet military intelligence) were for the 
first time to cooperate in a worldwide intelligence operation codenamed 
RYAN. (Andrew & Gordievsky, 1990, p. 583) 
Ben Fischer, a former CIA officer, intelligence historian, and a leading 
scholar on Operation RYAN, describes Andropov as the leading proponent of 
RYAN.  “He inaugurated the alert in 1981 as Chairman of the KGB and presided 
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over its expansion after succeeding Leonid Brezhnev as General Secretary the 
next year” (Fischer, 2014).  The KGB formed a new watch center to process 
RYAN reporting in their headquarters.  The new division was a high priority and 
was almost certainly initiated by Andropov.  The formation of a special RYAN 
commission chaired by KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov underscored the alert’s 
top-level political backing and its bureaucratic clout (Fischer, 2014).  As General 
Secretary, Andropov continued Operation RYAN, the program he had started, to 
ensure the Soviet’s would not be caught by a surprise nuclear attack from the 
United States. 
Another element which increased the appeal and probably positively 
affected Soviet receptivity towards warning intelligence was the highly scientific, 
analytic methodology the RYAN computer system employed.  US intelligence 
and defense officials knew of the Soviet computer system at the time and praised 
its capabilities claiming the results were “highly objective, empirically provable 
and readily adaptable to modern data processing” (Jones, 2016, p. 14).  Soviet 
leaders were “highly dependent” on this computer model during the 1983 war 
scare period (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 43).  The PFIAB 
concluded that although it may seem very unusual, potentially absurd, from an 
American perspective to put so much trust in a computer to calculate the strategic 
balance of forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, “this approach may 
have been especially appealing to Soviet leaders at the time” (PFIAB Report, The 
Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 46).  Nearly all senior Soviet leaders during this period 
were formally trained as engineers.  To them a seemingly objective, scientifically 
197 
 
based computer model handling a complex problem like the strategic balance 
would have had broad appeal and would have been considered a highly credible 
source of intelligence (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 46). 
Intelligence Failures - Impact on Receptivity 
During Yuri Andropov’s short tenure as General Secretary between Nov 
1982 – February 1984, there was not a significant, punctuating intelligence failure 
on par with President Kennedy’s Bay of Pigs fiasco which had the potential to 
damage intelligence receptivity.  The long, grinding war in Afghanistan occurred 
during this time, but the initial decision to intervene in that country was either not 
well informed by intelligence or the Soviet leadership dismissed those 
assessments.  The Soviet Chief of Foreign Intelligence, Vladimir Kryuchkov, 
opposed the intervention as did KGB officers involved in Afghan affairs 
(Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, pp. 991-1046 and 1014-1017 as cited in 
Garthoff, 2015, p. 59).  The GRU was not aware of the pending political decision 
to invade nor asked for an assessment (Garthoff, 2015, p. 60).  Andropov’s role in 
the Afghanistan decision is disputed.  Some sources state he opposed the invasion 
based on the negative impact it would have on relations with the West, while 
Garthoff contends Andropov joined Brezhnev, Ustinov, and Gromyko in the 
December 12, 1979 invasion decision (Garthoff, 2015, p. 60).  In any case, since 
Andropov was KGB Chairman at the time of the invasion decision, he would 
probably not have blamed intelligence for the increasingly difficult Soviet 
situation in Afghanistan (since their assessments were accurate despite not 
receiving a full hearing by the Soviet leadership). 
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The KAL 007 shootdown incident could be considered relevant due to its 
temporal proximity to the November 1983 Able Archer exercise and because it 
was a massive, publicly embarrassing Soviet failure which had the potential to 
damage relationships between the Soviet senior political leadership and elements 
within the Soviet defense establishment.  The Soviet Air Force was primarily 
responsible for the shootdown of the civilian jetliner.  Andropov, recalling Soviet 
Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin from his vacation in Crimea, put the 
full blame on the Soviet military.  He told Dobrynin, “Our military made a gross 
blunder by shooting down the airliner and it probably will take us a long time to 
get out of this mess” (Dobrynin, 1995, p. 537).  During the conversation with 
Dobrynin, Andropov cursed “those blockheads of generals who care not a bit for 
grand questions of politics” (Dobrynin, 1995, p. 537).  Andropov believed this 
flight was an American provocation designed to test the air defense capabilities in 
the Soviet Far East but that was no excuse for the Soviet Air Force to shoot the 
plane down instead of forcing it to land.  The Defense Minister, Ustinov, 
summoned the top generals from the Soviet Far East for a severe verbal 
reprimand over the poor state of radar coverage in that area (Dobrynin, 1995, pp. 
537-538).  Given the lack of direct KGB or GRU involvement in this incident and 
Andropov’s channeling of his anger towards the Soviet military, it is unlikely 
KAL 007 had adverse impact on the relationship between the Soviet leadership 
and its intelligence organizations or on the credibility of their subsequent 
intelligence reporting. 
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The Andropov-Chebrikov Relationship 
Upon taking power as the General Secretary, Andropov moved to 
consolidate power and form his own team of advisors.  He moved within a few 
months to appoint several known, trusted individuals from his time in the KGB.  
Key among these appointments, was his new KGB Chairman, Viktor Chebrikov.  
General Secretary Andropov had a long, 14-year relationship with his newly 
appointed KGB Chairman, who had served as Andropov’s deputy from 1968-
1982.  When Andropov moved out of his KGB leadership job in May 1982 to take 
a position in the Central Committee Secretariat to be groomed as the next General 
Secretary, the KGB Chairman position was filled by Vitaly Fedorchuk, but only 
for seven months.  After Brezhnev’s death in November 1982, Andropov moved 
Fedorchuk to be the Minister of the Interior and moved Viktor Chebrikov into the 
KGB Chairman position (Ebon, 1983, p. 84).  Although Andropov’s choice of 
Chebrikov may have seemed a natural selection based on his long-standing 
relationship, Chebrikov was identified as a protégé of Brezhnev, having, like 
Brezhnev, begun his party career in the Dnepropetrovsk region and attended the 
same college as Brezhnev.  According to Andropov biographer Zhores Medvedev, 
“Chebrikov was a trusted adherent of Brezhnev” (Medvedev, 1983, p. 121).  
Despite his former association with Brezhnev, Andropov concluded Chebrikov 
was “an able man whom he knew well and could count upon for full co-
operation” (Medvedev, 1983, pp. 121-122).  Of course, Andropov’s relationship 
with his country’s intelligence service extended beyond just one man.  In fact, to 
rapidly consolidate his power and surround himself with trusted confidants, 
Andropov brought along many of his entourage from the KGB to fill key party 
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and government posts, “Geidar Aliyev became a Politburo member and first 
deputy premier, Vitaly Fedorchuk was named Minister of Internal Affairs, and 
Victor Chebrikov became KGB Chairman” (Solovyov and Klepikova, 1983, p. 
275).  Chebrikov remained the KGB Chairman through Andropov’s short tenure 
as General Secretary, and through Chernenko’s even shorter period as General 
Secretary (February 1984-March 1985) before Gorbachev replaced him with 
Vladimir Kryuchkov who had served as the head of the KGB First Chief 
Directorate under Andropov.  Kryuchkov’s career ended abruptly in 1991 as he 
was one of the key leaders in the failed August coup against Gorbachev. 
Intelligence Receptivity During the Soviet War Scare of 1983 
Based on the Soviet military reaction to the events of Able Archer, it 
seems clear the Soviet senior political and military leadership were very much 
aware and in tune with the intelligence data they were receiving from the field.  
Evidence from the 1990 PFIAB report and the May 18, 1984 Special National 
Intelligence Estimate indicates Soviet leaders took defensive precautions in 
reaction to NATO events as they unfolded during Exercise Able Archer.  Soviet 
Air units in Germany and Poland assumed a high alert status by readying nuclear 
strike forces during the exercise, and increasing the number of fighter-interceptors 
on strip alert (Central Intelligence Agency, Implications of Recent Soviet Military-
Political Activities, 1984, p. 1 and p. 4).74  What may be less clear is the level of 
                                                 
74 Note:  This Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) downplays the significance of Soviet 
military reactions to Able Archer and concludes the War Scare in terms of Soviet propaganda 
efforts “Soviet talk of nuclear war has been deliberately manipulated to rationalize military efforts 
with domestic audiences and to influence Western electorates and political elites” (Central 
Intelligence Agency, Implications of Recent Soviet-Military-Political Activities, 1984, p. 5).  The 
1990 PFIAB report was critical of this interpretation. 
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General Secretary Andropov’s role during the 1983 War Scare and the level of his 
involvement with Soviet intelligence agencies during the period between early 
November and the conclusion of the Able Archer exercise on November 11.  We 
do know that Andropov was extremely ill during this period.  He suffered from 
chronic hypertension and diabetes which was complicated by kidney disease 
(PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 66).  The day after the KAL 007 
incident Andropov took part in his final Politburo meeting in Moscow before 
leaving for vacation in Crimea.  In mid-October 1983, Andropov possibly had to 
have one kidney removed.  His failing health forced cancellation of a state visit to 
Bulgaria (although the official reasons given was due to the intense international 
situation).  Andropov also failed to appear in the annual Kremlin celebration of 
the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 
69).  He was not seen in public since at least before the KAL 007 incident on 
September 1 and would not be seen in public again until his death in February 
1984. 
Operation RYAN After the Crisis 
In 1984, following the Exercise Able Archer crisis, bureaucratic 
momentum kept RYAN alive and it is clear the enthusiasm emanated from the 
KGB Center although not from the Residencies.  KGB Headquarters continued to 
issue refined operational instructions to its field officers who were skeptical and 
increasingly apprehensive of the effectiveness of this operation.  The KGB 
operation in London was scolded for not turning in one of their bi-weekly reports 
into headquarters during the summer of 1984 (Andrew & Gordievsky, 1993, p. 
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89).  Andrew & Gordievsky make the argument that interest in Operation RYAN 
continued to decline for several reasons.  First was the change in senior leadership 
in Moscow.  The most ardent supporters of RYAN, those with the greatest nuclear 
war paranoia, were replaced by a new group of leaders less nervous about 
nefarious Western motives.  General Secretary Andropov died on February 9, 
1984.  His successor, Konstantin Chernenko, was less suspicious of Western 
intentions than Andropov.75  Chief of the General Staff, Ogarkov, a prominent 
public hawk, was fired and reassigned.76  Defense Minister Ustinov became 
seriously ill with pneumonia shortly after Ogarkov was fired and died on 
December 20, 1984 (Andrew & Gordievsky, 1990, p. 604).  A second key reason 
for the decline of Operation RYAN was the expected imminent nuclear attack 
from the United States/NATO did not occur.  Soviet leaders had been 
aggressively warning their KGB Residencies, and whipping up public anxiety of 
nuclear war for the past two years, an event that fortunately did not happen.  
Logically, this certainly did not mean it would not or could not occur in the 
future.  However, the heightened level of vigilance the Center demanded, in 
reality, was difficult to credibly sustain given the lack of indications of a pending 
US attack.  Third, Operation RYAN intelligence failed to secure the war plans 
Soviet official so desperately sought.  Soviet intelligence failed to find evidence 
the U.S. or NATO was preparing an imminent nuclear attack.  Gordievsky and 
                                                 
75 Chernenko differed from Andropov in that he believed the United States might “return to a 
realistic evaluation of the correlation of forces and resume negotiation and détente with the Soviet 
Union” (Garthoff, 2015, p. 71).   
76 Ogarkov may have been moved from the Politburo to signal a willingness to improve relations 
with the United States.  This move, placing Akhromeyev as Chief of the General Staff may have 
been driven by younger Politburo members Gorbachev, Romanov, and Aliev. 
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other Residents “were encouraged to note the emergence in Moscow of a less 
paranoid interpretation of American and NATO policy” (Andrew & Gordievsky, 
1993, p. 89).  Documentary evidence from the MfS archive indicates the East 
German effort to support Operation RYAN really ramped up in 1984 and 1985 
and the East Germans continued RYAN reporting until April 1989.77  The KGB 
did not shut Operation RYAN fully down until November 27, 1991, one month 
before the end of the Soviet Union (Garthoff, 2015, p. 63).   
Leadership Interpretation of Warning 
 Soviet leaders suffered from both motivational and cognitive distortions in 
interpreting intelligence to formulate current situation assessments.  Soviet leaders 
made assumptions concerning the motivation for US/NATO activities which 
biased their interpretation of events.  Additionally, based on overwhelming 
evidence, the fear they perceived created deep motivational distortions in their 
interpretation of intelligence.   
Based on their reaction to the Able Archer exercise, Soviet leaders must 
have assessed the situation and the danger of nuclear conflict as real.  The PFIAB 
cited the Warsaw Pact military reaction to the exercise as “unprecedented” in 
scale.  Based on Soviet/Warsaw Pact military preparations for this exercise and 
the scale of their reaction, “Soviet military leaders may have been seriously 
concerned that the U.S. would use Able Archer 83 as a cover for launching a real 
attack” (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 70).  A heavily redacted 
                                                 
77 Based on MfS Operation Ryan reporting found at the Wilson Center Digital Archive at:  
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/224/project-ryan 
204 
 
section of the PFIAB study details the numerous military actions the Soviets 
undertook in anticipation of and during the exercise.  Many indicators of Soviet 
military activity had been seen only during crisis periods in the past and included 
transporting Soviet nuclear weapons from storage sites to operational units by 
helicopter, a suspension of all flight activity except intelligence collection flights 
from November 4-10, (to perform maintenance and ensure maximum combat 
readiness), and improving the readiness posture for selecting priority NATO 
targets (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 72).  The Soviets placed 
their nuclear forces on alert in response to Able Archer, a step they had never 
taken in the past in response to NATO exercises (Jones, 2016, p. 34).  On 
November 11 the heighten state of alert was lowered and Marshal Ustinov made a 
speech in Moscow that the PFIAB authors believe sheds light on possible reasons 
for the unusual Soviet response to the Able Archer exercise.  Marshal Ustinov 
called US actions "“reckless”, “adventurous”, and accused the U.S. of moving the 
world towards “nuclear catastrophe” (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, 
p. 74).  Ustinov went further to state, “no enemy intriguers will catch us 
unawares” referring to Soviet fears the U.S. and NATO would use the cover of an 
exercise to launch a surprise nuclear attack (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 
1990, p. 74).  Marshall Ustinov seemed genuinely concerned, warning the officers 
listening to the speech that the international situation had deteriorated and “the 
increased danger of an outbreak of a new world war” necessitated extraordinary 
measures (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 74).   
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 The PFIAB assessed the Soviet interpretation of their intelligence on Able 
Archer as generating legitimate concern.  The evidence the PFIAB cites for this 
assessment is as follows (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 75-76): 
• US-Soviet relations were at their lowest point in 20 years and the threat of 
an imminent US attack was a constant theme in Soviet media.78   
• The Soviets were possibly very concerned about the integrity of nuclear 
command and control as the only person authorized to release nuclear 
weapons, General Secretary Andropov, was seriously ill with kidney 
failure. 
• Soviet doctrine envisioned a NATO surprise attack coming under the 
guise of a NATO exercise which would have ensured such forces were 
mobilized, equipped, and brought to full combat readiness prior to 
transitioning from exercise to full combat mode. 
This indicates the Soviet leadership trusted the services providing the 
warning intelligence.  US intelligence noted some Soviet forces were readied to 
preempt or counterattack NATO action launched under the cover of the Able 
Archer exercise. 
The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the U.K. also noted the 
unprecedented Soviet reaction to Able Archer in a memo from the Ministry of 
Defence to Prime Minister Thatcher advocating for a system of notifications for 
                                                 
78 Imminent war was a constant media theme in the Soviet press at that time.  This led many in the 
US Intelligence Community to falsely dismiss the Soviet war scare as merely Soviet propaganda.  
US intelligence failed to see the true danger present at the time that an accident or miscalculation 
from NATO could have triggered a catastrophic Soviet response (Central Intelligence Agency, 
Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities, 1984, pp. iii-iv). 
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future nuclear command post exercises.  Although the JIC could not make a firm 
conclusion, it stated “…we cannot discount the possibility that at least some of the 
Soviet officials/officers may have misinterpreted Able Archer 83 and possibly 
other nuclear CPXs79 as posing a real threat” (Ministry of Defence, United 
Kingdom, Soviet Union Concern About a Surprise Nuclear Attack, 1984, cited in 
Jones, 2016, pp. 251-257). 
Sources of Soviet Anxiety 
Soviet leaders, especially during the period of this study, harbored a deep, 
genuine fear of the United States.  In a broad, strategic context, senior Soviet 
leaders realized by 1983 that détente had broken down.  President Reagan’s 
strong, anti-Soviet rhetoric and psychological operations campaign80 reinforced 
Soviet leader’s existing fear and distrust of the U.S. and its NATO allies.  The 
Soviets were also well aware that their nuclear forces were increasing vulnerable 
to a disarming US first strike.  This sense of vulnerability was heightened by the 
pending deployment of Pershing II and Gryphon missile systems to Western 
Europe in late 1983 when the Soviets realized their propaganda and active 
measure campaign in Western Europe had failed to derail the nuclear 
deployments.  Additionally, Soviet concerns about President Reagan’s Strategic 
Defense Initiative program, led Soviet leaders to conclude the U.S. was opening a 
new chapter in the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers to outcompete 
                                                 
79 CPX – Command Post Exercise 
80 The US psychological operations campaign included increased US naval and air activity near 
the Soviet Union designed to test Soviet military readiness by gauging their responsiveness to US 
military operations near the Soviet Union.  It was also designed as a show of force to demonstrate 
US military capabilities and willingness to operate at extended ranges from US/allied territory. 
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the Soviet Union technologically.  Finally, the Soviets also realized their 1979 
invasion of Afghanistan was increasingly a drain on resources and on the morale 
of the Soviet military.  Beyond this strategic backdrop, specific incidents, which 
immediately proceeded Exercise Able Archer, also contributed to the punctuated 
sense of fear Soviet leaders felt in November 1983, including the following 
events: 
• 1 Sep 1983 – Soviet shootdown of KAL 007 
• 26 Sep – Soviet early warning scare 
• 5 Oct – Lech Walesa awarded Nobel Peace Prize 
• 23 Oct – Beirut U.S. Marine Corps barracks bombing – resulted in an 
increased alert posture at US bases which Soviet intelligence 
misinterpreted as an indicator of potential nuclear conflict 
• 26 Oct – US invasion of Grenada – The Soviet KGB and other leaders 
thought their Central American ally in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas, were 
next on this list for a US invasion (Andrew & Gordievsky, 1990, p. 599) 
The overarching theme in the literature on the Soviet War Scare of 1983 
deals with the incredible level of fear Andropov and other senior Soviet leaders 
(Ustinov, Ogarkov, and others) felt based on the factors listed above.  Most trace 
the beginning of this acute sense of fear to President Reagan’s strong anti-Soviet 
rhetoric used in the 1980 presidential campaign against President Carter which 
became increasingly relevant after the new president took office and signaled it 
was not just rhetoric, but a new, more aggressive phase in the post-détente era had 
dawned.  It is clear Andropov became fearful to the point of paranoia based on his 
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statements while serving as head of the KGB and later as General Secretary.  In 
May 1981, General Secretary Brezhnev made an unprecedented appearance at 
KGB senior leadership conference to denounce Reagan’s aggressive policies.  
KGB Chairman Andropov asserted:  
The new US administration was actively preparing for nuclear war and 
announced that the Politburo had decided that the KGB and the GRU 
would cooperate in a worldwide operation to monitor any indication of US 
and NATO measures for the initiation of a nuclear attack, in particular a 
surprise missile strike. (Garthoff, 2015, p. 62) 
On June 16, 1983, Andropov told the Central Committee “there had been 
and ‘unprecedented sharpening of the struggle’ between East and West.  ‘The 
threat of nuclear war overhanging mankind causes one to reappraise the principal 
goals of the activities of the entire Communist movement’” (Andrew & 
Gordievsky, 1993, p. 81). 
On September 28, 1983, following the Soviet shootdown of KAL 007 on 
September 1, 1983: 
The terminally ill Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, issued from his sickbed a 
denunciation of American policy couched in apocalyptic language 
unprecedented since the depths of the Cold War.  The United States, he 
said, was ‘a country where outrageous military psychosis is being 
imposed. (Andrew & Gordievsky, 1993, p. 85) 
Andropov suggested a major international crisis might be approaching, 
“The Reagan administration in its imperial ambitions, goes so far that one begins 
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to doubt whether Washington has any brakes at all preventing it from crossing the 
mark before which any sober-minded person must stop” (Hersh, 1986, p. 176 as 
cited in Andrew & Gordievsky, 1990, p. 598).  On November 2, 1983, Andropov 
was quoted from a recent speech and included in the KGB First Chief Directorate 
Work Plan for 1984, “Its essential aim is to attempt to secure a dominant position 
in the world for the United States, regardless of the interests of other states and 
nations.”  The report stated, “The threat of an outbreak of nuclear war is reaching 
an extremely dangerous point” (Andrew & Gordievsky, 1993, p. 17).  The report 
went on to warn: 
…the task of not overlooking immediate preparations by the adversary for 
launching a surprise nuclear missile attack on the U.S.S.R. or local wars 
and armed conflicts threatening the security of the Soviet Union and 
countries friendly to it, has acquired even greater urgency and immediacy. 
(Andrew & Gordievsky, 1993, p. 17) 
Nearing the Able Archer Exercise, in late 1983, Andropov highlighted the 
dangers of war in a statement to the Politburo “the danger of war was then greater 
than at any other time since the Cuban Missile Crisis” (Garthoff, 2015, p. 68).  
The KGB leadership continuously echoed these assessments in their speeches, 
cables, and operational directives to KGB Residencies abroad. 
 Cognitive Factors 
Beth Fisher’s work can also be used to assess cognitive factors and how 
they influenced the Soviet leadership’s interpretation of intelligence during the 
War Scare of 1983.  Fisher contrasts theory-driven with data-driven approaches to 
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how leaders assess situations and make decisions.  Theory driven approaches start 
with assumptions.  Humans tend to interpret new information through the prism 
of those assumptions which can and often do lead to information interpretation 
biases.  In contrast, Fisher argues, data-driven approaches, where data is collected 
and analyzed to draw conclusions based on raw information, is more likely to 
reach sound, unbiased conclusions.  She contends humans are more prone to use 
theory-driven thinking more often than data driven thinking.  This section 
analyzes how Soviet assumptions may have contributed to intelligence 
interpretation problems leading up to and during the Able Archer 83 exercise.  
These assumptions regarding US motivations and Soviet strategic vulnerabilities 
which the KGB and senior Soviet leaders faced are based on secret intelligence 
found in the declassified 1990 PFIAB study.  The following is a description and 
an analysis of each of these assumptions using what we now know (the historical 
record) and information processing errors Beth Fisher outlines which can lead to 
interpretation errors. 
Assumption 1 –The new US administration was actively preparing for a 
nuclear war and a US nuclear first strike on the Soviet Union was possible 
(PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 53).  Soviet perceptions of US 
intent are understandable from a Soviet perspective given the sources of anxiety 
detailed above.  The Soviets viewed US rhetoric and actions with an offensive 
lens.  Using that perspective, the Soviet interpreted open source and secret 
intelligence as reaffirming their view of the US/NATO as hostile, offensive 
aggressors.  For example, the Soviets were deeply fearful of the pending (late 
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1983) deployment of new, destabilizing (in their view) Pershing II and Gryphon 
missiles in Western Europe.  Had the Soviet viewed the US/NATO deployment 
simply as a defensive response to their earlier deployment of SS-20 missiles 
which threatened every Western European capital with similarly quick nuclear 
destruction, they may have interpreted intelligence on the Pershing IIs and 
Gryphons as a defensive response to their earlier deployment. 
Assumption 1A - The U.S. might initiate a nuclear war if it achieved a 
level of overall strength significantly greater than the Soviet Union (PFIAB 
Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 54).  As a corollary to the first 
assumption, this line of thinking may have been heavily influenced by the Soviet 
experience with the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 (Operation 
BARBAROSSA).  The Soviet failure in 1941 to properly interpret indications and 
warning intelligence led to the worst military disaster in Soviet history.  
According to Ben Fischer, who wrote about the enduring trauma of the German 
surprise attack on Soviet perceptions and defense strategy: 
The connection between ignored warnings and surprise attack has never 
been forgotten in Moscow.  For decades after the war, Soviet leaders 
seemed obsessed with the lessons of 1941, which were as much visceral as 
intellectual in Soviet thinking about war and peace. (Fischer, 2007) 
Fischer believes the propensity for the Soviet leadership to remain ever 
vigilant and assume the worst81 may be related to the fact that the generation of 
                                                 
81 Anatoly Dobrynin, the long-time Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. disputes the notion that Soviet 
senior leaders (Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Cherenkov) believed an attack could take place at any 
moment, with the probable exception of Yuri Andropov. 
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Soviet leaders in senior positions during the War Scare of 1983 experienced the 
horror of World War II first-hand while KGB field operatives experienced it 
through history books.  The Soviet interpretation of intelligence prior to and 
during the war scare may have also been influenced by confirmation bias.  
Leaders received intelligence which was largely unevaluated field reporting with 
little contextual analysis.  This alarming intelligence confirmed what they already 
believed; the U.S. was planning an imminent nuclear attack against the Soviet 
Union.  On that assumption, Soviet fear is certainly understandable based on their 
historical experience.  However, the Soviets seriously misjudged Western intent.  
The U.S. and its NATO allies did not have any plans or intent to launch a pre-
emptive nuclear war against the Soviet Union. 
Assumption 2 – The Soviet Union would continue to fall behind the U.S. 
in economic power and scientific expertise (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 
1990, p. 54).  One of the more impressive accomplishments of Soviet intelligence 
during this period was their ability to collect scientific and technical intelligence 
against the West.  Soviet leaders were aware of the growing technological gap 
between the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact and the US/NATO.  This fear became 
even more acute in early 1983 when President Reagan unveiled his concept for 
the Strategic Defense Initiative.  An important element in the Soviet’s calculation 
and perception of the “correlation of forces”, the increasingly apparent inability of 
Soviet military design bureaus to qualitatively match US and Western weapons 
systems and the overarching fear that the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal would 
not be able to compensate for this problem, if the U.S. were successful in 
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developing and deploying an effective ballistic missile defense system, further 
contributed to their fear.  On this assumption the Soviet assessments were correct 
and Soviet leaders objectively interpreted the intelligence on this subject.  They 
were technologically outclassed and Soviet leaders knew it. 
Assumption 3 – The Soviet domestic situation and hold on Eastern Europe 
was deteriorating – weakening Soviet capacity to compete strategically with the 
United States (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 1990, p. 54).  The domestic 
situation was indeed deteriorating in the Soviet Union and within their Eastern 
European satellite states.  The KGB ran an extensive domestic intelligence 
apparatus and were very much aware of the levels of domestic political dissent 
and economic dissatisfaction in the country.  Soviet leaders were struggling with 
the challenge of satisfying consumer demand for basic necessities.  In Eastern 
Europe, the 1980/1981 Solidarity trade union crisis in Poland was a further 
reminder of the potential for civil unrest in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union.  
Soviet officials were concerned with their ability to control internal dissent, 
despite an omnipresent and brutal internal security apparatus which could be 
challenged in the future.  The Soviets correctly interpreted intelligence on this 
issue.  The domestic situation was indeed deteriorating in the Soviet Union and 
across their Warsaw Pact sphere of influence. 
Motivational Factors 
Based on the motivational model of decision making, Andropov and his 
hardline colleagues sought mechanisms to minimize and alleviate their fear and 
anxiety.  They may have done this through initiation of Operation RYAN.  Their 
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need to maintain their emotional well-being may have interfered with their ability 
to accurately process information.  The Soviet leaders, like most wise decision 
makers, sought to minimize their level of uncertainty in assessing the current 
situation and this provided a strong motivation for launching and devoting 
significant financial and intellectual resources to this intelligence operation.  Beth 
Fisher, in discussing this model in her book chapter, Perception, Intelligence 
Errors, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, outlines five coping mechanisms that can 
also be applied to the Soviet War Scare of 1983.  Humans engage in this type of 
thinking to maintain peace of mind and reduce anxiety.  This is done 
subconsciously.  These motivational factors can lead to misinterpretation of 
information.  These motivational factors will be assessed in terms of Soviet 
senior-leader motivations for launching and operating Operation RYAN. 
Defensive Avoidance – occurs when one seeks to avoid anxiety-arousing 
warnings concerning future negative consequences of preferred actions.  In the 
Soviet case, Soviet leaders may have chosen to pursue an aggressive intelligence 
collection and analysis program believing it was a suitable, realistic alternative to 
addressing their anxieties (listed above) head on.  The Soviets knew they were not 
in an economic position to continue competing with the U.S. in terms of 
qualitative factors in the nuclear arms race and the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI).  Seeking intelligence on US nuclear war plans and current nuclear attack 
posture was designed to ensure the Soviets would not be caught by surprise and 
could retaliate with their full nuclear force, if necessary. 
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Selective Attention – occurs when one prefers to pay more attention to 
information that suggests certainty.  The Soviets were certainly guilty of this bias.  
KGB field operatives provided raw information which Soviet leaders used to 
suggest certainty in terms of their view that the U.S. and NATO were on an 
aggressive, one-way path towards nuclear conflict in the immediate future.  
Andropov and his circle in the Politburo sought certainty by launching and 
maintaining Operation RYAN.  Their interpretation of the data, which reinforced 
their pre-existing world view, improved their sense of certainty (however 
distorted and wrong those assessments were) regarding their assessment of the 
US/NATO. 
Bolstering – occurs when one seeks to downplay the trade-offs associated 
with a specific decision.  This is difficult to assess in the Soviet case as data on 
alternatives to Operation RYAN is limited.  Certainly, the Soviets had many 
choices concerning how to use the significant amount of resources which were 
poured into this program.  It is unknown if such a rational debate about alternative 
uses of these resources ever occurred.  Soviet leaders may have simply believed 
this intelligence operation was the most logical way to alleviate their fears and did 
not engage in any motivationally based reasoning to justify the program relative 
to other options. 
Exaggerate the positive/minimize the negative – occurs when one 
exaggerates positive consequences, minimizes negative consequences, and seeks 
out information which discredits disturbing info.  Soviet leaders were motivated 
to ensure Soviet nuclear forces would not be rendered ineffective and incapable of 
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retaliation in a US surprise nuclear attack.  The central focus of RYAN was to 
provide intelligence to preclude that scenario.  I have found no evidence to 
suggest, and it is doubtful Soviet leaders casually or systematically considered, 
any possible negative consequences (although many later emerged) prior to 
deciding on this course of action. 
Wishful thinking – occurs when one is convinced the chosen course of 
action will succeed despite information to the contrary.  This was probably not a 
factor because it is unlikely Andropov, the father of the RYAN program, and later 
the most powerful leader in the Soviet system as General Secretary would have 
been directly challenged with dissenting views on the utility of the program.  Key 
leaders were convinced of the need for this intelligence program and were 
confident it would succeed.  I have found no evidence there were any dissenting 
views concerning the initiation or continuation of this program. 
The Soviet leadership’s fear of imminent nuclear attack likely biased their 
interpretation of the intelligence the KGB and GRU provided.  General Secretary 
Andropov, Defense Minister Ustinov,82 and KGB Chairman Kryuchkov were part 
of the remaining Stalinist hardliners, who had a much more limited working 
knowledge of the United States and NATO.  While their field operatives with 
such knowledge were genuinely skeptical that the US/NATO would ever launch a 
nuclear strike, the more isolated Soviet leadership was much more pessimistic 
regarding US intent.  While Soviet intelligence services were reporting the 
                                                 
82 Ustinov had a more realistic view toward the dangers of nuclear war than senior members of the 
Soviet uniformed military and was much more pessimistic toward any notion of a “winnable” 
nuclear confrontation with the United States. 
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activation of indicators which led the senior Soviet leadership to believe the 
alliance was preparing a nuclear strike, Soviet leaders failed to objectively assess 
NATO’s political/military intent.  Given that threat assessments are comprised of 
both enemy military capability and intent, the Soviets mistakenly assessed Able 
Archer as a preparation for a real-world attack.  They may have let their deeply 
ingrained fear interfere with the ability to objectively evaluate the available 
intelligence.  NATO had no intention of launching a preemptive nuclear strike 
against the Soviet Union.  US President Reagan and other US leaders believed the 
idea of such an attack was so farfetched that they initially completely dismissed 
such an assertion as incredible.  They believed, until Oleg Gordievsky presented 
contrary information via the British, that Soviet stated fears of the U.S. and 
NATO were part of a well-organized Soviet propaganda effort designed to 
weaken US and European resolve regarding Pershing II and Ground-launched 
Cruise Missile deployments to Europe.   
Soviet Reaction based on their Intelligence Interpretation 
One of the most compelling arguments concerning the seriousness with 
which the Soviets interpreted their intelligence warning was the fact that they 
placed their forces on a heightened state of alert, which they had never done 
during previous exercises (Jones, 2016, p. 34).  Jones points out what we don’t 
know is exactly which Soviet forces went on alert and how close they were to 
launching a preemptive nuclear attack against the US/NATO.  KGB defector 
Gordievsky blames Operation RYAN for increasing the danger of accidental 
nuclear war.   
218 
 
In the tense atmosphere generated by the crises and rhetoric of the past 
few months, the KGB concluded American forces had been placed on alert-and 
might even have begun the countdown to war.  According to Andrew and 
Gordievsky (1990): 
The world did not quite reach the edge of the nuclear abyss during 
Operations RYaN.  But during Able Archer 83 it had, without realizing it, 
come frighteningly close-certainly closer than at any time since the Cuban 
missile crisis of 1962. (p. 605) 
 While there is little doubt Soviet leaders assessed the danger as real, there 
are still lingering questions concerning the degree of uncertainly the Soviet 
political and military leaders had concerning US intent.  US intelligence did not 
detect a large-scale Warsaw Pact mobilization to counter the perceived NATO 
threat.  The PFIAB authors credits the Soviet with historically making correct 
situation assessment regarding earlier US alerts.  However, the board goes on to 
assess the Soviets probably did not understand the true intent of this NATO 
exercise and they worked to combat that uncertainty by ordering increased 
intelligence collection flights and requesting additional human intelligence 
collection via their KGB Residencies in Western European capitals.  Soviet 
military moves, conducted in secrecy, leads one to believe the Soviets were also 
carefully preparing to launch a surprise preemptive attack in such a way as to not 
trip US intelligence indicators warning of such a possibility or lead to a self-
fulfilling prophecy by provoking a NATO attack.  “This situation could have been 
extremely dangerous if during the exercise – perhaps through a series of ill-timed 
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coincidences or because of faulty intelligence – the Soviet had misperceived US 
actions as preparations for a real attack” (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 
1990, p. 76). 
Conclusion – Current Situation Assessment 
Making a final evaluation regarding the accuracy of the Soviet’s Current 
Situation assessment before and during the war scare is difficult.   
Intelligence Quality –  The overall quality of intelligence the KGB 
provided their senior political/military leaders was poor and misleading.  The 
indicators they used prior to this crisis were crude, dangerously ambiguous, and 
not well tailored to detect nuclear attack preparations.  The Soviets admitted they 
failed to penetrate western military organizations which would have allowed them 
direct human intelligence access to the information they needed to gauge the 
intent of those charged with nuclear attack decisions and implementation of those 
decisions.  Another catastrophic problem:  Intelligence was biased from the 
source.  Field operatives had bureaucratic incentives to feed KGB Center raw, 
unevaluated, alarmist reporting which conformed to the tone of the guidance they 
received from their paranoid KGB and national-level leadership.  KGB 
Residencies routinely filed biased reports, lacking context, to their masters at 
higher headquarters.  The Operation RYAN effort at the field level was met with 
skepticism by agents who were much more in tune with the West than their more 
isolated leadership in Moscow.  Thus, the overall quality of intelligence reporting 
Soviet leaders received from Operation RYAN was often poor and highly 
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misleading.  Bad inputs (intelligence) significantly contributed to bad outputs 
(current situation assessments).   
Receptivity –  Soviets leaders, especially Yuri Andropov, were highly 
receptive to the intelligence they received.  Andropov had served as KGB 
Chairman for 15 years prior to becoming the General Secretary and was in a great 
position to be aware of the KGB’s capabilities and limitations.  He surrounded 
himself with former KGB protégés as General Secretary which further 
demonstrated the level of trust he placed in that organization and their personnel.  
Despite proximate incidents such as the shootdown of KAL 007 and the early 
warning incident of September 26, 1983, which could have led Soviet leaders to 
categorical reject or at least seriously discount the validity of intelligence, Soviet 
leaders continued to receive and act on Operation RYAN intelligence.  They 
worked to further refine their indicator list in 1984 and 1985 after Able Archer 83 
and reaffirmed discipline in their Residencies when field operatives did not 
comply with KGB Center directives on Operation RYAN.  There is no indication 
up to or during the Able Archer exercise that Soviet leaders were unreceptive to 
the intelligence this operation produced. 
Interpretation – At the macro level, Soviet leader’s interpretation of the 
intelligence they received was influenced by both motivational and cognitive 
biases.  Fear of Western military capabilities (which was rational) and intent 
(which was not rational) was a primary factor which led Andropov and other key 
senior officials in the Politburo and in the KGB to interpret intelligence in a way 
which convinced them of US intent to launch an imminent nuclear strike.  Leaders 
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suffered from confirmation bias.  They interpreted the already biased intelligence 
they received in a way which confirmed their pre-existing belief that President 
Reagan was intent on launching a nuclear attack.  This was a case of confirmation 
bias (KGB field officers politicized their reporting to conform with their 
superior’s view of the world and the intelligence recipients (Soviet leaders) 
integrated this intelligence to reinforce their pre-existing view of the current 
international situation).  Soviet leaders also were victim of the fundamental 
attribution error.  They failed to recognize US/NATO actions such as the Pershing 
II/Gryphon missile deployment as defensive in nature, a systemic feature of the 
international security environment but rather ascribed them to nefarious intentions 
based on US/NATO intent to preemptively attack the Soviet Union.  One might 
ague Soviet leaders correctly interpreted biased, flawed intelligence which 
provided fragmentary, misleading indicators of an imminent nuclear attack – they 
believed the inflammatory reporting the KGB provided.  There is an element of 
truth to that, however, the aged Soviet leaders also harbored deep biases based on 
fears which can reasonably be described as paranoia.  Their experiences with 
surprise in World War II, a lifetime of intense ideological indoctrination, and 
limited on the ground experience with the West, also contributed to biases which 
led them to misjudging Western intentions. 
In summary, Soviet leaders were operating under a dangerously flawed 
assessment of the current situation immediately prior to and during the Able 
Archer Exercise in November 1983.  Gordievsky claims, this led to the most 
dangerous period for the two superpowers since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
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October 1962.  The fact that this crisis did not end in a nuclear exchange, initiated 
by the Soviet Union might lead one to downplay the significance of this crisis or 
concluded that at the end of the day the Soviets accurately assessed the current 
situation and exercised restraint by not launching a nuclear attack against the 
US/NATO.  That may be true.  An alternate explanation may be found based on 
any or a combination of four key situational factors:   
1)  Most immediately, the Able Archer Exercise (which lasted five days, 
from November 7-11, 1983) came to an end before the Soviets made any final 
decisions regarding using nuclear weapons to pre-empt what they believed were 
US/NATO preparations for a strike.  
2)  Andropov’s rapidly declining health between late September 1983 until 
his death in February 198483 resulted in Soviet decision making paralysis.84  
3)  Over the medium term, there was a change in the senior Soviet 
leadership which ushered in a relatively less paranoid group of individuals who 
eased tensions. 
4)  Western leaders, notably British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and 
President Reagan, upon hearing about the Able Archer crisis from Gordievsky, 
took deliberate steps to reduce tensions with the Soviets.  Director of Central 
                                                 
83 Andropov suffered from chronic hypertension and diabetes which were complicated by kidney 
disease.  In mid-October 1983, he possibly had one kidney removed.  His failing health caused the 
cancellation of a state visit to Bulgaria (The intense international climate was the official reason 
given for the cancelation.) and on November 7, 1983 Andropov failed to appear at the annual 
Kremlin celebration of the 1971 Bolshevik Revolution (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 
1990, p. 69). 
84 Andropov was the Soviet leader charged with nuclear release authority.  Andropov’s 
deteriorating health did cause consternation among senior Soviet military officials who feared the 
US might take advantage of the situation to launch a preemptive strike nuclear against the Soviet 
Union. 
223 
 
Intelligence William Casey sent a memo in June 1984 to President Reagan about 
the crisis and convinced a very surprised president that Soviet fear and rhetoric 
was not simply hostile propaganda but represented genuine, if misplaced, fear of 
US intentions to launch a nuclear strike (PFIAB Report, The Soviet War Scare, 
1990, pp. 15-18). 
Soviet leaders received mixed quality intelligence from intelligence 
services they trusted (they were receptive) and failed to objectively interpret that 
information due to their own biases and those of their intelligence services.  The 
Soviets may have correctly assessed NATO nuclear capabilities but completely 
misunderstood US/NATO intent.  This led to an inaccurate understanding of the 
current situation immediately prior to and during Exercise Able Archer.
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CHAPTER 5 – THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR THREAT TO THE 
UNITED STATES 
Despite the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear war between the 
United States and Russia continues.  Both sides maintain strategic nuclear forces 
on constant alert and the deteriorating relationship between the US/NATO and 
Russia means the potential for conflict is now greater than for much of the post-
Cold War period.  This chapter serves as a bridge between the two historical case 
studies and the contemporary Russian nuclear threat to the United States.  It 
presents Russia’s threat perceptions and their strategic goals.  This chapter also 
discusses Russian national security strategy, military doctrine, and Russia’s 
current and future strategic nuclear capabilities.  Russian military forces are 
undergoing a significant nuclear force modernization effort which extends and 
enhances the nuclear threat to the United States and our allies.  The risk of an 
accidental nuclear war or a nuclear exchange based on a faulty current situation 
assessment remains a possibility today as it was during Cuban Missile Crisis or 
the Soviet War Scare.  Contemporary nuclear risks are presented to apply what we 
have learned from investigating the two case studies in terms of the theory of 
warning intelligence and current situation assessment to suggest what can be done 
in the future to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear conflict between the U.S. and 
Russia. 
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Russia’s Threat Perceptions and Strategic Goals 
Russia’ nuclear forces are designed to underpin President Vladimir Putin’s 
campaign to restore Russia’s status as a great power.  Putin is determined to 
develop capabilities and display the political will to reestablish Russia as a key 
player in international affairs.  He seeks to actively restructure the international 
order that the United States and our allies have worked hard in the post-World 
War II era to build and maintain but which Putin believes is skewed too heavily to 
benefit the United States and the West at Russia’s expense.  Russia, as well as 
China, seeks to diminish US influence by promoting a multi-polar world order 
based on the principles of state sovereignty (with a strong emphasis on non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other states), a strong role for the United 
Nations, and a concept of balance of power politics which seeks to prevent one or 
more states from dominating the international order (Defense Intelligence 
Agency, 2017, pp. 14-15).   
Putin views past US and NATO interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and 
Libya as dangerous precedents, violating state sovereignty to protect human rights 
or to change ruling regimes.  Putin also sees US and Western influences as 
responsible for the instability in former Soviet republics which resulted in the 
various color revolutions and in the Arab Spring.  Based on US and NATO 
actions since the end of the Cold War in 1991, Putin believes the West has 
actively worked to undermine Russia both domestically and internationally.  He 
fears democracy promotion activities are targeted at Russia and make him the 
possible future target of regime change under the guise of spreading democracy to 
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Russia.  Beyond Vladimir Putin’s personal fears, he seeks to rebuild Russia as a 
great power and requires the political, economic, military, and informational 
power to support that lofty ambition.  Russia today seeks to enhance their military 
capabilities which allow their armed forces to project power, enhance the 
credibility of Russian diplomacy, and ensure Russia’s international interests are 
not routinely disregarded (as Putin believes has been the case in the post-Cold 
War era).  The fact that President Putin is engaging in a broad modernization of 
Russia’s strategic nuclear forces is a sign of his conviction that these weapons are 
critical to Russia’s security and status as a re-emerging great power.85 
Threat Perceptions 
Russian government leaders, despite early efforts by the U.S. and NATO 
in the 1990s to better integrate Russia into the international community, sees the 
U.S. and our allies as the principle threat to Russian security, its geostrategic 
goals, and even the current government’s continued hold on power (Defense 
Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 15).  The current Russian National Security 
Strategy explicitly identifies the United States and NATO as its main threats and 
charges the West with continuing the Cold War strategy of containment to sustain 
                                                 
85 Please see Mankoff, 2014 and Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community, 2018 for additional analysis regarding how Russia views its place in the world, its 
“privileged interests” in Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Republics, and how Russia seeks 
to enhance its position through greater political, economic, and military integration with former 
Soviet Republics.  For additional military capability information and analysis of the Russian 
nuclear threat to the United States, please see:  Lowther and Dodge, 2017; Russia and Eurasia, The 
Military Balance, 2018; Oliker, 2016; and The Global Nuclear Weapons Environment, 2017.  
Congress has also addressed the Russian military threat and force modernization plans in several 
hearings including:  Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, 2015; Understanding and Deterring 
Russia:  U.S. Policies and Strategies, 2016; and The Growing Russian Military Threat in Europe, 
2017. 
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its continued domination of the current international order and prevent Moscow 
from realizing its hard-earned and rightful place in the international arena 
(Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 15).  Additional US/NATO actions which 
contribute to Russia’s dire assessment of the threat include NATO enlargement 
and its consequent buildup of military capabilities closer to Russia’s western 
border, the deployment of NATO missile defense systems in Europe, and US 
research and development of strategic, conventional precision strike weapons 
systems (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 15). 
At a broader, ideological level, Russia has a continued fear and distrust of 
the U.S. based on our commitment, which transcends domestic partisan divides, 
to promote the spread of democracy around the world.  Russia and other 
revisionist powers resent what they perceive as a moral crusade which they see as 
a mechanism for imposing a single set of values on others who have different 
historical, social, or cultural experiences.  Moscow fears this continued effort to 
impose what the West believes is a universal set of norms is dangerous for 
Russian internal stability and, more precisely, for the continued rule of Vladimir 
Putin and his government.  Putin believes democracy promotion efforts motivate 
non-governmental organizations and hostile intelligence services to actively 
agitate the Russian population which could lead, someday, to a people-power 
revolution in Russia.  Putin directly ties the 2011 Arab Spring demonstrations and 
the various 2003-2005 “color revolutions” in the former Soviet Republics of 
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, and more recent events dealing with the ouster 
of President Victor Yanukovych in Ukraine (2014) with foreign meddling in the 
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internal affairs of sovereign states.  He is convinced such a sequence of events 
could also lead to his personal downfall if the Russian people rise to openly 
oppose his rule. 
 Putin and other conservative political entities within Russia seek to 
combat this fear, in part, through appeals to nationalism by emphasizing the return 
to and preservation of traditional Russian cultural and spiritual values.  Such 
thinking, which was also promoted in the Soviet period, seeks to protect Russians 
from “decadent” and dangerous Western values which seek to weaken or destroy 
Russia from within.   
 Russia is also working to develop a strategic partnership with China, 
which also seeks to contain US global influence and promotes itself as an 
alternative model of political and economic development.  The Russian Foreign 
Policy Concept states this renewed relationship with China is intended “to 
promote foreign policy cooperation with China in various areas, including 
countering new challenges and threats, resolving urgent regional and global 
problems, and (sic) cooperation in international organizational and multilateral 
associations” (Putin, 2016).  Yet, this relationship may not prove to be solid as 
China’s dominant and growing economic power may alienate a prideful Russia, 
which faces a more pessimistic long-term economic and demographic outlook.  
Sharing a long border, far from the center of Russian conventional military power, 
Russia may someday fear Chinese designs on Russian territory which could result 
in a revival of military competition between these two large, nuclear-armed states. 
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 This antagonistic vision Putin maintains against the West has grown 
stronger since his clear articulation of Russia’s new foreign policy at the Munich 
Security Conference of 2007.  This conference was a turning point in Russia’s 
relationship with the U.S. and its western European allies.  Putin strongly 
condemned the U.S. for its international actions which, in his view, had created 
international instability through the illegitimate use of force.  Putin stated: 
We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of 
international law.  And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, 
coming increasingly closer to one state’s legal system.  One state and, of 
course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national 
borders in every way.  This is visible in the economic, political, cultural, 
and educational policies it imposes on other nations.  Well, who likes this?  
Who is happy about this? (Putin, Speech at the Munich Security 
Conference, February 10, 2007) 
He called on the West to share international power and leadership with 
other rising economic powers, including Russia.   
Russian National Security Strategy and Foreign Policy Concept 
The current version of Russia’s National Security Strategy was adopted in 
December 2015.  This document explicitly defines Russia’s stated strategic 
national interests and outlines foreign and defense priorities for six years, through 
2021.  This document guides strategic planning, defines national interests, and 
details Russia’s national strategic priorities.  It defines domestic and foreign 
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policy goals to strengthen national security and ensure sustainable, long-term 
national development.  The previous national security strategy, released in 2009, 
served the same purpose and outlined similar national priorities but given the 
deterioration in relations between Russia and the West over the course of the 
period between 2009 and December 2015 the tone of the latest strategy is more 
aggressive (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 16).  The current strategy 
defines Russian national interests as:   
• Strengthening the countries defense 
• Ensuring political and social stability 
• Raising the standard of living 
• Preserving and developing culture 
• Strengthening Russia’s status as a leading international power 
Section 14.A.B of Russia’s military doctrine lists the following main 
military threats to the Russian Federation (Embassy of the Russian Federation to 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2014, as cited in 
Boston and Massicot, 2017, p. 13): 
Disruption of: 
• State and military command and control systems 
• Strategic nuclear forces 
• Missile attack warning system  
• Space surveillance system 
• Nuclear weapons storage facilities and nuclear power engineering 
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• Nuclear chemical, pharmaceutical, and medical industries 
• Other potentially dangerous facilities 
Russia is to pursue these interests by focusing on eight strategic national 
priorities: 
• National defense 
• State and public security 
• Economic growth 
• Scientific, technology, and education 
• Healthcare 
• Culture 
• Ecology of living systems and rational use of natural resources 
• Strategic stability and equal strategic partnership 
Key differences between the 2015 version and the 2009 version shed light 
on emerging and growing Russian national security concerns.  New threats to the 
nation included the work of non-governmental organizations in Russia, “color 
revolutions,” and the use of social media to promote internal instability.  These 
threats are feared as mechanisms which could provoke mass political movements 
demanding regime change in Russia.  The new strategy also highlights the 
continuing requirement to strengthen traditional Russian moral and spiritual 
values as a means of inoculating the population against subversive Western ideals 
(Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 17).  Another area of the strategy which 
offers insight is the direct, explicit accusation that the U.S. and NATO are acting 
to undermine Russian internal stability and threaten its national security (Defense 
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Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 17).  Aligning with the 2014 version of Russia’s 
Military Doctrine, the new National Security Strategy highlights the importance 
of conflict prevention, conventional and nuclear deterrence, and the need to 
improve Russia’s force generation process (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 
17). 
These three documents reflect many traditional Russian themes regarding 
its threat perceptions and its view of Russia’s place in the world.  Russia sees 
itself as one of the world’s leading powers, a great power, whose sovereignty 
must be respected and whose foreign policy must be conducted independently to 
secure its national interests.  These ideas are certainly not unique to modern 
Russia which has aspired to such status for several centuries.  Several factors 
contribute to the sense that Russia is more than a regional power including:  
Russia identity as an Orthodox Christian nation, its geographic position at the 
cross-road between Europe and Asia, the incredible size of its territory, its great 
accomplishments during the Soviet period (the creation of an industrialized 
economy, defeat of Nazi fascism, its accomplishments in space, and its nuclear 
weapons and missile program).  A certain nostalgia for its lost Cold War-era great 
power status leads Russia to believe it has a special responsibility as one of the 
major nuclear powers, alongside the United States, in international security affairs 
(Facon, 2017, p. 6).  Facon, writing an official assessment for the European Union 
on Russia’s new strategic planning documents, emphasizes Russian leaders today 
view the international environment as “dangerous, volatile, chaotic, and marked 
by stiff competition for resources, control of markets and transport routes, and 
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political influence amongst major powers.” (Facon, 2017, p. 6).  Putin believes 
the world is moving from a unipolar world, dominated by the United States and 
its western allies, to a multi-polar world characterized by regional and global 
competition.  These documents reflect Russia’s view, and again this is not new, 
that it is surrounded by threats and challenges on all sides.  Facon points out the 
Russian population shares this acute threat perception.  As of January 2016, 65% 
of the Russian people surveyed in a Levada opinion poll believed other countries 
are a military threat to Russia.  This figure has grown in the 10-year period from 
2006-2016 from 40% to 60% (Facon, 2017, p. 7).  
The top priority for Russian foreign and security policy is maintaining 
influence in the independent states of the former Soviet Union.  This priority 
reflects Russia’s long-standing desire to protect itself with buffer states from 
external invasion and instability.  From a Russian perspective, this means they 
have legitimate needs to exert political or military control over their immediate 
neighbors.  Russia sees exerting such power also increases its international 
standing as a great power in the emerging multipolar world order.  To achieve this 
position, Russia has built economic and political/military international 
organizations such as Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization to unify former Soviet republics under Russian leadership.  
Russia’s relationships with these states and concerted efforts to strengthen its 
leadership role in regional organizations which it dominates, are designed to 
influence its neighbors.  These are Russia’s top foreign policy priorities according 
to its 2016 Foreign Policy Concept (Facon, 2017, p. 7) 
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Russian Military Doctrine and Strategy 
Russia has carefully observed the modern, American way of conventional 
war as exemplified by Operation Desert Storm in 1991.  In that campaign, US 
strategists employed air power to attack targets deep in Iraq to isolate the regime 
leadership, pound frontline forces with heavy aerial bombing and artillery and 
then use armored maneuver warfare to quickly seize the initiative and defeat 
Iraq’s fielded forces.  Using the full spectrum of capabilities, the U.S. and our 
coalition partners accomplished their objectives very quickly and with minimal 
coalition casualties.  Russia recognizes and has reformed its military to adapt to 
its view of modern warfare.  Gone are large, conscription-based, mass 
mobilization ground forces designed for large-scale theater warfare.  General 
Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff, has stated, “frontal engagements of large 
formations of forces at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming 
a thing of the past, while long-distance, contactless actions against the adversary 
are becoming a major means of achieving one’s goals” (Facon, 2017, p. 11).  
Consequently, Russia has adapted its military doctrine from a posture of 
accumulating unlimited military power to devising operational concepts which 
better integrate conventional, nuclear, and unconventional elements of military 
power (Facon, 2017, p., 15).  Specifically, Russia is modernizing weapons to 
support an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy to prevent foreign military 
intervention in current or potential hot spots such as Crimea, Kaliningrad, and the 
Arctic (Facon, 2017, p. 15).  These weapons include:  air and missile defense 
systems, anti-submarine warfare capabilities, surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, 
land, and air and sea-launched cruise missiles and electronic warfare capabilities. 
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Today, Russia fears the effective use of precision-guided conventional 
weaponry which, in their view, can achieve results similar to nuclear weapons.  
Based on this assessment, equating the effects of US conventional precision 
weapons with nuclear weapons, Russia has articulated a doctrine which envisions 
using nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack, if necessary, to 
preserve the existence and sovereignty of Russia.  Thus, like the United States, 
Russia rejects calls for a no first-use nuclear weapons policy.  This stance should 
not be surprising as the supreme national interest of any state is to guarantee the 
existence of the state and its people.  However, Moscow has taken this policy a 
step further and has developed and publicly discussed the theoretical concept of 
using nuclear weapons to “de-escalate” conventional conflicts (Defense 
Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 22).  This has caused great concern among Western 
governments which have traditionally viewed nuclear weapons as weapons of last 
resort to be used in very limited circumstances including:  retaliation for use of 
weapons of mass destruction, to forestall the complete defeat of their conventional 
military forces (for example in a massive Soviet/Russian invasion of Western 
Europe or a North Korean invasion of South Korea), or when their survival of the 
state is threatened with nuclear weapons.  The emerging Russian “escalate-to-de-
escalate” strategy signals a potential greater Russian willingness to use nuclear 
weapons beyond the narrower scenarios detailed above.  US military leaders, 
including Admiral Haney, the recently retired commander of US Strategic 
Command, fears the Russians may use nuclear weapons in a very limited way 
early in a conflict to deter US and NATO action to defend or re-enforce the 
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defenses of a NATO ally or any other nation in which the U.S. or NATO has an 
interest.  Haney stated, Russia “is declaring and recklessly demonstrating its 
willingness to escalate-to-de-escalate, if required” (Haney, 2016 as cited in 
Kristensen, 2017, p. 117).  Russia may be willing to use a nuclear weapon or a 
small number of weapons to deter any Western involvement to forestall or reverse 
Russian aggression in the future (such as Russian territorial aggression against 
Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014).  Such use may even be designed to prevent 
the targeted nation from defending itself using conventional capabilities. 
Russia’s most recent version of its military doctrine states: 
The Russian Federation reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in 
response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass 
destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression 
against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons 
when the very existence of the state is under threat. (CSCE, 2017, p. 51 
and Boston and Massicot 2017, p. 6) 
According to Boston and Massicot (2017), Russian doctrine provides 
some ideas concerning which issues Russia considers jeopardizing the “very 
existence of the state.”  Russia is likely to use nuclear weapons in response to 
non-nuclear attack when it believes there is a grave threat to 1) its territorial 
integrity, 2) continuity of government, 3) viability of its strategic nuclear 
deterrent.  The destruction of Russian integrated air defense system which 
protects western Russia or the approach to Russia via the Baltic region near 
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Kaliningrad or St. Petersburg could also be considered jeopardizing to the future 
existence of the state and might warrant Russia nuclear use (p. 6). 
As explained by Alexy Arbatov (2017), the official Russian nuclear 
doctrine contains only two differences from US stated nuclear strategy as 
articulated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.  These two differences include 
America’s willingness to defend our allies with nuclear weapons if they are 
attacked with convention force (note the Russian statement above indicates the 
Russians envisions using nuclear weapons to defend their allies only if they are 
attacked using weapons of mass destruction) and Russia’s willingness to use 
nuclear weapons to defend Russia against conventional attacks which risk state 
survival.  The U.S. has no need to make this type of statement given America’s 
incredible conventional superiority (p. 35). 
The main purpose of Russian strategic nuclear forces is to maintain a 
reliable, credible deterrent force.  Potential nuclear mission scenarios include:  
preemptive (first strike) strike, counter-strike (launch on warning), and retaliatory 
strike (response to enemy nuclear detonations in Russia).  The third nuclear 
mission set, retaliatory strike, poses the most challenging scenario from a war 
fighting perspective and requires robust, redundant C3 structures as well as 
nuclear forces hardened and capable of delivering a retaliatory, second-strike.  
This second-strike capability forms the core of Russia’s deterrence posture against 
large nuclear forces such as those maintained by the United States. 
Some debate exists regarding Russia’s nuclear strategy.  Some western 
analysts believe Russia has recently reduced its threshold for employing nuclear 
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weapons (Miller, 2015 as cited in Kristensen, 2017, p. 117), however, others 
believe Russia is building a nuclear capability to provide more flexible response 
options, similar to the U.S. nuclear strategy (Arbatov, 2016 as citied in 
Kristensen, 2017, p. 117).  While a careful reading of Russia’s official military 
doctrine is useful, the nation’s political and military officials have made 
statements which suggest Russia is willing to use nuclear weapons in situations 
beyond the narrow scenarios defined in their official military doctrine.  Russia has 
had a long-standing issue with US and NATO ballistic missile defense 
development and has threatened to use nuclear weapons against those facilities.  
They have threatened to use nuclear weapons in regional conflicts (Kristensen, 
2017, p. 117) which has raised concerns among the former Warsaw Pact members 
of NATO in Eastern Europe.  Russia has stated their willingness to use nuclear 
weapons when the survival of the state is not in jeopardy or when the use of other 
types of weapons of mass destruction (such as chemical, biological, or 
radiological) are not involved as a threat to Russia (Kristensen, 2017, p. 117).  
Russia has also conducted military exercises which involve simulated use of 
nuclear weapons against countries with no nuclear capabilities such as Sweden 
(Kristensen, 2017, p. 117).  Since 1999, Russia has conducted military exercises 
which feature the first use of nuclear weapons in very calibrated ways designed to 
prevent further escalation of conventional conflict and to decisively end hostilities 
favorably for Moscow (Facon, 2017, p. 16). 
Beyond exercises, nuclear weapons have played a role in real-world 
Russian military operations.  According to Pavel Podvic, Director of the Russian 
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Nuclear Forces Project in Geneva, “Strategic forces play a role supporting 
whatever moves Russia makes,” including in Ukraine, Crimea, or Georgia.  The 
threat of escalation in a regional conflict is “a deliberate policy of Russian leaders 
because nobody wants to engage in nuclear conflicts for limited stakes” 
(Cordesman, 2017, p. 4-5). 
Russia has also escalated their political rhetoric regarding the use of 
nuclear weapons against NATO member states.  Russia has threatened to target 
Denmark, Romania, and Norway with nuclear weapons in response to US 
exercise activity or the deployment of NATO ballistic missile defense systems 
(Cordesman, 2017 and CSCE, 2017, p. 42). 
Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies believes nuclear threat statements from Russia’s leaders against the U.S. 
and NATO may be posturing and do not necessarily indicate a risk any greater 
than in the past.  However, he also recognizes that rhetoric and political moves 
play an important role in deterrence and strategic intimidation.  These threats may 
serve as a way to block the expansion of forward deployed conventional deterrent 
forces to NATO states along or near the Russian border, to delay or stop the 
further fielding of vital ballistic missile defense systems in forward NATO areas, 
or to politically paralyze NATO and European Union (EU) counter-measures 
designed in response to Russian pressure (Cordesman, 2017, p. 5-6). 
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Current Russian Nuclear Forces 
The Soviet Union was the second world nuclear power, testing its first 
nuclear device in August 1949, four years after the first operational use of a 
nuclear weapon by the United States against Japan.  Russia, which inherited the 
Soviet nuclear arsenal following the end of the Cold War in 1991, maintains the 
world’s largest inventory of nuclear weapons.  A key component of its national 
security strategy, Russia maintains and continues to modernize its strategic and 
tactical nuclear weapons.  Nuclear weapons provide Russia deterrence, serve as a 
source of domestic, national pride, and enhance its international prestige.  The 
nation’s nuclear force posture is largely a legacy of how Soviet nuclear forces 
were developed and deployed during the Cold War when the Soviet Union, like 
the United States, developed a strategic triad of manned bombers, land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic 
missile systems (SLBMs).  Russian Aerospace Forces control the manned bomber 
portion of their nuclear capability, while the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) is 
responsible for ICBMs, and the Navy controls SLBMs.  Russia possess 
approximately 7,000 nuclear warheads in varying degrees of readiness, from 
operationally deployed to awaiting destruction.  The majority of those weapons 
(4,300) are operationally deployed with the nation’s strategic and tactical nuclear 
forces, including 1,950 strategic warheads deployed on ballistic missiles and at 
bomber bases.  Five hundred strategic and 1,850 tactical warheads are in storage. 
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Strategic Rocket Forces – Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
During the Soviet era, the Strategic Rocket Forces were the most 
prestigious military service of the Soviet Armed Forces.  Established in December 
1959 to operate the world’s first land-based nuclear-armed intercontinental 
ballistic missile system (the SS-6), the SRF today remains one of the most 
powerful nuclear missile forces in the world (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, 
p. 47).  The force is organized in three missile armies (27th, 31st, and 33rd) 
consisting of 12 missile divisions.86  Eight division operate road-mobile missile 
systems while the remaining four operate silo-based systems (Defense 
Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 47).  Russia maintains and operates several Soviet-
era ICBMs and three of the oldest system comprise more than half of the entire 
Russian ICBM force.  However, Russia is approximately two thirds of the way 
through a major force modernization program designed to replace all Soviet-era 
missiles with newer types of systems by the early 2020s (Kristensen, 2017, p. 
118).  This will result in fewer missiles then currently deployed but with an 
increased number of warheads per missile.  Current deployment modes include 
fixed, silo-based missiles as well as road-mobile weapons systems.87  The oldest 
deployed ICBM systems are the silo-based, liquid-fueled, SS-19 (deployed 1979-
1984) which carry 6 warheads per missile,88 followed by the SS-18 (deployed 
1988-1992), the workhorse of the Russian ICBM fleet, which carry 10 warheads 
                                                 
86 Kristensen and Norris (2017) count 11 missile divisions with 39 missile regiments. 
87 Road- and rail-mobile systems are notoriously difficult for foreign intelligence services and 
operational forces to find, track, fix, and attack.  Thus, their survivability in a nuclear conflict is 
enhanced over fixed, silo-based systems. 
88 Russian ICBMs and SLBMs which carry multiple warheads have a multiple, independently 
targeted, re-entry vehicle or MIRV.  This allows a single missile to deliver warheads to several 
different, geographically dispersed, targets. 
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(Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 29).  The SS-25 is a solid-fueled, single 
warhead, road-mobile ICBM (deployed 1985-1992).  The Russian Strategic 
Rocket Forces operate 30 SS-19s and 46 SS-18s in silos and 72 road-mobile SS-
25s (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 48).  These three systems are nearing 
the end of their designed service life and are expected to be removed from service 
between 2019-2021 (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 30).  The most 
modern system currently deployed, the SS-27 consists of 60 silo-based and 18 
road-mobile missiles (SS-27 Mod 1) and 73 of the latest SS-27 Mod 2 (Defense 
Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 48).  In total, as of 2016, the SRF operated 299 
intercontinental nuclear missiles with approximately half of those equipped with 
multiple warheads.  Russia is undertaking an extensive nuclear force 
modernization program which will replace these three ICBM systems between 
2020-2022 with a force evenly split between silo-based and road-mobile systems. 
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Table 1 – Current and Planned Russian ICBM Forces 
(Listed by initial deployment year) 
 
System 
(NATO 
Designation) 
System 
(Russian 
Designation) 
Deployment 
Period 
Propellant Missiles 
 
Warheads/ 
Missile 
Deployment 
Mode 
Soviet-era 
Systems 
      
SS-19/M3 
Stiletto 
RS-18 1979-1984 Liquid 20 6 Silo 
SS-25 
Sickle 
RS-12M 
(Topol) 
1985-1992 Solid 72-90 1 Road-
mobile 
SS-18/M6 
Satan 
RS-20V 1988-1992 Liquid 46 10 Silo 
       
Russian-era 
Systems 
      
       
SS-27 
Mod 1 
RS-12M2 
(Topol-M) 
1997 Solid 60 1 Silo 
SS-27 
Mod 1 
RS-12M1 
(Topol-M) 
2006 Solid 18 1 Road-
mobile 
SS-27 
Mod 2 
RS-24  
(Yars) 
2010 Solid 70 4 Road-
mobile 
SS-27 
Mod 2 
RS-24 
(Yars) 
2014 Solid 12 4 Silo 
SS-X-31 RS-26 2016 Solid  4 Road-
mobile 
SS-30 RS-28 
Sarmat 
Early 2020s   10 Silo 
Sources:  Defense Intelligence Agency, Russian Military Power, 2017 and 
Kristensen, 2017 
Navy - Ballistic Missile Submarines 
Russia currently maintains 12 submarines dedicated to launching strategic, 
ballistic missiles under the Naval High Command.  The most modern Russian 
SLBN system is the DOLGORUKIY-class submarine which carries the SS-N-32 
BULAVA sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (Defense Intelligence Agency, 
2017, p. 30).  The Russian Navy also operates six DELTA IV- class and three89 
                                                 
89 The Pacific fleet maintains three DELTA III boats but one is in overhaul status leaving two for 
operational deployment at any given time (Kristensen, 2017, pp. 120-121). 
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DELTA III-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines as part of its 
nuclear triad (Kristensen, 2017, p. 120).  These submarines are split between the 
Russian Northern and Pacific Fleets.  The Northern Fleet maintains and operates 
six DETLA IV and one DOLGORUKIY SSBNs.  The Pacific Fleet SLBM 
component consists of two DELTA III and two DOLGORUKIY submarines.  The 
SS-N-18 STINGRAY (3 warheads) submarine-launched ballistic missile carried 
by the DELTA III, the SS-N-23 SINEVA (4 warheads) on the DELTA VI, and 
the latest submarine launched missile, the SS-N-32 BULAVA (6 warheads), on 
the DOLGORUKIY class submarine can all strike targets in the U.S. from their 
home ports (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 68-69).  Russian ballistic 
missile submarines carry 16 missiles per boat and combined can deliver 800 
nuclear warheads to targets in the U.S. (Kristensen, 2017, p. 120). 
Aerospace Force – Manned Strategic Bombers 
Russia operates several different types of manned, strategic nuclear 
bombers which are part of its Long-Range Aviation (LRA) Command.  The three 
types of aircraft are all Soviet-era legacy systems but have undergone extensive 
technological upgrades and service life extension programs to remain viable 
threats into the future.  The oldest Russian bomber currently active is the Tu-95 
BEAR, followed by the Tu-22M BACKFIRE, and finally, the Tu-160 
BLACKJACK.  There are approximately 50 deployed Russia nuclear bombers 
which can carry more than 600 nuclear armed Air-launched Cruise Missiles 
(ALCMs) (Kristensen, 2017, p. 122) for use against the U.S. or our allies. 
  
245 
 
Table 2 – Operationally Deployed Russian Strategic Bombers 
Bomber Number Armament 
Tu-95MS 
BEAR 
60 6-16 X AS-15 KENT (Kh-55) 
AS-X-21 (Kh-102) 
Tu-22M3 
BACKFIRE 
50+ 3 X Kh-32 or 12 AS-16 KICKBACK (Kh-15) 
Tu-160 
BLACKJACK 
16 12 X AS-15 KENT (Kh-55) 
AS-X-21 (Kh-102) 
Sources:  Defense Intelligence Agency, Russian Military Power, 2017 and 
Kristensen, 2017 
Russian Nuclear Command and Control 
The current Russian command and control system is based on the Soviet 
experience with nuclear forces in the Cold War and meets the military 
requirements of reliability, speed, and security.  Russian nuclear planners have 
designed a complex command and control system, which like the US system, 
protects Russian nuclear weapons from unauthorized or accidental launch and 
concentrates command authority in the most senior echelon of government.  This 
enables Russian forces to respond quickly, if necessary, to an attack which 
necessitates a nuclear response.  Similar again to the US system, the Russian 
president has immediate access to the nuclear briefcase, which is carried by 
military officers who accompany the president.  According to Russia’s military 
doctrine, the Russian president, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the 
Russian Armed Forces, maintains primary release authority for the use of nuclear 
weapons.  The Russian minister of defense and the head of the general staff also 
have nuclear briefcases.  Due to strict secrecy, it is not known if nuclear launch 
authority requires only the president to authorize a launch of if that decision 
requires concurrence with the defense minister or head of the general staff 
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(Arbatov, 2017, p. 43).  The Russian General Staff is responsible for monitoring 
the status of Russian nuclear forces and relays launch commands from the 
Russian president to the nation’s nuclear forces.  The Russian government has 
built a robust, redundant nuclear command, control, and communications system 
to ensure survivability and continuity of communication in a nuclear crisis.  They 
also maintain a system, Perimeter, also known as the Dead Hand System, to 
ensure nuclear retaliation in the event the planned Russian nuclear command, 
control, and communication system breaks down under nuclear attack (Defense 
Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 26-27). 
Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Forces 
Russia also maintains a large stockpile of tactical, non-strategic nuclear 
weapons.  These weapons were designed and built during the Cold War and 
intended for battlefield use.  Compared with strategic nuclear systems, tactical 
nuclear weapons have limited range and cannot reach the U.S. from Russian 
territory.  These weapons, nonetheless, still pose a threat to our NATO allies in 
Europe, our treaty allies in East Asia, and forward deployed US forces stationed 
in those areas.  The Russian tactical nuclear arsenal contains warheads for air-
delivered gravity bombs, short-range ballistic missiles, air-to-surface and surface-
to-air missiles, air-delivered depth charges,90 anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-
aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines (Defense 
Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 31). 
                                                 
90 Use for anti-submarine warfare 
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Russia’s short-range nuclear missiles are a special concern for our NATO 
allies.  Russia fields two types of these missiles systems, the SS-21 TOCHA and 
the SS-26 ISKANDER-M.  The original SS-21 entered service in 1976 and the 
improved SS-21 version, the TOCHA-U, came on line in 1990 (Defense 
Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 77).  The latest missile, the SS-26 which was 
fielded in 2007, is replacing the SS-21 and is also a solid-fueled, road-mobile, 
single-warhead missile system.  Compared with the SS-21, this missile has 
superior terminal guidance systems using either radar, electro-optical, or infrared 
imaging matching technology which enables the missile to strike mobile targets 
(Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 77).  According to Kristensen (2017), 
Russia maintains approximately 140 missiles with 140 warheads for these two 
systems (p. 116).  The SS-26 also brings an increased range of 400-500 km over 
the more limited 120 km range of the SS-21.  This allows the SS-26 to strike 
targets in NATO territory.  In 2016, Russia announced its intention to deploy the 
SS-26 ISKANDER-M system to Kaliningrad Oblast which borders NATO 
member states Poland and Lithuania.  This missile can strike targets in Poland, the 
three Baltics states (which are also NATO allies), and Sweden.  The Russian 
military completed the deployment in October 2016 and the government has 
declared the Kaliningrad SS-26 basing as permanent (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, SS-26 Missile Threat Webpage, 2016). 
Russia has also developed a new missile system, the SSC-8, with a range 
of approximately 1500-2000 km and has deployed at least one battalion of this 
ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
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Forces (INF) Treaty.  Each missile battalion is comprised of four mobile missile 
launchers which are very similar to the launcher used for the SS-26 ISKANDER 
missile system (which is allowed under current arms control treaties), making 
differentiation of these systems difficult for treaty monitoring/verification 
purposes and order of battle analysis.  Each launcher is equipped with six ground-
launched cruise missiles each with one nuclear warhead.  On March 8, 2017, U.S. 
Air Force General Paul Selva, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
testified before the House Armed Services Committee stating: 
We believe that the Russians have deployed a land based cruise missile 
that violated the spirit and intent of the intermediate nuclear forces 
treaty….The system itself presents a risk to most of our facilities in 
Europe and we believe that the Russians have deliberately deployed it in 
order to pose a threat to NATO and to facilities within the NATO area of 
responsibility. (Barrie & Boyd, 2017) 
The SS-26 system missile is capable of striking targets in the three Baltic 
States and northeastern Poland, if deployed in western Russia and as far away as 
Germany and Denmark, if deployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast.   
Russian Nuclear Force Modernization 
Russia has embarked upon a large-scale conventional and nuclear force 
modernization plan.  Between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 
difficult but ultimately successful five-day military campaign against Georgia in 
2008, the Russian military suffered across the board deterioration of its 
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operational effectiveness, readiness, and morale.  In 2009, the Russian 
government, reacting to the debilitated state of the Russian Armed Forces adopted 
a comprehensive plan to reform and modernize the military.  Entitled the “New 
Look,” it is an effort to transform the Soviet-era Russian military force, which 
was built based on large infantry and mechanized ground forces designed for 
invading and occupying Western Europe, to a smaller, lighter, more professional 
force designed for expeditionary warfare.  The Russian military has changed their 
command structure, the organizational structure of their military services, and 
reconfigured their military districts to adapt to changes they see in 21st century 
warfare. 
A second component to the reform program, oriented toward planning and 
funding new weapons systems, is Russia’s State Armaments Program.  This plan 
emphasizes modernization of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, space, precision 
strike systems, and aerospace defense capabilities (Defense Intelligence Agency, 
2017, p. 43).  This plan, a priority for President Putin, seeks to modernize 70% of 
Russia’s military equipment between 2011-2020 (Defense Intelligence Agency, 
2017, p. 75).  The Russian government plans to spend $28 billion through 2020 to 
modernize the various elements of the nation’s nuclear triad (Defense Intelligence 
Agency, 2017, p. 29).  The goal of this expansive modernization program is to 
replace rapidly aging Soviet-era nuclear systems which are reaching the end of 
their operational service life with modern systems.  The Russians seek to maintain 
nuclear parity with the U.S.  To maintain deterrence, they also want to ensure and 
improve the survivability of their nuclear force.  At the geopolitical level, Russia 
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seeks to maintain the prestige that nuclear weapons provide and regain a position 
of power, on par with the U.S., in international affairs.  From a military 
perspective, Russia is very concerned with US advances in conventional, 
precision strike capabilities, especially the prospects of quick, global strike 
weapons.  It has also registered its displeasure with the 2002 US withdrawal from 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and subsequent continued development 
and deployment of US and NATO ballistic missile defense systems.  From the 
Russian viewpoint, US quick, precision strike capabilities place many Russian 
targets at a risk of very quick destruction, and thus these new weapons possess the 
same effects as nuclear weapons.  Additionally, Russia also fears their nuclear 
deterrent is substantially diminished with US/NATO ABM deployments.  In 
addition to the operational need to modernize its nuclear forces, Russia seeks to 
develop and field nuclear weapons which compensate for US conventional 
precision strike developments and to counter improved US/NATO ABM defenses 
in both the United States and Europe. 
US technological advances are broadening the Russian interpretation of 
the meaning of strategic warfare.  American development and refinement of 
conventional, precision strike capabilities cause Russia significant concern.  
Long-range conventional weapons can now attack strategic targets that have 
historically only been held at risk by nuclear weapons.  New cyberweapons are 
designed, in part, to augment the effects of both conventional and nuclear kinetic 
weapons by attacking command, control, communication systems, early warning 
(EW) systems, and intelligence collection systems.  Additionally, Russia sees 
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US/NATO missile defense developments as further degrading their strategic and 
tactical nuclear deterrent.  The combination of these factors provides the U.S. 
with significant superiority in the strategic competition with Russia (Rogov & 
Squassoni, 2017, pp. 51-52). 
 Russia is shifting its nuclear force posture away from Soviet-style mass to 
a position which places greater emphasis on survivability of its nuclear forces 
(Colby, 2016, p. 2).  As discussed above, this is largely in response to Russian 
concerns over US technological superiority in precision strike capabilities; anti-
ballistic missile systems; and command, control, communication, computer, and 
intelligence (C4I) networks.  While other components of the US nuclear force 
have remained stable from a technological perspective, Russia believes US 
fielding of advanced capabilities in these three areas has tipped the strategic 
nuclear balance in the US’s favor.  Their emerging force modernization program 
is designed, in part, to counter these developments.  Russia is increasing the 
number of strategic warheads deployed on road-mobile systems and is building a 
new class of quiet ballistic missile submarine with plans to more frequently keep 
these submarines on patrol.  These efforts serve, from a Russian perspective, to 
enhance deterrence by complicating US nuclear targeting.  The new Russian 
nuclear weapons systems are much more difficult to track and accurately attack 
compared to fixed, land-based silos and nuclear bomber airfields both of which 
are highly vulnerable to a first-strike. 
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Strategic Rocket Forces – Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
Modernization of ICBMs for the Russian SRF is a high strategic priority 
for President Putin.  To replace the heavy, silo-based, MIRVed SS-18, Russia is 
developing a new missile, the Sarmat with the goal of fielding this missile 
between 2018-2020.  It is also deploying a second new missile, the Rubezh 
(Border), also known as the RS-26.  This new road-mobile system is smaller than 
the current SS-27 Mod 2 and is designed to overcome Western missile defense 
systems.  Russian research and development teams are working on a third missile, 
the Barguzin ICBM, a rail-mobile system (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 
48).91  After the completion of the currently planned force modernization, the 
overall number of SRF missiles will decrease below the approximately 300 
currently deployed but the number of missiles capable of carrying multiple 
warheads will increase.  Additionally, between 2010-2020, all Russian road 
mobile systems will carry multiple warheads.92  Russia’s future deployment of 
mobile ICBM systems, which the U.S. does not have an equivalent capability, 
will continue to complicate our ability to find, fix, and destroy these systems in a 
potential nuclear conflict.  Such complications serve the Russians well, enhancing 
the survivability of their ICBM force and thus enhancing deterrence.   
The SRF of the future will remain the pride of Russia’s nuclear attack 
force, operating approximately 1,200 nuclear warheads, the vast bulk of their 
                                                 
91 Some reports indicate Russia may have either delayed or cancelled this system (Kristensen, 
2017, p. 117).   
92 Prior to 2010 Russian road mobile systems were capable of delivery a single warhead.  This will 
change as the SS-25 is phased out.  The SS-27 and newer RS-26 are road-mobile, MIRVed 
systems. 
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nuclear capability under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).  
These missiles are expected, like their US equivalents, to remain on alert, capable 
of launch within minutes of receiving orders from President Putin and with the 
capability of impacting US targets 25-30 minutes after launch. 
Navy - Ballistic Missile Submarines 
The most modern Russian ballistic missile submarine is the 
DOLGORUKIY-class submarine with three operational boats.  The Russian Navy 
plans to acquire eight additional DOLGORUKIY-class submarines and plans to 
build a new generation strategic ballistic missile submarines between 2031 and 
2050 (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 83).  The DOLGORUKIY-class 
submarine is equipped with the SS-N-32 BULAVA solid-fuel missile with six 
MIRV warheads and an intercontinental range of 8,000 kilometers.  This missile 
will also replace older SLBMs in the Russian Navy’s missile inventory. 
Aerospace Force – Manned Strategic Bombers 
Russia is in the process of upgrading two manned bombers, the Tu-95 
BEAR, and Tu-160 BLACKJACK bombers to allow their continued operation 
through 2030, and is developing a new, latest-generation bomber, the PAK-DA.  
All current Tu-160s will be upgraded to Tu-160 M1 or M2 and the production line 
will be re-opened for the TU-160M2 sometime after 2023 (Defense Intelligence 
Agency, 2017, p. 80).  The new PAD-DA is scheduled for development over the 
next 10 years and will possess both conventional and nuclear weapon delivery 
options, stealth technology, and a short- and unimproved runway takeoff/landing 
capability (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 30). 
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 Russia is also modernizing its air-launched cruise missile systems for its 
Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers.  The Kh-102 is the designation for the new 
missile which will replace the existing Kh-55 cruise missile (Defense Intelligence 
Agency, 2017, p. 78). 
Nuclear Arms Control Treaties Currently in Force 
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) 
Nuclear arms control treaties are important in mitigating the level of 
potential destruction in the event of a nuclear conflict.  The current strategic 
nuclear arms control treaty in force, the US-Russia New Strategic Arms Control 
Treaty, New START, cuts and limits each side to 1,550 operationally deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads.93  The total number of deployed and non-deployed 
delivery systems (nuclear capable, manned bombers; ICBMs; and SLBMs) is 
limited to 800 with the number of operationally deployed systems limited to 
700.94  The treaty was signed on April 8, 2010 and entered into force on February 
5, 2011.  The agreement provided each side seven years to reach the treaty’s 
limitations which must be fulfilled no later than February 5, 2018.  The New 
START Treaty will expire in 2021 but allows for one, five-year extension.  This 
treaty reduces the number of US and Russian nuclear weapons to their lowest 
levels since the 1950s (Rogov & Squassoni, 2017, p. 52). 
                                                 
93 Note:  Although each manned bomber carries multiple nuclear warheads, each bomber counts as 
one warhead under the New START Treaty. 
94 The difference between 800 and 700 delivery systems allow 100 delivery system to be in 
various states of non-operational status (such as in different stages of maintenance). 
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Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 
The INF Treaty, negotiated by President Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev and signed on December 8, 1987, required the destruction of ground-
launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500-5,500 kilometers 
within three years.  The treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988 with the 
exchange of instruments of ratification in Moscow.  This treaty is significant in 
that it eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons and set the precedent for on-
site inspection of nuclear facilities in both the U.S. and Soviet Union.  The United 
States eliminated its Pershing-class intermediate-range ballistic missiles along 
with the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), known as the Gryphon, and 
the Soviet Union eliminated their SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 ballistic missile systems.  
By May 1991, with full treaty implementation, both sides had destroyed 2,692 
missiles. (Department of State, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
Website).  Despite the success of this treaty, Rogov and Squassoni believe this 
agreement is on the verge of collapse.  The U.S. has accused Russia of violating 
the INF Treaty by testing and deploying a new ground-launched cruise missile 
system known in the West as the SSC-8.  The 2,500 km range of this new system 
places it within the limitations set by the treaty.  In response, the US Congress has 
ordered the Pentagon to start a research and development program on a new, US 
intermediate-range, road-mobile, ground launched missile system (Barnes, Sonne, 
& Forrest, 2017).  Russia has responded by accusing the U.S. of violating the INF 
Treaty by deploying the Mk-41 Aegis Ashore ground-based missile defense 
system with the SM-3 missile in Romania.  While the SM-3 is clearly designed to 
counter potential Iranian-launched ballistic missiles threatening our European 
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NATO allies, Russia asserts the system can launch offensive surface-to-surface 
missiles (Rogov & Squassoni, 2017, p. 53 and Barnes, Sonne, & Forrest 2017).  
The INF Treaty is key to strategic stability in Europe and the NATO Secretary 
General, Jens Stoltenberg, has endorsed efforts to resolve differences between the 
U.S. and Russia.  Recalling the dangerous nuclear standoff in Europe of the 
1980s, Stoltenberg stated: 
I’m part of a political generation in Europe which really grew up with the 
very intense debate related to the deployment of the SS-20s and the 
Pershing.  We also very much welcomed the INF Treaty which then 
eliminated these weapons in Europe.  So, I think that the INF Treaty is a 
cornerstone.  (Barnes, Sonne, & Forrest 2017) 
Moving forward it is interesting to note the current attitude of Russia’s 
political leadership towards arms control.  Contrary to the view of their Soviet 
predecessors, Russian leaders do not believe nuclear arms control treaties, in 
general, enhance Russian national security.  They view them as tools the West 
used during the period of Russian weakness in the 1990s to exploit the 
geopolitical situation at Russia’s expense in which Russia was forced to make 
unilateral concessions to the West.  Arbatov notes the one exception to this view 
is the current strategic nuclear arms control treaty, New START, which the 
Russians view as clearly beneficial to both the U.S. and Russia.  From the Russian 
perspective, this treaty led to reductions in the US nuclear arsenal, providing a 
period of strategic nuclear parity with the U.S. while Russia worked to withdraw 
aging strategic systems and replace them through their current nuclear force 
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modernization effort.  However, this limited, positive Russian view of nuclear 
arms control may be short lived as the Russians view any additional reductions in 
nuclear arms as placing Russian national security at risk.  Arbatov believes the 
role nuclear weapons play in Russia is greater today than at any period since the 
Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the Unities States in the early 1970s.  
Given the importance Russia attaches to its nuclear arsenal as a primary source of 
its standing in international relations and the ultimate guarantor of its security, 
further reductions are probably unlikely (Arbatov, 2017, p. 59-60). 
Russian Doctrine:  Escalate to De-escalate – Potential Scenarios 
Potentially much more dangerous than Russian nuclear force 
modernization, which is largely centered around replacing aging capabilities, is an 
element of Russia’s military doctrine known as “escalate to de-escalate”.  This 
doctrine is designed to capitalize on Russia’s superior tactical nuclear capabilities 
and may partly be the result of their own perceptions of convention inferiority in 
relation to U.S. and NATO.  This portion of their doctrine was closely examined 
in expert Congressional testimony in May 2017 before the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe.  Dr. Michael Carpenter, Senior Director at 
the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement described the 
concept as one which: 
Allows for the first use of a nuclear weapon to compel adversaries to settle 
a conflict on Moscow’s terms rather than to fight on or escalate the 
conflict.  Under this doctrine, Russia could, for example, use a tactical 
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nuclear weapon for a first-use “demonstration effect.”  If used in a conflict 
with a NATO ally, however, this could have the exact opposite of its 
intended effect and prove dangerously escalatory, with devastating 
consequences for all parties. (The Growing Russian Military Threat in 
Europe, 2017, p. 42) 
This suggests Russia could use a nuclear weapon to de-escalate a 
conventional conflict that was not being fought on Russian territory, for example, 
in coordination with a Russian conventional attack against one of its neighbors 
(The Growing Russian Military Threat in Europe, 2017, p. 51). 
Current and Future Risks of Accidental Nuclear War 
In the current, post-Cold War era, it is reasonable to believe the risk of 
nuclear war between the United States and Russia is a remote possibility.  
Thankfully, the vast nuclear arsenals of both sides have shrunk based on nuclear 
arms control agreements negotiated from the early 1970s through 2010.  The two 
nations have a much different relationship now than during the height of the Cold 
War.  However, tensions are rising due, among many factors, to Russian 
perceptions of US and NATO expansion, intervention in the sovereign affairs of 
other nations (by supporting pro-democracy movements and even violent regime 
change), and the continued development of ballistic missile defenses.  The U.S. 
and NATO view Russian acts of aggression against Georgia, Ukraine, renewed 
rhetorical threats against the U.S. and NATO, as well as more aggressive Russian 
military activities (military exercises, airspace violations, and dangerous acts near 
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NATO forces) as evidence of a new, more assertive Russian foreign and military 
policy.  Many analysts believe the risk of an inadvertent nuclear war between the 
U.S. and Russia remains (Barrett, 2016, p. 1).  The current situation remains 
inherently dangerous because both nations retain the two largest nuclear forces in 
the world and maintain many of those weapons on high alert states.  This nuclear 
force posture allows each side to launch a nuclear strike within minutes of 
notification of an actual or perceived attack.  Given the enormous destructive 
capability of even a single warhead, the use of a tactical or strategic nuclear 
weapon would be devastating and even a limited nuclear exchange would be 
catastrophic.  This section will detail three potential scenarios, based on the 
impressive work of Anthony Barret, a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the 
RAND Corporation.  Barret conducted a comprehensive review to develop likely 
pathways and conditions under which the U.S. and/or Russia might misinterpret 
events which would lead to a nuclear strike by one or both sides in a future 
conflict.  He uses fault tree models to analyze three scenarios which could lead to 
inadvertent nuclear conflict.  Scenario 1 involves an early warning system false 
alarm, scenario 2 is centered on a conventional conflict in Russia’s near abroad 
(in a former Soviet republic, involving a Russian ally, or in another area or in a 
situation deemed critical to its national security interests), and scenarios 3 deals 
with a false nuclear attack indication from Russia’s “Dead Hand” system.  The 
first scenario applies to either the U.S. or Russia while scenarios 2 and 3 involve 
only Russian nuclear forces.  Barrett underlines the importance of other factors in 
all of these scenarios including how the level of tension between the U.S. and 
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Russia effects threat perceptions and the consequent actions each side might take 
in each of the three scenarios (Barrett, 2016, p. 2).  One of the assumptions is the 
accidental or deliberate use of nuclear weapons increases in a conventional 
conflict or during a period of increased tensions or crisis (Barrett, 2016, p. 2).  
Senior leaders are more likely to escalate and cross the nuclear threshold in such 
situations when intelligence indicators of potential nuclear attack are active.  
Barrett notes there are two types of crises in which the U.S. and Russia have come 
close to nuclear disaster, 1) a two-sided crisis, such as the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis, in which both Russia and the U.S. raised nuclear alert levels and engaged 
in a standoff and 2) a one-side crisis, such as the Soviet War Scare of 1983 during 
NATO Exercise Able Archer, in which only the Soviet side 
perceived/misperceived the situation as a crisis (Barrett, 2016, p. 2).  The 
following describes Anthony Barrett’s analysis of the three potential scenarios in 
more depth which could lead the U.S. and Russia to an inadvertent nuclear 
conflict. 
Scenario 1 – Early Warning False Alarm Scenario 
The early warning false alarm scenario involves the misinterpretation of 
data generated by either the Russian or US early warning systems.  In the US 
case, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is responsible 
for maintaining 24/7 monitoring of missile and bomber threats to the United 
States.  Both the Russian and US systems consist of ground-based radars designed 
to detect manned bombers in the atmosphere and missiles in space as well as a 
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space-based satellite component to detect missile launches.95  The system is 
designed to provide multiple-source confirmation of enemy bomber and missile 
activity to improve the probability of launch confirmation.  If a launch is 
confirmed, watch officers contact senior military leaders and the president to 
notify them of the activity and provide a situation assessment at which point the 
president must decide upon a course of action, given the situation, and make the 
decision to order a retaliatory attack or not. 
The requirement to confirm a launch warning using multiple sources, 
including radar and satellite data is known as dual phenomenology (Barrett, 2016, 
p. 2).  The multiple-source approach seeks to reduce the potential for false 
positives but is not foolproof.  Barrett describes an incident in 1980 in which a 
faulty computer chip indicated a missile launch was in progress against the U.S.  
While system anomalies might be responsible for false launch indications, 
misinterpretation of valid data may also be a factor in the future.  The 
proliferation of longer-range ballistic missiles and the proposed development and 
fielding of prompt global strike weapons using conventional ICBMs could lead to 
misidentification or misinterpretation of valid data with catastrophic 
consequences. 
A potential scenario, from a Russian perspective, might look like the 
following:  Due to budgetary shortfalls, Russian aerospace defense forces are 
unable to adequately maintain a key component or various elements of their 
                                                 
95 The space-based satellite component uses a system of satellites which employ infrared sensors 
to detect the hot exhaust gasses from ballistic missile launches. 
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ground and/or space-based surveillance network.  Resulting technical problems 
due to an aging system or one that is not properly maintained leads to an 
increasing number of false alarms.  Russia receives a launch notification from its 
infrared satellite system but is unable to determine if it is a genuine launch or 
caused by a natural phenomenon such as the reflection of sunlight from high-
altitude clouds or from a man-made phenomenon such as an oil field fire in the 
northern U.S. near a US ICBM field in Montana, Wyoming, or North Dakota.  
Soon after the potential launch detection, orbital debris strikes the Russian 
satellite, destroying it without warning.  Russian officials interpret the loss of their 
early warning satellite as a potential US anti-satellite or cyber-attack designed to 
degrade Russian nuclear early warning capabilities.  At this point, Russian 
warning officers possess limited information but could logically conclude, 
however erroneously, that Russia is under nuclear attack.  With the physical loss 
of their warning satellite and loss of confidence in other elements of their warning 
system, Russian senior official might recommend a nuclear strike against the U.S. 
based on the limited information at hand.  This scenario could take place during 
periods of calm or high tensions between the two countries.  
The two critical risk factors at play in this scenario is the state of perceived 
relations between Russia and the U.S. (along a spectrum from calm to crisis-level 
relations) and whether the country receiving the launch indications has adopted a 
launch-on-warning or a launch-under attack response posture.  According to 
Barrett, both postures result in launching a counter-attack based on the false 
indications and before the incoming attack can adversely affect key command and 
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control facilities (Barrett, 2016, p. 3).  Put another way, the response strategy does 
not entail riding out an attack before launching a nuclear counter-attack.  The 
main difference between a launch-on-warning and a launch-under-attack response 
deals with the amount of time available to gather additional warning surveillance 
data which affects evidence threshold for interpreting the data and declaring a 
valid attack.  A launch-on-warning response requires a quicker attack validation 
than a launch-under-attack response but may provide senior decision makers with 
a slightly greater amount of time to decide upon a response.  A launch-under-
attack response allows warning officers more time to collect and evaluate launch 
warning data but may reduce the amount of time decision makers have to 
formulate a response. 
Some nuclear strategists believe it is better for Russia to maintain a 
launch-on-warning response posture as a means for enhancing nuclear deterrence 
(Quinlivan & Oliker, 2011, pp. 25-27).  Both the U.S. and Russia developed and 
potentially adopted such a response strategy during the Cold War.  Given the 
compressed timeframe required for threat validation in the launch-on-warning 
posture, the potential for reaching erroneous conclusions based on false and/or 
incomplete interpretation of warning data is much greater than during a launch-
under-attack response posture. 
Clearly, false indicators of attack represent a danger of inadvertent nuclear 
war between Russia and the U.S.  Given the long, nearly 70-year history of the 
nuclear standoff between the U.S. and Soviet Union/Russia, many may find it 
incredible that such a disaster has been averted for so long.  Over that period, 
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several different events have indeed led to false attack alarms on both sides of the 
nuclear divide.  Barrett points out four, well-known, false early warning incidents 
which moved beyond the theoretical problems and highlight real-world, historical 
breakdowns in the reliability of the nuclear early warning system.  The following 
incidents occurred and thankfully did not lead to senior-level decisions to launch 
nuclear counter-strikes: 
• 1979 – Operator Error - A training tape which simulated a large-scale 
Soviet nuclear attack against the U.S. was accidently inserted into a 
NORAD computer 
• 1980 – Computer System Error – A computer chip failed in a NORAD 
early warning computer indicating a Soviet attack against the U.S. 
• 1983 – Sensor or Data Interpretation Error – Russian infrared satellite 
misidentified sunlight reflected from high-altitude clouds as a US ICBM 
launch against Russia 
• 1995 – Data Misinterpretation – Russian warning officers misidentified a 
Norwegian rocket launch to deploy a satellite as a US submarine-launched 
ballistic missile targeting Russia 
Additional circumstances could also lead to false nuclear warning 
indications and attack validation.  Terrorists could launch a missile resembling a 
US or Russian missile to provoke a nuclear response.  Potentially more likely, a 
terrorist group, a cyber-hacking group, or a rogue state could launch an offensive 
cyber-attack on the Russian or US early warning system to simulate a false attack 
or communicate an erroneous nuclear attack via either state’s nuclear command 
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and control system (Fritz, 2009 as cited in Barrett, 2016, p. 5).  However, in 
comparison to other potential scenarios, the idea of terrorist induced false launch 
indication is low (Barrett, Baum, & Hostetler, 2013).  Barrett believes Russian 
and American officials should still consider and plan for such remote possibilities 
(Barrett, 2016, p. 5). 
The employment of current and future US global strike capabilities and 
similar Russian conventional capabilities could also lead either side to falsely 
conclude it was under nuclear attack.  This is because the attack profile of these 
weapons types and resulting warning signatures are similar to nuclear ballistic and 
cruise missiles.  Use of ICBMs, SLBMs, and cruise missiles with conventional 
warheads and flightpaths which cross Russia or operate near Russian territory 
could be difficult to distinguish from nuclear capable systems.  Even if only a 
single weapon were launched, or the US or Russian operators determined the 
point of projected impact was not on their territory (which they currently have the 
technical capability of doing), warning officers might still assess the attack as a 
debilitating electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack designed to degrade and disrupt 
the opposing side’s command, control, and communication capability.  Russian 
fears the U.S. might mask this type of specialized nuclear operation under the ruse 
of a conventional, global-strike attack against one of Russia’s neighbors is 
plausible in the future and in fact, was one of the main concerns with the 1995 
Norwegian rocket launch, which the Russians believed was a potential EMP 
attack (Barrett, 2016, p. 5). 
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Scenario 2 – Accidental Escalation of a Conventional Conflict 
A classic scenario for nuclear conflict and potentially one of the more 
plausible concepts involves the escalation of a conventional war to the use of 
tactical and then strategic nuclear weapons.  This is theoretically possible between 
any two nuclear powers and was a constant concern during the Cold War between 
the U.S. and Soviet Union and their respective allies.  Today, this scenario 
remains a concern between the U.S. and Russia, India and Pakistan, and with the 
emerging North Korean nuclear program, between North Korea and the U.S. 
(including our allies South Korea and Japan).  Barrett cites the danger of using 
conventional capabilities to degrade enemy nuclear capabilities to the point where 
the enemy starts to question the remaining deterrent value of its second strike 
nuclear capability.  A further deliberate or potentially inadvertent risk involves 
degrading an enemy’s early warning network during a conventional conflict 
which results in uncertainty and lack of confidence in that state’s ability to detect 
a nuclear attack and thus protect its tactical and/or strategic nuclear deterrent.  
Accidental escalation could also result when national leaders have a good 
understanding of the various red lines they should not cross which could lead to a 
transition from a conventional to a nuclear conflict but their military forces 
inadvertently cross that threshold (Morgan, et al., 2008 as cited in Barrett, 2016, 
p. 6).  This type of accident could result from leaders not providing proper rules 
of engagement for their forces, operators not understanding or misinterpreting the 
rules of engagement; lack of discipline; bombing the wrong targets; or straying 
across an international border. 
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The greatest risk for this type of scenario probably involves Russia and 
Poland/the Baltic States.  Another potential flashpoint involves Ukraine, but this 
is probably a lesser risk given the US and NATO’s tacit recognition of Russian 
interests in that country and the fact that it is not a NATO member state.  Some 
analysts also cite the potential for conflict between Russia and NATO in the 
Arctic region in which a minor incident, such as a clash over mineral rights or an 
accident involving a Russian and NATO vessel at sea could escalate into a 
conventional and then nuclear conflict.  According to Forrest Morgan, “There is a 
significant chance that either Russian or Western leaders would engage in 
escalatory actions while assuming that the other side would back down, fearing 
the runaway consequences of further escalation” (Morgan, 2012, p. 37 cited in 
Barrett, 2016, p. 9). 
Of these various flashpoints, the conflict most likely to require a US 
response involves Russian actions which significantly threaten a NATO member 
state.  In a scenario involving Russian aggression against the territory of these 
states, US and NATO military operations would not only pit them against 
Russia’s invading forces but would put those forces in very close proximity to 
Russian territory.  If the U.S. and NATO were to follow current doctrine, they 
would probably first have to gain air superiority to allow a forcible entry into the 
country to regain control.  Such operations would probably entail attacking air 
defense systems (missile sites and air bases) and command and control facilities 
located in Russia responsible for enemy operations in NATO territory.  To 
prevent a NATO intervention, Russia might employ its escalate-to-de-escalate 
268 
 
doctrine to deter any pending military action to reverse Russian military gains.  
Conversely, should Russia begin to see their gains reversed on the battlefield, they 
may consider using one or a small number of lower yield, tactical nuclear 
weapons to prevent a NATO victory, avoid national humiliation, and preserve 
Russia’s international prestige.  In summary, the potential for nuclear conflict 
between the U.S. and Russia in scenario 2 could come about when 1) national 
leaders recognize and respect the threshold between conventional and nuclear 
conflict but somehow their operational military forces in the field make critical 
errors which lead to nuclear conflict or 2) national leaders intend to accomplish 
their objectives using conventional weapon systems, and then either miscalculate 
their adversary’s political/military response to the crisis or find the tide of battle 
turning on them and resort to using tactical nuclear weapons to deter military 
intervention or to reverse their fortunes on the battlefield. 
Scenario 3 – “Dead Hand” Scenario 
The third inadvertent nuclear conflict scenario deals with the “Dead Hand” 
or Perimeter system as known in Russia.  Dead Hand is a semi-automated system 
designed to launch Russia nuclear weapons against the United States when there 
is evidence of nuclear detonations in Russia and there is a break in the normal 
nuclear command and control system between Russia’s senior leaders and nuclear 
weapons system operators.  The system is believed to operates as follows:  A 
network of specialized sensors detect nuclear detonations in Russia by measuring 
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light, radioactivity, seismic shocks, and atmospheric overpressure.96  If the sensor 
system detects what it believes to be nuclear detonations and the Dead Hand 
system cannot communicate with the national leadership, it would conclude 
Russia is under nuclear attack.  The system incorporates a “man-in-the-loop”, 
probably a senior Russian defense official at a hardened nuclear command and 
control facility to make the final decision regarding launching Russian nuclear 
weapons in retaliation.  However, it is important to note that in a crisis in which 
the Dead Hand system would come into play, the individual who would make the 
final nuclear weapons release decision would probably have very little 
information beyond the nuclear detonation data and the communication-link 
failure (Barrett, 2016, p. 10). 
This Russian doomsday system addresses the fear that the U.S. could 
launch a nuclear strike to decapitate the Soviet leadership (Colby, 2016) and thus 
paralyze their nuclear forces, leaving their military forces and other valuable 
targets susceptible to systematic nuclear destruction.  The system was initially 
fielded in the 1980s to enhance deterrence against this type of US nuclear first 
strike.  According to DIA and the commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket 
Forces, this system remains operational.  In 2011, Russian Lieutenant General 
Sergey Karakayev confirmed the Cold War-era system still exists and is on alert, 
“If there is a need for a retaliatory strike, the command for an attack may come 
from the system, not people” (Sudakov, 2017).  DIA also described Russian 
                                                 
96 This is known in the US Intelligence Community as Measurement and Signature Intelligence 
(MASINT). 
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nuclear command and control and the Dead Hand system in its recent, 
unclassified 2017 Russia Military Power edition (Defense Intelligence Agency, 
2017, p. 26).  Given the dearth of official Soviet/Russian information on the Dead 
Hand system, some analysts have questioned the real deterrent value of this 
system (Barrett, 2016, p. 10).  However, others believe the system is really 
designed not necessarily for deterrence, but to provide Russia the option of not 
being forced into a launch-on-warning scenario (Blair, 1995; Hoffman, 2009; 
Thompson, 2009 as cited in Barrett, 2016, p. 10).  As long as this system 
functions properly, this might be seen as a positive, stabilizing posture which 
relieves pressure on senior leaders to launch-on-warning if attack indications are 
ambiguous. 
A potential scenario involving the Dead Hand could look like the 
following:  a crisis which raises tensions between the U.S. and Russia leads to 
Russian activation of the Dead Hand system including the dispatch of a senior 
defense official to the underground command and control bunker near Moscow 
where the Dead Hand system operates.  Potential crises that could trigger Dead 
Hand activation include Russian conventional military activity in its “near 
abroad” (in former Soviet states), US direct military support for the Ukrainian 
government to retake eastern Ukraine which involves the potential for direct 
confrontation between US and Russia forces, or a Korean scenario (including the 
entire range of options from a US pinprick, warning attack against North Korean 
nuclear/ballistic missile facilities, to a full-scale North Korean nuclear attack 
against the continental United States).  As a precaution, Russian officials also 
271 
 
raise their nuclear force alert level.  The Russian official at the Dead Hand bunker 
has the authority and ability to launch Russian nuclear weapons against the U.S. if 
he believes Russia is under nuclear attack and communication with the nation’s 
other senior leaders is severed.  Unattributed cyber activity adversely affects the 
quality, consistency, and integrity of the data Dead Hand bunker officials are 
receiving from the Russian nuclear early warning network.  A few days into this 
hypothetical crisis, apocalyptic terrorists detonate a nuclear weapon in 
Washington, DC followed a few minutes later with a similar detonation in 
Moscow (Barrett, 2016, p. 10).  The nuclear detonation in the Moscow area 
triggers the Dead Hand nuclear alert sensors which Russian officials correctly 
interpret as confirmation that Russia is under nuclear attack.  The staff in the 
Dead Hand bunker also feel the shock of nuclear blast and all communication 
with the senior Soviet political and military leadership is severed.  Yet, some of 
the nuclear command, control, and communication links remain operational.  
Soviet officials in the Dead Hand bunker are not aware of the nuclear attack 
against Washington, DC and must decide to launch Russian nuclear weapons 
against the U.S. with no additional information.  The ability of Russian sensors to 
precisely discriminate between weapons design and thus positively attribute the 
origin of the weapon is unknown.  However, the risk of the Dead Hand system 
identifying the nuclear detonation source as the U.S. if the nuclear terrorists were 
to acquire a US nuclear weapon design or acquire a device with similar detonation 
signatures, is an additional risk. 
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Barrett also discusses several other potential triggers which could lead 
Dead Hand operators to misleading conclusion regarding a nuclear detonation in 
Russia.  He cites the potential for meteorite impacts to exhibit signatures similar 
to nuclear blasts which the US Department of Defense have sometimes initially 
attributed to nuclear detonations.  Meteorite impacts with greater than one kiloton 
of explosive force occur routinely with approximately eight such incidents per 
year.  While one kiloton is a very small nuclear detonation compared with the 
nuclear capabilities of both the Russian and US arsenals, EMP weapons are 
designed with low yields (Barrett, 2016, p. 11).  Although a larger meteor strike 
might resemble a nuclear detonation which could lead to a Dead Hand nuclear 
launch, such an event is highly unlikely. 
Barrett raises the additional possibility of a potential cyber-attack which 
could precipitate a Dead Hand launch.  Although the Dead Hand system operates 
on a closed network and is not connected to the internet, that does not make it 
immune from computer viruses which could lead to erroneous attack indications.  
There are precedents for viruses adversely affecting closed, secure computer 
networks.  In 2008, a foreign intelligence service penetrated US Department of 
Defense (DoD) classified networks using a computer virus which a DoD 
employee transferred unwittingly via a removable USB drive (Barrett, 2016, p. 
11).  This led to the ban of USB drives on all DoD computers.  Similarly, the 
STUXNET computer virus which corrupted industrial control systems the Iranian 
government used for Uranium enrichment processing, was also introduced into a 
closed, secure computer network via a USB drive.  The introduction of a 
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malicious computer virus into the Dead Hand system is plausible and represents a 
future risk should the Russian government activate this system during a future 
crisis. 
Deliberate Nuclear Attack Risks 
Given the mutual vulnerability of both sides to a devastating nuclear 
attack, it may seem completely implausible that deliberate nuclear conflict (vice 
the accidental scenarios detailed above) between the U.S. and Russia is possible.  
However, Elbridge Colby argues nuclear weapons remain relevant and plausible 
scenarios unfortunately exist which involve the deliberate use of nuclear weapons.  
Perceptions of vulnerability and/or deliberate escalation are two ways which 
could lead to nuclear use. 
Perceptions of Vulnerability 
The perception of vulnerability is not new in nuclear strategy and involves 
the belief that the adversary has key or overwhelming capabilities which could 
motivate its launch of a disarming first strike.  This may not objectively be the 
case but remains a problem nonetheless if the perception of vulnerability exists.  
Russia has been and remains fearful of US and Western rapid technological 
advances and our ability to successfully integrate new capabilities into our 
military doctrine and employ them in the battlespace.  Russia fears it may not be 
able to survive a preemptive nuclear attack or that it may not have sufficient 
surviving nuclear forces to deter a US first-strike.  Historically, it has been 
difficult, if not impossible for the U.S. to convince Russia of its intent, especially 
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regarding anti-ballistic missile defenses, despite strenuous efforts by past 
administrations.  Colby cites numerous factors which contribute to Russian 
perceptions of vulnerability as a combination of:  distrust, Russian paranoia, 
concealment of military capabilities to attain or retain military advantage, 
verification challenges, Russia’s sub-standard early warning system, and US 
reluctance to enter binding agreements. 
 Russia, if faced with deteriorating political or military situation or with an 
outright crisis, may feel time is not on their side and that could lead them to 
rapidly increase the readiness levels of their tactical and/or strategic nuclear 
forces.  Russian leaders could reasonably believe, given their perception of 
superior US capabilities, the decision window for obtaining critical intelligence, 
validating facts, and making reasoned judgements, was narrowing or rapidly 
closing.  Without fast, decisive action, Russia would leave itself open for almost 
certain military defeat.  In such a scenario, senior Russian leaders might believe 
they need to use their nuclear forces before they lose them to a US preventive 
strike.  While this fear of a deliberate conflict based on perceptions of 
vulnerability is not new, Colby explains new technologies such as cyberwar, 
space/counterspace, and remotely controlled or autonomous capabilities may 
improve targeting of C4I, early warning systems, and nuclear forces which would 
exacerbate existing Russian fears and thus contribute to lowering the threshold of 
nuclear weapons use.97 
                                                 
97 Colby and James N. Miller Jr are studying this problem as part of a project at the Center for a 
New American Security and the Harvard Kennedy School funded by the Carnegie Corporation of 
New York. 
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Deliberate Escalation 
Controlled use of nuclear weapons, as opposed to full-scale, general 
nuclear use, is another potential strategy both Russia and the U.S. are capable of 
employing.  Historically, in response to growing Soviet nuclear capabilities the 
U.S. shifted it nuclear strategy from Massive Retaliation under the Eisenhower 
Administration to Flexible Response under President Kennedy.  The U.S. and 
NATO used the strategy which envisioned the employment of tactical nuclear 
weapons to forestall defeat of NATO forces in Europe from a massive Soviet 
conventional attack.  Today, the threat of limited, tactical nuclear use or even the 
actual use of a small number of nuclear warheads could serve to credibly 
communicate one side in the conflict is prepared to escalate to general, full-scale 
nuclear use.  As previously detailed, Moscow has developed this escalate to de-
escalate strategy to deter a conflict or quickly terminate a conflict before the U.S. 
and its NATO allies can mobilize and employ their superior conventional forces.  
Colby emphasizes Russia has “such an approach, possesses the capability to 
undertake it, and exercised for its implementation” (Colby, 2016, p. 5).  Such a 
limited nuclear war could occur but just like during the Cold War, the risks of 
further nuclear escalation are potentially great.  This fear of further escalation 
may serve as a brake on this type of scenario given the risk of uncontrollable, 
general nuclear war is too great for either side to contemplate. 
Future Risk Trends 
The potential risk of conflict between the US/NATO and Russia has 
increased since 2014 due to Russian aggression against Ukraine.  The increased 
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tensions and Russia strategic shift towards a more competitive, adversarial 
relationship with the West increases the overall probability of a nuclear conflict, 
either by accident, by miscalculation, or by intent.  The potential for Russian 
misinterpretation also hinges on their ability to upgrade and maintain enough 
infrared missile launch detection satellites and early warning radars.  The number 
of satellites Russia has available for this important mission has varied from a 
height during the Cold War of eight to nine satellites in highly elliptical orbits 
(HEO) and one in geostationary earth orbit (GEO) from 1987-1996 (Podvig, 
2002, p. 49 as cited in Barrett, 2016, p. 13) to a low of one HEO and no GEO 
satellites as of November 2015.  The Russian Aerospace Defense Forces are 
moving to a new generation of early warning satellite, the EKS, and two are 
currently in HEO orbits with a total of six satellites planned for operational use 
with the goal of completing the deployment of the latest generation of warning 
satellites sometime after 2020 (“Launch of the Second Satellite of the EKS Early-
warning System”, 2017 and “GLONASS vs. GPS: An Aerospace Forces Colonel 
on the Status of Russia Military Space Program,” 2016 cited in Boston & 
Massicot, 2017, p. 6).  This represents a positive trend, providing the effort is 
sustained as a budget priority and does not experience technical problems. 
Russian perceptions of US first-strike nuclear capabilities also remains a 
future risk.  The U.S. is undergoing a nuclear force modernization program and 
has deployed operational ballistic missile defense systems.  These developments, 
combined with US conventional precision-strike capabilities have led Russian 
leaders to believe the US could launch a debilitating first strike against Russian 
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nuclear forces (Quinlivan & Oliker, 2011, p. 22 as cited in Barrett, 2016, p. 14).  
Russian fear of US effectiveness in a first-strike scenario increases the probability 
during any of the three crisis scenarios presented above that Russia may adopt a 
launch-on-warning posture.  The potential for a Russian nuclear launch during a 
period of crisis is naturally higher than during a non-crisis period.  Additionally, a 
launch-on-warning posture enhances the deterrent value of Russia’s nuclear force. 
Risk-reduction Options – What can be done to help prevent inadvertent 
nuclear conflict between the U.S. and Russia? 
Anthony Barret in his RAND study of potential nuclear conflict between 
the U.S. and Russia outlines several measures which the U.S. and Russia could 
pursue to reduce the probability of an accidental nuclear war between these two 
respective states.  Barrett recognizes that some of these options will involve 
significant tradeoffs which might entail assuming risk in other areas of each 
nation’s nuclear deterrence strategy.  However, it is worth considering some of 
these possibilities to reduce the potential for catastrophic, accidental nuclear 
conflict.  Specifically, US and Russian planners and decision makers could study 
and implement some of the following measures, which will be discussed in turn: 
• Enhance Russian Early Warning Capabilities 
• Enhance C4I Capabilities and Survivability 
• Reduce Dead Hand Vulnerabilities 
• Use Risk Models to Mitigate Risk 
We certainly have a large stake in ensuring Russia feels certain the U.S. is 
not launching a surprise nuclear attack against their homeland.  The U.S. should 
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find ways of enhancing Russian early warning system capabilities.  Assisting 
Russia in enhancing and maintain confidence in their early warning system is in 
America’s interest and serves to reduce the probability of an early warning false 
alarm or a miscalculation associated with the Dead Hand system.  Barrett 
recommends the U.S. take specific, concrete measures to compensate for the 
periodic gaps in Russian early warning system coverage and occasional reliability 
issues.  Specifically, Barrett details measure including keeping US ballistic 
missile submarines in specific geographic areas covered by Russian early warning 
satellite systems, establishing a joint US-Russian early warning center, and 
allowing Russia to place launch sensors on or near US ICBM silos.  He also 
believes the U.S. should encourage Russia to make further investments to 
improve the coverage reliability of their early warning systems and to improve the 
survivability of their command and control systems as well as their fielded 
nuclear forces.  Placing additional launch detection satellites in orbit with 
enhanced sensors would certainly improve system reliability and would mitigate 
the potential for misidentification of incoming missile threats to Russia.  
Improving Russian command and control facilities will reduce Russian fears of 
leadership decapitation in a potential US first strike and will thus reduce 
incentives to launch-on-warning.  To further reduce this fear, Barrett also suggests 
re-shaping the US nuclear arsenal to reduce threats to Russia’s second-strike 
capability by employing less accurate SLBM warheads, or partial de-alerting of 
some US ICBMs. 
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Some of these proposed risk-reduction measures are more realistic than 
others.  Confining US ballistic missile submarines to specific geographic areas 
under Russian missile launch warning satellites coverage is counter to the 
preeminent reason for developing submarine-launched missiles as a deterrent 
strategy.  These submarines are designed to be stealthy, to hide, and to allude 
enemy anti-submarine warfare capabilities to ensure second-strike options and 
serve to enhance nuclear deterrence.  Confining these boats to certain areas 
reduces the survivability of these platforms and therefore diminishes their 
deterrent value.  Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, if these submarines 
are performing their mission correctly, there is no way for the Russians to verify 
these boats are operating in the zone of coverage or outside their zone of 
coverage. 
The idea of establishing a joint US-Russian early warning center could 
serve to build trust and facilitate timely, clear communication in times of nuclear 
crisis.  There is also a risk such a center could contribute to fear and 
miscalculation if, during a nuclear crisis, communication was lost between one or 
both national governments and this joint warning center, either from one side 
preventing such communication or from a system outage.  Despite these potential 
problems, overall, this is probably a positive, feasible recommendation.   
Allowing Russia to place sensors near US ICBMs is a novel approach 
which could serve to enhance early warning confidence.  Such measures would 
have to be reciprocal and both sides would have to allow technicians from the 
other state routine, unhindered access to the sensors on their territory to perform 
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maintenance, guard against tampering, and ensure reliability.  Such a system, 
would enhance warning confidence as long as both sides maintained confidence 
in the integrity of their sensors and associated communication systems (meaning 
the systems had not been tampered with or subjected to spoofing).  
Barrett recommends the U.S. should encourage Russia to further invest to 
enhance its early warning system and its command and control system.  The US 
Government can certainly do this, but such measures are probably unnecessary as 
these upgrades are already in Russia’s self-interest and it is unlikely advice or 
“encouragement” from the U.S. would have any positive or negative effect on the 
pace of such Russian modernization or enhancement efforts. 
Reducing the accuracy of US SLBMs is probably an unworkable solution 
as it would be difficult, if not impossible, for Russia to verify and thus have 
confidence in this measure to reduce the vulnerability of Russia’s second-strike 
nuclear forces.  However, reducing the number of silo-based ICBMs on alert 
would serve to reduce launch-on-warning decision time pressures.  These 
weapons, based on their fixed geographic position, are highly vulnerable to attack 
during a first-strike.  Additionally, these forces are on continuous alert, ready to 
immediately launch upon lawful orders from their respective national command 
authority.  Two factors contribute to the potentially devastating effects of this type 
of weapons system:  First the vulnerability of silo-based nuclear missiles puts 
immense time pressure on decision makers to use these systems in a crisis before 
they are destroyed by highly accurate enemy nuclear weapons.  Additionally, silo-
based missiles are currently on continuous, high-readiness alert in both Russia and 
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in the United States (as they were during the Cold War).  This status facilitates 
their quick launch upon authentication of lawful launch orders.  Unlike manned 
bombers, these systems cannot be recalled or aborted and will strike targets using 
a polar flight path 25-30 minutes after launch.  Several former US defense 
leaders, based on their experience during the Cold War, have advocated “de-
alerting” both sides’ silo-based nuclear forces for these reasons.  
Barrett also presents other factors which contribute to Russian fears of a 
disarming first-strike and these factors raise the probability of misperceptions 
leading to miscalculations.  Potentially destabilizing capabilities such as EMP and 
cyber weapons are designed to disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy command, 
control, communications, and intelligence systems (C3I) (Lin, 2013 as cited in 
Barrett, 2016, p. 15).  Russian knowledge of such US capabilities could lead 
them, during a nuclear crisis, to interpret loss of communications or data from 
EW or intelligence collection sensors to the conclusion that the U.S. had used an 
EMP or cyber weapon as a prelude to a limited or full-scale nuclear attack.  
Barrett asserts the U.S. should consider stopping further development of EMP 
weapons to avoid such Russian perceptions during a crisis and reduce launch-on-
warning pressures.  The mere Russian knowledge that the U.S. possibly has such 
C3I denial capabilities, whether true or not, probably renders any future effort to 
reduce or eliminate EMP or cyber capabilities ineffective.  Both the U.S. and 
Russia know it is impossible to completely verify these systems do not exist and 
therefore, would not have confidence they would not be used in a future nuclear 
conflict. 
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The final recommendation Barrett makes to reduce the probability of and 
inadvertent nuclear conflict concerns reducing the risks associated with Russia’s 
Dead Hand system.  Some Russian and US analysts believe the Dead Hand 
system is a useful element in maintaining strategic stability because it reduces 
Russian reliance on a launch-on-warning nuclear strategy (Blair, 1995, pp. 54-55 
as cited in Barrett, 2016, p. 16).  The Dead Hand system, if it functions properly, 
reduces the danger of an inadvertent launch as it allows Russian leaders more 
time to make decisions and provides firmer evidence Russia is actually under 
nuclear attack (nuclear detonations have taken place in Russia vice merely 
indications of inbound nuclear delivery vehicles).  Russian senior leaders would 
not feel the same time pressure associated with a mentality of “use them-or-loose-
them” when faced with the possibility of an inbound US first-strike.  Barrett 
recommends the Russian’s make a few improvements to the current Dead Hand 
system to ensure it contributes to mitigating potential false alarms.  The system 
must have sensors and associated data processing capabilities to differentiate 
between US, Chinese, and terrorist-built nuclear weapons as well as naturally 
occurring phenomena such as meteor strikes to ensure attacks are properly 
attributed to their source.  The improved Dead Hand system would need to also 
incorporate measures to thwart internal and external tampering or spoofing by 
nefarious actors to prevent system operators from being tricked into believing an 
actual attack was underway.  The United States could play a role by refraining 
from preparing for what Russia may perceive as a disabling first-strike. 
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Conclusion 
Russia under President Putin is pursuing a strategy designed to place 
Russia in position as a leading global military power.  This is a key component to 
his drive to restore national pride and regain international prestige as a truly 
global power in a multipolar world.  To achieve this status, Russia must develop 
and field forces capable of deterring and, if necessary, fighting and defeating 
states which have developed capabilities to challenge Russia across the full 
spectrum of conflict.  Russia is building offensive and defensive forces to initiate 
or respond to action across this spectrum of conflict, from information warfare 
through full-scale nuclear war.  Economic sanctions imposed by the West in 
response to the Russian annexation of Crimea and its continued support for rebel 
forces in Eastern Ukraine have hurt the Russian economy and slowed Russian 
defense modernization efforts.  Additionally, the untimely slump in global energy 
prices have also hurt the Russian State Armaments Program as a large proportion 
of the Russian government budget is based on revenue from its energy sector.  
Despite these setbacks, Russia is continuing with its comprehensive effort to 
modernize its military and, although progress has slowed, the country continues to 
make headway, developing and fielding powerful, modern military capabilities in 
each of its military service components. 
Material capabilities aside, how Russia thinks about nuclear strategy, 
nuclear deterrence, and arms control also affects the US-Russian relationship.  
Alexy Arbatov (2017) believes the U.S. and Russia are as far apart from each 
other as during the nuclear war scare of the early 1980s regarding their 
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understanding of the role of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and strategic 
stability (p. 41). 
Arbatov highlights a paradox of nuclear deterrence in our current age.  
Although the number of nuclear weapons has radically decreased since the end of 
the Cold War, he sees a much higher probability of nuclear weapons use today 
than at any time since the fall of the Soviet Union.  He believes the reduction in 
the number of nuclear weapons has decreased the perception of a nuclear war 
fought under the strategy of mutually assured destruction.  Today, we are moving 
from an era when large numbers of nuclear weapons could catastrophically end 
human civilization into a much more abstract notion of the realities of nuclear 
conflict in the current world with fewer nuclear weapons.  Additionally, current 
Russian and American political leaders have had a much different experience than 
their Cold War predecessors who faced real, catastrophic nuclear destruction.  
Arbatov notes current US and Russian leaders have not made categorical 
statements rejecting nuclear use such as President Reagan’s maxim that “nuclear 
war can never be won and must never be fought.”  Other technical issues which 
provide Russian and US decision makers more flexibility in their use of nuclear 
weapons may also lead to increased potential for nuclear use, including improved 
accuracy, and yield variability which provides more limits on civilian casualties 
than earlier nuclear weapons.  As nuclear weapons become relatively less 
destructive then their earlier counterparts and as delivery accuracy improves, the 
perceived gap between some lower yield, tactical nuclear weapons and the most 
powerful, precision, convention weapons may be narrowed to such a point where 
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the line between the use of these two types of weapons is significantly blurred.  
Such a development may invite leaders to use nuclear weapons in the future in 
scenarios that would have been unthinkable in the past.  Additionally, Arbatov 
(2017) fears this next generation of political and military leaders on both sides 
lacks the knowledge gained by living through the Cold War and experiencing the 
long evolution in strategic nuclear thinking which took place between 1945 and 
the demise of the Soviet Union.  These leaders may not have strong memories of 
past nuclear crises between the two superpowers.  Given these factors and the 
renewed confrontation between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine, Georgia, Syria 
and other issues, the potential for mishandling future crises could lead to dire 
consequences (p. 51).  Interestingly, Arbatov (2017) sees the main risk of conflict 
between the U.S. and Russia not from Russia expansionist tendencies but from 
Russia’s own sense of isolation and vulnerability which leads it to taking risks to 
consolidate its position and avoid being perceived as weak.  Other factors which 
point toward potential conflict include the lack of civilian input on operational 
military plans, programs, and exercises (this is a legacy of the Soviet military 
planning system, that was somewhat overcome in the post-Cold War era but has 
regressed under President Putin) as well as the Russian propensity to militarily 
challenge NATO near Russia (p. 59). 
A final concluding thought from Alexy Arbatov may serve as a transition 
to the final chapter of this study: 
Peace is not to be taken for granted; it requires relentless efforts to sustain-
-whether relations between the great powers are good or bad.  This is the 
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main lesson to be learned from the quarter-century after the end of the 
Cold War.  (Arbatov, 2017, p. 62)
287 
 
CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION 
This dissertation examined how the most senior leaders of two nuclear 
armed superpowers used intelligence to formulate current situation assessments 
during the two most dangerous nuclear crises in history.  To better understand this 
phenomenon, I proposed the following theory of intelligence in nuclear crisis 
management:  To assist leaders in making accurate current situation assessments 
intelligence must be accurate, leaders must be receptive to intelligence, and they 
must objectively evaluate intelligence.  These conditions are most likely when 
intelligence agencies produce independent, objective, non-politicized intelligence, 
when senior leaders trust the quality of the intelligence produced to support their 
decision making and the senior intelligence community leaders responsible for 
leading that effort, and finally, when leaders are conscious of their own potential 
biases and work to more objectively interpret relevant intelligence. 
While this might seem obvious, in reality, the quality of intelligence, 
despite the best efforts of dedicated analysts and their leaders can fall short.  
Additionally, intelligence failures damage respect for intelligence and for those 
who produce it which adversely affects intelligence receptivity.  Finally, leaders 
are subject to psychological factors which influence their interpretation of 
intelligence.  They can and often fall victim to biases inherent in all attempts to 
interpret, evaluate, and integrate information when making current situation 
assessments. 
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This theory argues all three key factors, (provision of quality intelligence, 
receptivity towards intelligence, and objective interpretation) must be operating 
for leaders to make accurate situation assessments during a nuclear crisis.  A 
failure in any one of those areas will lead to a distorted, inaccurate view of enemy 
capabilities and/or intent which could prove catastrophic during a high-stakes, 
high-stress nuclear crisis. 
In this final chapter, I first briefly review this theory and how I applied it 
to the two case studies.  I will then summarize the findings and describe how this 
theory explains how key US and Soviet governments leaders reached situation 
assessment before and during the two key nuclear crises.  Finally, I explain the 
study’s implications for intelligence and decision making in light of the growing 
Russian nuclear threat to the United States and suggest areas for additional 
research on this fascinating topic. 
Developing and Testing the Theory 
I began my thinking on this study by posing three research questions.  The 
first and most obvious question dealt with the quality of intelligence the US and 
Soviet intelligence communities produced to support their senior political and 
military leadership during the respective nuclear crises.  Recognizing it is highly 
unlikely, maybe even impossible, for leaders to make accurate assessments of the 
enemy threat without quality foreign intelligence, I wanted to examine how well 
intelligence agencies supported their political leaders with timely, accurate, 
relevant intelligence.  To answer that question, I proposed two hypotheses: 
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H1(a) – Intelligence Quality - Senior US leaders received quality warning 
intelligence of the Soviet threat prior to and during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
which contributed to an accurate current situation assessment. 
H1(b) – Intelligence Quality - Senior Soviet leaders received inaccurate 
and/or highly biased intelligence reporting prior to and during the Soviet War 
Scare of 1983 which contributed to a distorted current situation assessment. 
The second question transitioned from a focus on intelligence quality to 
the relationship between intelligence and policy.  This question was designed to 
examine the bridge between two communities—intelligence officers, charged 
with objectively and independently evaluating threats to their respective states and 
policy makers, charged with assessing the situation, defining courses of action, 
making national security decisions, implementing those decisions, and overseeing 
their implantation.  To answer that question, I proposed two additional 
hypotheses: 
H2(a) –  Leadership Receptivity - US leaders were receptive of the threat 
warning and their receptivity increased over time based on the strength of the 
intelligence evidence which contributed to an accurate current situation 
assessment. 
H2(b) – Leadership Receptivity - Soviet leaders were highly receptive of 
the threat warning to the extent that it led to an inaccurate, distorted current 
situation assessment (irrational fear of imminent US nuclear attack). 
My final research question centered on leaders and how they interpret 
intelligence.  Given that leaders are human, and all humans are subject to 
290 
 
psychological biases which affect how they interpret information, this question 
examines how biases might interfere with objective intelligence interpretation.  
My final two hypotheses concerned objective intelligence interpretation: 
H3(a) – Objective Interpretation - US leaders objectively interpreted 
warning intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis which contributed to an 
accurate current situation assessment. 
H3(b) – Objective Interpretation - Soviet leaders did not objectively 
interpret warning intelligence during the Soviet War Scare which contributed to 
an inaccurate, distorted current situation assessment. 
My dependent variable was an accurate situation assessment, and the 
three independent variables were:  1) intelligence quality, 2) intelligence 
receptivity, and 3) intelligence interpretation. 
In the body of the dissertation I examined the two most dangerous nuclear 
crises between the superpowers since the dawn of the nuclear age in 1945.  The 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is widely regarded as the closest point the US and 
Soviet Union came to nuclear war.  The 1983 Soviet War Scare, which 
culminated with NATO Exercise Able Archer 83, was not recognized by the US, 
at the time, as a particularly dangerous event, but it was dangerous based on 
serious Soviet fears of US intent to launch a nuclear attack.  Thankfully, during 
the long history of the Cold War, there were not many such cases, but these two 
support my theory as the following table summarizes: 
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    Cuban Missile Crisis  Soviet War Scare 
 
Intelligence Quality   X 
Receptivity    X    X 
Objective Interpretation  X 
Figure 2 - Case Study Summary 
The factors of quality intelligence, receptivity, and objective interpretation 
of intelligence are all present in the cases when senior leaders made accurate 
situation assessment98 (in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis) but only one factor 
was present in the alternate case (Soviet War Scare).  Both cases are similar in 
terms of receptivity.  President Kennedy was receptive towards intelligence.  He 
was a voracious intelligence consumer before the crisis and routinely received and 
engaged with intelligence analysts during the Cuban crisis.  Conversely, General 
Secretary Andropov and the senior Soviet military leadership were receptive to 
the intelligence regarding the Soviet War Scare as evidenced by their rhetoric 
prior to the Able Archer exercise and their unusual military reaction during the 
exercise itself.  As the Soviet case demonstrates, being receptive to intelligence is 
not enough to arrive at accurate current situation assessments.   
 The table above demonstrates there is a correlation between the variables 
in the Cuban Missile Crisis case.  The question remains, how does one explain the 
finding that the combination of quality intelligence, receptivity, and objective 
interpretation of intelligence leads to accurate current situation assessments?  The 
                                                 
98 At the start and during the crisis 
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theory of accurate situation assessment may shed light on why these three factors 
are significant. 
 First, quality intelligence warning is essential.  Strategic intelligence is 
important because it allows leaders to direct resources toward major, long-term, 
enduring national security threats.  However, quality strategic intelligence was not 
the decisive factor in either of these two cases.  Both nations were well aware of 
the nuclear capabilities of the other side and the ever-present, long-term nuclear 
threat those weapons posed.  The US had succeeded in collecting critical nuclear 
intelligence through the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union.99  Both the U.S. and 
the Soviets were well aware that despite Khrushchev’s bluster, the Soviet Union 
was not turning out nuclear missiles “like sausages”, they suffered from strategic 
nuclear inferiority.  Indeed, that may have been a major reason Khrushchev 
gambled by placing Soviet missiles in Cuba in the first place, to correct the 
strategic imbalance he and other leaders were acutely aware of.  From a strategic 
intelligence warning perspective both sides were aware of each other’s nuclear 
capabilities and made assumptions regarding each other’s intentions.  Overall, 
they were relatively confident with their assessment of the threat the other side 
posed.  However, in terms of tactical intelligence the cases were different.  The 
U.S. relied heavily on the collection of technical intelligence from the U-2 and 
largely discounted human intelligence from refugees.100  Imagery intelligence 
                                                 
99 Which abruptly ended on May 1, 1960 with the shootdown of Francis Gary Powers.  The brief 
intelligence gap of approximately 100 days was quickly filled with the Corona satellite imaging 
program which provided even more coverage of Soviet denied territory than the U-2. 
100 With the benefit hindsight, the CIA was criticized for not taking more seriously human 
intelligence which indicated the Soviets were importing missiles to Cuba.  The key unknown 
question at the time was were the missiles defensive or offensive systems. 
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from the U-2 provided concrete evidence of the presence of nuclear missiles in 
Cuba.  The Soviets placed a high value on field reports, intelligence provided by 
their KGB Residences, based on observations which were driven by their budding 
indicator list.  US intelligence which supported situation assessments during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis was highly accurate in terms of assessing military 
capabilities, but President Kennedy still had a challenge in assessing Soviet intent.  
Aerial reconnaissance and human intelligence from Oleg Penkovsky101 provided 
the president the time he needed to define various potential courses of action and 
decide on the US strategy to eliminate the Soviet missile threat to the United 
States.  Despite the value decision makers placed on strategic intelligence, tactical 
intelligence was more important in dealing with the imminent or current crises.  
The US had high quality tactical intelligence during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
The Soviets had poor quality tactical intelligence during the Soviet War Scare. 
 Second, leadership receptivity towards intelligence occurs when policy 
makers regard the pending threat as serious, trust intelligence professionals, and 
their leaders and believe in the credibility of intelligence.  To evaluate intelligence 
receptivity, this study examined potentially significant preceding intelligence 
failures, the relationships between the President/General Secretary and the 
DCI/KGB Chairman, and how the leaders interacted during and after the 
respective crises.  In the Cuban case, President Kennedy remained receptive to 
intelligence despite potential negative consequences of the previous Bay of Pigs 
                                                 
101 Penkovsky provided operations manuals on the two types of offensive missiles systems in Cuba 
which allowed CIA analysts to make assessments regarding the operational timeline for the Soviet 
missiles in Cuba. 
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failure.  He maintained a professional relationship with his DCI John McCone and 
the intelligence briefers who supported the various EXCOMM meetings during 
the crisis.  The president trusted the intelligence he received and made high-stakes 
policy decisions based on that intelligence.  Although there was some negative 
fallout following the crisis in terms of Kennedy’s perceptions of McCone, 
McCone continued to serve the President Kennedy for the remainder of his 
presidency and remained the DCI under President Johnson until 1965.  In the 
Soviet War Scare case, General Secretary Andropov and other senior political and 
military leaders were presumably receptive of intelligence.  This assessment is 
based on Andropov’s previously long tenure as KGB Chairman, his relationship 
with KGB Chairman Chebrikov, and Soviet military reactions which indicate they 
recognized the seriousness of the US/NATO nuclear threat during Exercise Able 
Archer based on their unusual military reaction to that exercise.  In summary, 
both leaders were receptive towards intelligence.  The level of their receptivity 
was driven by the seriousness of the nuclear threat which focused leaders on using 
intelligence to maximize their situational awareness.  They also trusted the 
intelligence products and the personnel presenting that intelligence during the 
respective crises. 
 The third key factor in building an accurate current situation assessment is 
leadership interpretation of intelligence.  Motivational and cognitive factors work 
to distort our perceptions of reality.  This is a true wildcard factor in this theory as 
it is not easily subject to improvement.  While intelligence can be improved 
through organization or process changes, receptivity and interpretation fall in the 
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realm of human psychology and are not easily recognized or corrected.  President 
Kennedy interpreted intelligence to reinforce his previously held worldview that 
the Soviet Union represented an opportunistic, aggressive world power.  This was 
based on his historical knowledge of past Soviet behavior, how Khrushchev 
treated him at the Vienna Summit in 1961, and his concern the Soviets were 
operating in Cuba as a prelude to a move against Berlin to diminish America’s 
international standing.  This offensive view may have led Kennedy to dismiss or 
discount Soviet defensive motivations.  Potentially defensive motivations 
included:  1) The Soviet placed missiles in Cuba to guarantee Cuba’s territorial 
integrity and political independence.  The Soviets and Cubans feared a US or 
another US-back invasion to rid the island of Castro’s communist government and 
2) The Soviets sought to quickly redress the strategic nuclear imbalance by 
placing offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba.  To Kennedy’s credit, the EXCOMM 
examined these possibilities but discounted them.  In contrast, Andropov and his 
closest advisors, including KGB Chebrikov, Defense Minister Ustinov, and Chief 
of the General Staff Ogarkov, developed such a state of paranoia that they were 
unable to objectively evaluate the intelligence the KGB provided.  Additionally, 
that intelligence was heavily skewed to reinforce their pre-existing beliefs which 
also reinforced the confirmation bias that is clearly evident.  In summary, 
President Kennedy and his advisors more objectively interpreted intelligence 
while General Secretary Andropov and his key advisor did not. 
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Contribution of This Study 
This dissertation contributes to our understanding of theory by describing 
the role intelligence plays in informing senior leaders’ current situation 
assessments.  In terms of theory, it shows poor quality intelligence which 
reinforces pre-exiting, biased beliefs leads to distorted, inaccurate situation 
assessments.  That is not a surprising finding.  More interesting is the fact that the 
skillful, objective use of tactical intelligence can overcome shortcomings in 
strategic intelligence.  This study adds to the literature on warning intelligence by 
analyzing the use of intelligence in nuclear crises.  It also adds to the literature on 
the relationship between intelligence professionals and leaders in the policy 
community, advancing and reinforcing Erik Dahl’s theory102 concerning the role 
receptivity (belief in the threat and trust in intelligence) plays in intelligence-
policy relations.  It also adds to the policy literature on focusing events. 
Regarding intelligence, this dissertation demonstrates despite 
shortcomings in strategic intelligence, effective situation assessment and 
consequent policy making can still occur if the intelligence community can 
deliver quality tactical intelligence.  The bulk of the February 1963 PFIAB study 
focused on US Intelligence Community shortcomings which precluded earlier 
detection of Soviet missiles in Cuba.  This comprehensive after-action report 
focused on the failure of the intelligence community to follow up on earlier 
strategic assessments which mentioned the possibility of the Soviets placing 
                                                 
102 As articulated in his April 2008 dissertation “Preventing Terrorist Attacks:  Intelligence 
Warning and Response” and subsequent work. 
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offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba but then quickly dismissed that possibility.  
That assessment led to a less aggressive intelligence collection posture than would 
have been necessary to find the missiles in a timelier manner.  Despite this 
shortcoming in strategic intelligence, the tactical intelligence President Kennedy 
and the EXCOMM received to inform their situation assessments during the 
crises was excellent and a true point of pride in US intelligence history.  US 
intelligence quickly recovered and effectively supported senior-level decision 
making during the crisis. 
A key focus of this study is the relationship between the intelligence and 
policy communities.  Receptivity, a concept advanced by Erik Dahl, is the bridge 
between these two communities.  This study contributes to Dahl’s work by adding 
two additional cases to the three terrorism cases he studied to further confirm the 
important role intelligence receptivity plays as a necessary but insufficient 
element for accurate assessments.  When leaders are receptive, they understand 
the seriousness of the current threat and trust the intelligence provided.  They used 
this information to constantly improve their understanding of an enemy’s 
capabilities and intentions in a fast moving, dynamic, threat environment.  In both 
cases in this study, senior leaders were highly receptive of intelligence.  However, 
in the Soviet case, receptivity simply reinforced their pre-existing beliefs and thus 
did not contribute to an objective assessment of the situation.  The lack of Soviet 
critical thinking and more vigorous questioning of their intelligence contributed to 
a failure to accurately understand Western intentions (which did not include 
nuclear attack) during the 1983 nuclear crisis. 
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To improve receptivity, national political and military leaders must remain 
vigilant of national security threats, appoint trusted and respected intelligence 
leaders to key intelligence positions, and ensure the intelligence community 
maintains the highest professional standards of integrity and objectivity and a 
commitment to remain outside the political fray.  
This study also demonstrates leaders can improve intelligence quality 
through organizational changes, processes changes, additional resources, et 
cetera., but those measures are not the complete answer to periodic calls for 
intelligence reform and improvement.  Intelligence quality must also be improved 
through constant training and recognition of the dangers bias, both overt and 
implicit, play in distorting intelligence assessments.  Conversely, on the policy 
side of the equation, human attitudes and perceptions are also in play.  Thus, 
systematic improvement in making current situation assessments will be difficult.  
Progress will require a disciplined approach to recognize and overcome biases 
which hinder our ability to objectively evaluate intelligence information as part of 
the situation assessment process. 
This study appears to be unique.  It is the only one I am aware of which 
develops a theory concerning how the intelligence and policy communities work 
together to ideally build an accurate, comprehensive, objective picture of the 
current situation to inform leadership deliberation on possible courses of action to 
address nuclear threats.  While there have been countless studies of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis focusing on decision making and many studies regarding the role of 
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intelligence, this is the first which compares the Cuban Missile Crisis with the 
Soviet War Scare based on my theory of current situation assessment. 
Suggestion for Future Research 
Working in the East German Ministry for State Security archive (BStU), 
the National Security Archive, and the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library 
archives and drafting this dissertation were amazing experiences.  This effort 
stimulated thought on potential, future research to advance both theoretical and 
practical aspects of intelligence warning and nuclear conflict.  Further research on 
this topic will advance our theoretical understanding of how leaders use or fail to 
use intelligence properly to make informed decisions regarding the most effective 
policies to maintain peace and security in the ever more dangerous nuclear 
environment we find ourselves in today.  The following questions are ripe for 
additional research: 
Theoretical Questions 
• What other factors (beyond those examined in this study) may be relevent 
in improving our understanding of how intelligence informs current 
situation assessments? 
• What other superpower nuclear case studies could be included to 
increase/decrease the power of this study’s findings? 
• Do other, non-US/non-Soviet case studies of potential nuclear conflict 
confirm/refute these findings?  Would looking at other nuclear states, such 
as India and Pakistan, during periods of crises advance this theory. 
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• Looking at historical indications and warning case studies involving large-
scale, conventional, force-on-force conflicts, do the findings strengthen or 
weaken this theory?  How could the theory be modified to be 
generalizable across the entire spectrum of conflict? 
Suggestion for Additional Research on the Soviet War Scare of 1983 
The Soviet War Scare and/or Operation RYAN are briefly discussed in the 
literature on the KGB, the Cold War, nuclear conflict and in memoirs as far back 
as at least 1991.  A renewed interest has flowed from the recent 2015 
declassification of the 1990 PFIAB study.  Despite the deep interest, many 
questions remain.  Potential research projects include the following: 
• Most of the available data and subsequent literature deals with the role of 
the KGB and human intelligence.  What role did Soviet technical 
intelligence collection play in shaping finished intelligence assessments on 
US/NATO capabilities and intentions during the War Scare period and 
specifically Exercise Able Archer? 
• If the KGB and/or GRU archives are opened, a quality evaluation of 
Soviet finished intelligence products provided to senior Soviet leaders in 
the early 1980s would provide greater insight into intelligence quality.  
The same could be said for an evaluation of intelligence receptivity and 
intelligence interpretation (based on potential hand-written notes, memos, 
sounds recordings, et cetera., if they exist) 
• A comparative study of Soviet KGB and East German MfS indicators 
across time would trace the evolution in thinking regarding Soviet and 
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East German knowledge and Western war plans and perception of 
intentions.  An evaluation of the indicators’ strengths and weaknesses (the 
indicators’ ability to accurately and reliably describe the steps US/NATO 
would have to take to launch a nuclear attack) could shed light on risks of 
accidental nuclear war based on flawed indicators. 
• An evaluation of MfS/KGB knowledge on the Pershing II and Gryphon 
systems (technical capabilities, deployment locations, communication 
networks, standard operating procedures, et cetera.) would be interesting 
in revealing the level of Soviet/Warsaw Pact operational knowledge of 
these highly sensitive nuclear delivery systems during the Cold War. 
Potential Research on the Current/Future of the Russian Nuclear Threat and 
the US Intelligence Warning System 
• In general terms, does the current US warning methodology need 
revision?  If so, what would a more effective methodology include?  This 
would be a classified study. 
• How does the current US Intelligence Warning system work in practice 
(vice in theory) and how effective is it in monitoring Russian, Chinese, 
North Korean, India/Pakistan nuclear capabilities and intentions (threats)?  
Include recommendations for improvements.  This would be a classified 
study. 
• Given the significant reduction in US intelligence collection and analytic 
capabilities directed against the Russian threat over the past 28 years, how 
can the U.S. most effectively reorient our analytic community to better 
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focus on the new, evolving Russian conventional and nuclear threats to the 
United States, NATO, and our other allies? 
• What type of US intelligence collection capabilities (both technical and 
human) are/will be required to effectively monitor Soviet nuclear systems 
to provide quality warning intelligence?  What are the costs?  What are the 
tradeoffs?  What would an implementation plan look like? 
Warning Intelligence and the Contemporary Nuclear Threat 
The United States and our allies currently face nuclear threats from 
Russia, China, and North Korea.  The US Intelligence Community is closely 
monitoring Iran whose nuclear program is constrained by the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action.  The previous chapter extensively outlined the 
current and long-term Russian nuclear threat to the United States.  While arms 
control agreements, including the two currently in force, the New Start Treaty and 
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty have served both US and Russian 
interests, the future of nuclear arms control is in doubt given Russia’s violation of 
the INF Treaty.103  Despite the remarkable political transformation which ended 
the Cold War and arms control treaties which have significantly reduced the 
number of strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, Russia and the United 
States maintain nuclear arsenals which pose significant threats to each other and 
the rest of mankind. 
                                                 
103 The US has accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty with the Russian deployment of the 
SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile.  The New Start Treaty is set to expire in Feb 2021.  It can 
be extended for an additional five years.  The INF Treaty is of unlimited duration but a state party 
can withdrawal from the treaty. 
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At this point in the study it is reasonable to ask, “Is a Russian War Scare 
of 20XX possible?”  Some would argue no—the events which were recounted in 
Chapter 4 were unique to the Cold War and are unlikely to be repeated.  Soviet 
fear of US imminent nuclear attack in the early 1980s was born out of vivid 
memories of the 1941German invasion.  The fear of surprise attack permeated the 
consciousness of aging Soviet leaders who experienced that tragedy first hand.  
That historical memory is certainly a part of President Putin but is not as large a 
factor in the current generation of Russian leaders.  A second factor which points 
to the improbability of such a scenario concerns the level of Soviet/Russian 
leadership isolation.  Soviet leaders were isolated during 1983 and despite 
extensive intelligence operations against the West, had fundamental 
misunderstandings regarding Western society and Western military intent.  The 
current crop of Russian leaders has been operating in and profiting from a 
globalized environment which has emerged since the fall of the Soviet Union.  
This has allowed them to gain better knowledge and understanding of the West 
and may have reduced the possibility of misinterpretations and misperceptions 
which could lead to catastrophic nuclear conflict.  Potentially, Russian trade and 
investment with the outside world might also reduce the risk of nuclear conflict.  
The quality of Russian intelligence may have also improved to better include 
situational context and rich, all-source assessments regarding US/NATO intent.  
All of these factors argue against a potential future Russian War Scare. 
Unfortunately, a case can also be made that a Russian War Scare may be 
possible in the future.  Based on similar factors which were operating in the early 
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1980s, it is conceivable the level of deep fear, isolation, and mistrust could also 
permeate Russian thinking in the future.  Current trends in Russia and the Russia-
US relationship suggest this is possible.  President Putin, who won re-election on 
March 18, 2018 for another six-year term, has built a foundation of power based 
on Russian nationalism and the idea that only he stands between Russia and the 
nefarious intentions of the West.  Putin’s control of Russian mass media allows 
him to stoke fear of the West through false news stories which promote 
conspiracy theories involving Western plots to deny Russia its rightful place as a 
proud, global power.  Putin’s background as a KGB officer probably has a strong 
influence on how he sees the world.  As a KGB counter-intelligence officer, he 
was trained to see the outside world in fairly hostile terms.   
At the personal level, he has repeatedly observed two phenomena which 
have generated deep fear:  1) US and NATO military interventions which alter 
events on the ground (such as in Bosnia and Kosovo) or drastically change 
sovereign political regimes (such as Iraq and Libya) and 2)  People-power 
revolutions which bring down governments resulting in the imprisonment or death 
of the ruling senior leaders (such as the color revolutions, close to home in the 
former Soviet republics of Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan or in other regions 
such as in Libya or the states affected by the Arab Spring).  These fears are 
exacerbated by Putin’s belief that the United States, the CIA, the State 
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Department and National Endowment for Democracy, are the hidden hand 
guiding these event—part of the US democracy promotion agenda.104 
Another factor which might contribute to a future Russian War Scare 
revolves around strategic nuclear vulnerability.  Although Russia is pursuing a 
nuclear force modernization strategy and President Putin publicly announced 
several new types of “invincible” nuclear weapons105 at a well-staged press 
conference on March 1, 2018106 (BBC 2018; Roth, 2018; and Cameron, 2018), 
Russia may face fear of strategic nuclear vulnerability similar to what the Soviet 
Union experienced in the early 1980s.  The U.S., NATO, along with Japan and 
Israel, are continuing efforts to research, develop, and field anti-ballistic missile 
capabilities which Russia has long feared and continues to denounce as a threat to 
strategic stability.107  A long-held Russian technological inferiority complex will 
also continue to contribute to a sense of strategic vulnerability.  Additionally, the 
U.S. released a new Nuclear Posture Review in early February 2018 which 
highlighted the Russian nuclear threat, “Russia is elevating the role of nuclear 
weapons, expanding and modernizing its nuclear forces, violating arms control 
treaties, and engaging in aggressive behavior” (Department of Defense, 2018 
                                                 
104 These fears represent mirror imaging.  The KGB has highly active in these types of “active 
measures” during the Cold War and Russian intelligence and cyber elements are actively engaged 
in such operations today.  It would seem only logical that Putin would conclude the West was also 
involved in such activities against Russia. 
105 Including a very long range nuclear cruise missile and long-range nuclear torpedoes designed 
to attacks ports and port cities.  Nuclear weapons experts have assessed Russia currently does not 
possess this type of technology but may be aspiring to develop these capabilities. 
106 Putin’s highly public display of these largely theoretical weapons was probably part of his re-
election campaign, coming just 17 days before the March 18, 2018 presidential election. 
107 US and allied anti-ballistic missile (ABM) efforts are directed against N. Korea and Iran.  The 
United States has repeatedly made clear and demonstrated through extensive talks with Russia that 
these systems are purely defensive, of limited capability, and are not designed for use against 
Russia but that has not dampened Russian opposition to this effort. 
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Nuclear Posture Review Fact Sheet, 2018, p. 1).  The 2018 Nuclear Posture 
Review called for the United States to modernize all three legs of the nuclear 
triad, specifically detailing the need to replace “Cold War-era ICBMs, ballistic 
missile submarines, strategic bombers, and air launched cruise missiles last 
modernized in the 1980s” (Department of Defense, 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 
Fact Sheet, 2018, p. 1).  These US moves, while necessary to maintain the 
strategic nuclear balance and prevent war, may be seen by Russia as further 
widening a strategic gap between the two countries, resulting in a growing sense 
of nuclear vulnerability akin to the situation in the early 1980s. 
The psychological factors discussed in this study in terms of how leaders 
interpret intelligence will also remain relevant.  Leaders, as human beings, are 
subject to motivational and cognitive factors which often distort their 
interpretation of new information (such as intelligence in nuclear crises).  This 
problem probably cannot be fully overcome.  It can be mitigated through 
awareness of potential overt and implicit biases, improved critical thinking skills, 
and the use of a moderate number of advisors with a wide variety of divergent 
views.108  Given human nature, faulty interpretation of intelligence and other 
information could contribute to misperceptions of enemy intent which could lead 
to a catastrophic nuclear war.  
                                                 
108 To avoid group-think. 
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Conclusion 
The conclusion in this study are much different than my original 
expectations.  I originally thought President Kennedy would have had much less 
trust of the US Intelligence Community than he did during the Cuban Missile 
crisis based on the failed Bay of Pigs invasion.  Kennedy overcame that potential 
mistrust by enlarging his pool of policy advisors and developing a more critical 
attitude towards military advice.  He replaced key intelligence leaders which 
restored his trust in the intelligence community.  I had no illusions regarding the 
seriousness of the threat these two crises posed to international peace, so I fully 
expected both US and Soviet leaders would be receptive to the intelligence 
provided as long as they trusted the sources of that intelligence.  Initially, I falsely 
assumed the Soviet KGB would provide objective, finished intelligence products, 
as the US Intelligence Community strives to provide to our senior leaders, only to 
discover their reporting was deliberately tailored to conform with the hardline, 
biased views of their leaders which field operatives provide KGB Center in raw, 
unevaluated form, lacking the key context field agents were in a unique position 
to provide.  I also assumed the harsh rhetoric from Soviet leaders towards the 
United States was simply a continuation of their long-standing anti-American 
propaganda program targeted to desensitize the Reagan Administration and the 
American populace in the early 1980s.  This study gave me a much better 
understanding of the depth and the true, genuine fear the Soviets felt during this 
period. 
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I hope this study will shed some light on the importance of quality 
warning intelligence, the intelligence-policy maker relationship, and the need to 
recognize and overcome motivational and cognitive biases when evaluating 
intelligence.  Moving forward, our nation faces a robust, modernized, highly 
capable Russian nuclear threat.  The Chinese government has also developed 
improved road-mobile and submarine launched ballistic missiles which also 
represent increased threats to the United States.  North Korea, probably at some 
point in 2018, and potentially Iran, at some point in the future, could strike the 
U.S. with nuclear weapons systems.  The challenge for US intelligence is to 
revitalize our intelligence warning system to remain ever vigilant with the goal of 
reliably communicating timely, accurate, warning intelligence to our senior 
political and military leaders.  The challenge for our decision makers is to be 
receptive to intelligence warning without sacrificing sound critical thinking skills, 
to challenge that warning when warranted, and to accept it when the facts support 
the legitimacy of the warning.  Potentially, the greatest enduring challenge for 
senior leaders in both the United States and Russia will remain—overcoming 
biases which can significantly distort intelligence interpretation to the point of 
catastrophic miscalculation, leading to inadvertent nuclear war between the 
United States and Russia.  It is my hope that senior leaders and intelligence 
professional in both the United States and Russia can work to improve their 
respective strategic and tactical warning capabilities, that leaders will continue to 
recognize the seriousness of the nuclear threat, be receptive to critically evaluated 
intelligence, and work to overcome/mitigate biases which distort their 
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interpretation of enemy intent.  The future of our two countries and the fate of 
mankind hang in the balance.
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Appendix A – Acronym List 
 
AEC – Atomic Energy Commission 
A2 – Anti-access 
AD – Area Denial 
ABM – Anti-ballistic Missile 
AS – Air-to-surface 
BStU – Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the 
former German Democratic Republic. Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen 
des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik 
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency 
COA – Course of Action 
DCI – Director of Central Intelligence 
DDR – German Democratic Republic.  Deutsche Demokratische Republik 
DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency 
EMP – Electro-magnetic Pulse 
EXCOMM – Executive Committee of the National Security Council 
EU – European Union 
EW – Early Warning 
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FOIA – Freedom of Information Act 
GEO – Geostationary Earth Orbit 
GLCM – Ground-launched Cruise Missile 
GLONASS – Global Navigation Satellite System 
GPS – Global Positioning System 
GRU – Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet/Russian General Staff.  
Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye (ГРУ) 
HEO – Highly Elliptical Orbit 
HUMINT – Human Intelligence 
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HVA – Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung – Foreign Intelligence Service of the 
Ministry for State Security of the German Democratic Republic 
HQ –  Headquarters 
ICBM – Inter-continental Ballistic Missile 
INF – Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 
IR –  Infrared 
IRBM – Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile 
HUMINT – Human Intelligence 
IMINT – Imagery Intelligence 
JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff 
JFK – John Fitzgerald Kennedy 
KAL – Korean Air Lines 
KGB – Soviet Committee for State Security.  Комите́т госуда́рственной 
безопа́сности (КГБ) 
LRA – Long-range Aviation 
MASINT – Measurement and Signature Intelligence 
MfS – Ministry for State Security of the German Democratic Republic.  
Ministerium für Staatssicherheit 
MRBM – Medium-range Ballistic Missile 
MIRV – Multiple Independently-retargetable Re-entry Vehicle 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NIE – National Intelligence Estimate 
NORAD – North American Aerospace Defense Command 
NPIC – National Photographic Interpretation Center 
NPT – Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NSC – National Security Council 
ONI – Office of Naval Intelligence 
PFIAB – President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
PICL – President’s Intelligence Checklist 
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PKK – Kurdistan Worker’s Party 
PRC – People’s Republic of China 
RC –  Reconnaissance 
RYAN – Sudden or surprise nuclear attack vnezapnoe raketno yadernoye 
napadeniye 
SA – Surface-to-air 
SACEUR – Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
SALT – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty 
SAM – Surface-to-air Missile 
SDI – Strategic Defense Initiative 
SICAR – Wilson Center Summer Institute on Conducting Archival Research 
SIGINT – Signals Intelligence 
SLBM – Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile 
SM – Standard Missile 
SNIE – Special National Intelligence Estimate 
SRF – Strategic Rocket Forces 
SS – Surface-to-surface 
SSC – Surface-to-surface Cruise missile 
START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
Stasi –  Ministry for State Security of the German Democratic Republic.  
Ministerium für Staatssicherheit.  Colloquial term 
TU – Tupolev Design Bureau 
UK –  United Kingdom 
US – United States 
USIB – United States Intelligence Board 
WMD – Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction
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Appendix B – Definitions of Key Terms 
 
Intelligence professionals and policymakers are linked by the process of 
intelligence warning.  The intelligence community collects, processes, exploits, 
and analyzes information to provide warning and decision makers must decide 
whether and how to act on that information.  This interaction is intelligence 
warning.  Mary O. McCarthy, former National Intelligence Officer for Warning, 
defined intelligence warning as, “Warning is a process of communicating threat 
information to decision makers in time for them to take action to manage or deter 
the threat” (Dahl, 2008, p. 8).   
The following key terms are defined for this study to provide clarity and to 
further the reader’s understanding of warning intelligence: 
Current Situation Assessment – Conclusions decision makers draw about the 
current state of events and an estimate of the next series of adversary courses of 
action.  
Indication – Information in various degrees of evaluation, all of which bear on 
the intention of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action (Joint 
Publication 2-0 - Joint Intelligence, 2013, pp. GL-8). 
Indicator – An item of information which reflects the intention or capability of 
an adversary to adopt or reject a course of action (Joint Publication 2-0 - Joint 
Intelligence, 2013, pp. GL-8). 
Interpretation – The action of explaining the meaning of something (Oxford 
English Dictionary, accessed January 24, 2018). 
Nuclear Release Authority – The senior leader in the chain of command who 
possesses nuclear weapon release authority for their state.  In the United States 
this official is the President of the United States and in the Soviet Union it was the 
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union.  
Objective – Not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering or 
representing facts (Oxford English Dictionary, accessed January 24, 2018). 
Receptivity – A combination of belief in the seriousness of a threat and trust in 
the intelligence being provided (Dahl, 2008, p. 12). 
Strategic Warning – Assists policy officials decide - in advance of specific 
indications of danger - which of the many plausible general threats to US security 
interests deserve concerted preemptive and defensive preparations (Johnson, 
2007, p. 174). 
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Tactical Warning – Warns policy makers of imminent adversary moves to 
launch an attack, develop a weapon, or effect a policy initiative that can harm US 
interests (Johnson, 2007, p. 173). 
Threat Warning – Urgent communication and acknowledgement of time-critical 
information essential for the preservation of life and/or vital resources (DoD 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2018, p. 234). 
Warning Intelligence – Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report 
time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that forewarn of 
hostile actions or intentions against United States entities, partners, or interests 
(Joint Publication 2-0 – Joint Intelligence, 2013, pp. GL-12).
329 
 
Appendix C – Chronology of Events:  Cuban Missile Crisis 
 
1945 
 
16 July U.S. tests first atomic bomb at the Trinity Test Site, New Mexico. 
 
6 August U.S. deploys first atomic weapon in combat against Hiroshima, 
Japan. 
 
1949 
 
29 August Soviet Union tests its first atomic bomb at Semipalatinsk, Kazakh 
Soviet Socialist Republic. 
1956 
 
4 July First U-2 mission flown from Wiesbaden Air Base, West Germany 
over the Soviet Union. 
 
1957 
 
27 August Soviets successfully test the first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. 
 
4 October Soviet successfully launch the first satellite, Sputnik, from 
Tyuratam into low earth orbit. 
 
November U.S. intelligence discovers a new, Soviet surface-to-air missile, the 
SA-2. 
 
1959 
 
1 January Cuban revolutionary forces enter the Cuban capital, Havana, 
ending the rule of pro-American President Batista. 
 
1960 
 
1 May U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, is shot down by an SA-2 over the 
Soviet Union, ending U-2 flights over Soviet territory. 
 
18 August First successful US satellite imagery reconnaissance mission 
(Corona 14). 
 
1961 
 
20 January John F. Kennedy inaugurated as 35th President of the United 
States. 
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17-20 Apr Cuban exiles, with CIA support, launch the failed Bay of Pigs 
invasion to topple the communist dictatorship of Fidel Castro. 
 
 
September US Intelligence Community revises estimate of Soviet ICBMs on 
alert from 140-200 to 10-25 based on Corona imagery.   
 
1962 
 
April Soviet Presidium approves Cuban request for conventional, 
defensive weapons. 
 
24 May Soviet Presidium briefed on plan to deploy offensive nuclear 
weapons to Cuba (Operation Anadyr). 
 
May Director of Central Intelligence McCone, imposes analytic 
requirement to verify HUMINT reporting of military order of 
battle with imagery intelligence. 
 
10 June Soviet Presidium approves plan to deploy offensive nuclear 
weapons to Cuba (Operation Anadyr). 
 
Late-Aug President Kennedy orders the Department of Defense to study 
military options to “eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of 
launching nuclear attack on the U.S.” 
 
31 August President Kennedy limits publication of intelligence on offensive 
weapons in Cuba. 
 
8 September First Soviet nuclear missiles reach Cuba.  Chinese Nationalist U-2 
lost over mainland China. 
 
8-16 Sep U-2 missions targeting Cuba suspended based on 8 September U-2 
loss over China. 
 
14 September President Kennedy meets with Defense Secretary McNamara and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss a contingency attack plan 
should the Soviet deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba. 
 
19 September Central Intelligence Agency releases Special National Intelligence 
Estimate, The Military Buildup in Cuba, which mistakenly assesses 
the likelihood of a Soviet offensive nuclear deployment to Cuba. 
 
Late-Sep IL-28 nuclear capable jet bombers and the first MiG-21 fighters 
deployed to Cuba. 
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26 September First successfully U-2 targeting Cuba since 8 September stand-
down. 
 
October  The U.S. has 14 ICBMs on alert and 200 manned bombers on 
airborne alert.  The Soviets have 44 ICBMs on alert. 
 
1 October Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
discuss the potential of a suspected Soviet Medium Range Ballistic 
Missiles (MRBM) deployment to Cuba. 
 
4 October The Targeting Working Group of the Interagency Committee on 
Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) recommends direct U-2 
overflights of Cuba based on growing HUMINT reporting of 
Soviet military activity in western Cuba.   
 
4 October Soviet ship Indigirka delivers 36 nuclear warheads for SS-4 
MRBM, 36 warhead for Sopka/FKR coastal defense cruise 
missiles, as well as 6 nuclear bombs for the IL-28, and 12 nuclear 
warheads for the Luna/FROG short-range tactical nuclear rocket 
arrive in Mariel, Cuba.  This was unknown to the U.S. at the time. 
 
9 October President Kennedy issues instructions to tightly control publication 
of intelligence on offensive weapons in Cuba but imposes no 
collection or analytic restrictions or restriction on dissemination of 
this information with a strict need to know.  US Intelligence Board 
misinterprets this instruction as an injunction against printing any 
intelligence on offensive weapons in any intelligence publication. 
 
14 October First clear-weather U-2 mission which collects imagery 
intelligence of a Soviet offensive nuclear weapons buildup in 
Cuba. 
 
15 October U-2 imagery processed and interpreted by NPIC analysts. 
 
16 October President Kennedy first informed of Soviet missiles in Cuba.  First 
NSC crisis meeting.  Two main courses of action discussed are:  1) 
an air strike and invasion and 2) naval quarantine with the threat of 
further military action. 
 
18 October President Kennedy meets Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko who asserts Soviet aid to Cuba is purely defensive and is 
not a threat to the U.S. 
 
19 October President Kennedy meets with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss 
military options. 
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20 October President Kennedy decides a naval quarantine of Cuba is the best 
option to address the crisis. 
 
21 October President Kennedy meets with Commander, Tactical Air 
Command.  General Sweeney cannot guarantee 100% destruction 
of the Soviet ballistic missiles. 
 
22 October President Kennedy phones former Presidents Hoover, Truman, and 
Eisenhower as well as British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to 
brief them on the situation.  President Kennedy sends first letter to 
Soviet First Secretary Khrushchev.  President Kennedy makes 
televised/radio address to the nation announcing Soviet actions and 
the US response.  The president increases the US military alert 
posture to DEFCON 3 (subsequently DEFCON 2 for strategic 
nuclear forces).  Soviet Presidium discussed using tactical nuclear 
weapons in the event of a US invasion of Cuba.   
 
23 October President Kennedy signs orders to implement a naval quarantine of 
Cuba.  First low-level, imagery intelligence flight over Cuba.  US 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson 
bring the Soviet nuclear deployment before the UN Security 
Council.  Attorney General Robert Kennedy meets Soviet 
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy. 
 
23 October Soviet ship Aleksandrovsk arrives in La Isabella, Cuba with 24 SS-
5 nuclear warheads and 44 warheads for the Sopka/FKR coastal 
defense cruise missiles.  This was unknown to the US at the time. 
 
24 October Khrushchev responds to Kennedy’s letter.  Soviet ships approach 
quarantine line but some halt and turn back while others, not 
carrying offensive weapons are allowed to proceed to Cuba. 
 
25 October Soviet MRBM missiles become operational.  President Kennedy 
sends another letter to First Secretary Khrushchev.  US United 
Nations Ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, despite Soviet denials, 
confronts Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin with imagery 
intelligence evidence of the Soviet nuclear missile deployment in 
Cuba.   
 
26 October Imagery intelligence reveals accelerated missile site construction 
and uncrating of IL-28 bombers.  Fidel Castro sends letter to 
Khrushchev urging him to initiate a nuclear first strike against the 
US if the US launches an invasion of Cuba.  President Kennedy 
receives a letter from First Secretary Khrushchev in which 
Khrushchev proposes removal of Soviet missiles for lifting of the 
naval quarantine and a US pledge to not invade Cuba.   
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27 October President Kennedy receives a second letter from Khrushchev 
demanding an additional US concession of removing Jupiter 
missiles from Turkey.  Kennedy responds to Khrushchev’s earlier 
letter and ignores responding to this more militant, demanding 
letter.  Soviet Presidium sends cable to military commanders in 
Cuba forbidding use of tactical nuclear weapons without 
authorization from Moscow.  A U-2 accidentally penetrates Soviet 
airspace on an air sampling mission flown from Alaska.  Soviet air 
defense forces shoot down a US U-2 targeting Cuba with an SA-2.  
Robert Kennedy meets with Ambassador Dobrynin.  They agree 
the Soviet will withdraw missiles in exchange for a US no invasion 
pledge.  A secret agreement for the US to withdrawal Jupiter 
missiles from Turkey is also included but was unknown at the 
time. 
 
28 October Radio Moscow announces the Soviet Union has agreed to the 
negotiated settlement reached on 27 October and releases the text 
of a Khrushchev letter agreeing to these terms. 
 
3 November Soviet ship Aleksandrovsk departs Cuba with 36 SS-4 nuclear 
warheads and 24 SS-5 nuclear warheads for the Soviet Union. 
 
21 November President Kennedy ends US naval quarantine of Cuba. 
 
1 December Soviet ship Arkhangelsk departs Cuba with all tactical nuclear 
warheads.  All Soviet nuclear warheads are withdrawn from Cuba. 
 
20 December Soviet ship Arkhangelsk arrives in Severomorsk. 
 
28 December President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board sends interim 
report on the Cuban Missile Crisis to President Kennedy. 
 
1963 
 
4 February President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board sends final report 
on the Cuban Missile Crisis to President Kennedy.
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Appendix D – Chronology of Events:  Soviet War Scare 
 
1979 
Soviets operationalize the VRAN computer model to provide 
strategic warning of surprise nuclear attack. 
1980 
 
23 June Soviet Central Committee resolution condemns the “adventuristic 
actions of the United States” which it asserts will lead to a 
“heightening of the danger of war.” 
 
17 November Brezhnev indicates in a speech he would not dwell on statements 
made by President-elect Reagan during “the heat of the election 
struggle” and would welcome any “constructive steps” to improve 
US-Soviet relations. 
 
December Soviet Premier Kosygin, a more moderate voice regarding US-
Soviet relations, dies. 
 
1981 
 
March Soviet leaders possibly conclude a period of increased US-Soviet 
confrontation had arrived. 
 
25 March Soviet leaders attack US foreign policy in Pravda newspaper 
article, the first such attack since President Reagan entered office. 
 
7 April Brezhnev makes major speech critical of the U.S. followed by 
another major anti-US speech on 27 April. 
 
May KGB chief Andropov declares at a major KGB conference that the 
new US Administration is actively preparing for war and a nuclear 
first strike is possible.  Andropov elevates strategic intelligence 
warning of a potential nuclear attack as the most important 
KGB/GRU mission. 
 
May Soviet naval officials launch program to shorten launch times for 
ballistic missile submarines in port. 
 
August Brezhnev secretly meets Warsaw Pact leaders in Crimea to obtain 
signatures on a strategic war planning document which streamlines 
the decision-making process to go to war.  This document provides 
the Soviet Union the authority to order Warsaw Pact forces to war 
without prior political consultations among the member states. 
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October Defense Minister Ustinov convenes a conference for senior Soviet 
military leaders and declares, “the acute intensification of the 
aggressive nature of imperialism threatens to incite the world into 
flames of a nuclear war.”  Brezhnev attends the conference and 
promises the Soviet military all their needs will be met. 
 
October KGB Headquarters issues formal instructions to KGB Residencies 
abroad to strengthen their strategic warning efforts. 
 
Soviets install new over-the-horizon radars to enhance early 
warning of nuclear attack capabilities. 
 
1982 
 
May KGB Chairman Andropov resigns post to take a post in the Central 
Committee Secretariat.  Vitaly Fedorchuk named as new KGB 
Chairman. 
 
10 November General Secretary Brezhnev dies, Andropov named as General 
Secretary. 
 
10-15 Nov Fearing the US would exploit the leadership transition immediately 
following Brezhnev’s death, KGB/GRU Residencies are placed on 
alert to monitor and report preparations for a nuclear attack against 
the Soviet Union. 
 
17 December Andropov appoints Viktor Chebrikov as new KGB Chairman.  
Outgoing KGB Chairman Fedorchuk appointed Interior Minister. 
 
December The Soviet Strategic Air Forces Commander-in-Chief authorizes 
plan to improve Artic air base combat readiness. 
 
1983 
 
January The Soviet military adds a new readiness condition, “Surprise 
Enemy Attack Using Weapons of Mass Destruction in Progress” to 
its existing four readiness levels. 
 
February KGB Headquarters issues new operational directive, the Permanent 
Operational Assignment to uncover NATO Preparation for a 
Nuclear Attack on the Soviet Union, to Residencies in NATO 
nations.  The directive uses the upcoming Pershing II missile 
deployment to highlight the critical need to gain insight on NATO 
war planning. 
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8 March President Reagan makes “evil empire” speech.  The Soviet press 
charges Reagan “can think only in terms of confrontation and 
bellicose, lunatic anti-communism.” 
 
March Andropov responds to the “evil empire” speech in Pravda by 
condemning the US drive towards acquiring a nuclear first-strike 
capability. 
 
Summer KGB/GRU pressures residencies to collect VRYAN requirements. 
 
June KGB Headquarters warns Residencies “the US Administration is 
continuing it preparation for nuclear war and is augmenting its 
nuclear potential.” 
 
August KGB Headquarters issues additional, more specific VRYAN 
collection requirements to Residencies. 
 
Late-summer Soviet population is preparing for war through increased civil 
defense activities. 
 
1 September KAL 007 shootdown 
 
September Soviet officials conclude President Reagan intentionally 
engineered the KAL 007 indecent to poison the international 
atmosphere and ensure Pershing II and GLCM deployment to 
Western Europe.  Soviet spokesmen accuse President Reagan and 
his advisors of “madness,” “extremism,” and “criminality.” 
 
26 September Serpukhaov-15 Early Warning launch detection false alarm. 
 
28 September General Secretary Andropov issues harsh condemnation of the U.S. 
in reaction to the KAL 007 shootdown. 
 
September General Secretary Andropov experiences kidney failure, 
continuing a long period of illness marked by hypertension and 
diabetes. 
 
5 October Lech Walesa awarded Nobel Peace Prize. 
 
23 October US Marine Corp barracks in Beirut is bombed.  Security alert at 
US bases in Europe raised triggering a Soviet intelligence 
indicator. 
 
26 October US military forces invade Grenada heightening Soviet fear the US 
might overthrow Daniel Ortega’s communist regime in Nicaragua. 
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October Warsaw Pact Commander, Marshal Kulikov, announces 
preparations for deploying new nuclear missiles to East Germany 
and Czechoslovakia. 
 
October Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces receive a new readiness directive to 
improve timelines for operational deployment of nuclear weapons. 
 
October General Secretary Andropov becomes gravely ill and has one 
kidney removed. 
 
13/14 Oct Warsaw Pact Commander, Marshal Kulikov, characterizes the 
international situation as “pre-war” and calls for more active 
reserve training and stockpiling of ammunition, food, and fuel 
while attending the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers’ Conference in 
Sofia, Bulgaria. 
 
20 October Soviets initiate significant military preparations to counter a 
potential US/NATO nuclear attack during upcoming NATO 
Exercise Able Archer which they believe will occur between 3-11 
November 1983. 
 
7 November General Secretary Andropov misses the annual Kremlin ceremony 
commemorating the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. 
 
7 November NATO conducts annual nuclear release procedure exercise known 
as Exercise Able Archer 83. 
 
8/9 Nov KGB issues orders to Residencies in Western Europe to report 
increased alert status at US military bases. 
 
11 November Exercise Able Archer 83 concludes.  Soviet military alert reduced 
and Soviet flight activities in East Germany return to normal 
levels. 
 
11 November Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov delivers speech in Moscow 
criticizing US activities as “reckless” and “adventurist,” and states 
the U.S. was pushing the world toward “nuclear catastrophe”.  The 
speech suggests Soviet fear of US/NATO exercise activities as 
cover for a potential nuclear attack is authentic. 
 
November General Secretary Andropov sends a letter to Prime Minister 
Thatcher stating the upcoming GLCM deployment to RAF 
Greenham Common is a threat to the Soviet Union which must be 
removed. 
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December US begins Pershing II missile deployment to West Germany.  
General Secretary Andropov orders Soviet arms negotiators to 
leave Geneva strategic arms talks until the missiles are removed. 
 
December Rumors of imminent nuclear war circulate at all levels of Soviet 
society. 
 
Soviets launch new infra-red launch detection satellites to enhance 
early warning of nuclear attack capabilities. 
 
1984 
  
January KGB convenes a special conference and emphasizes the continuing 
importance of Operation RYAN.  KGB Deputy Chairman and 
Chief, First Directorate, General Kryuchkov, told KGB officers the 
threat of nuclear war had reached “dangerous proportions.” 
 
9 February General Secretary Andropov dies, Chernenko becomes new 
General Secretary.  Chernenko accelerates the anti-US/NATO 
media campaign, intelligence collection efforts, and military 
preparations to counter a potential US/NATO nuclear first-strike. 
 
March Soviet diplomats receive telegram highlighting past themes 
regarding potential surprise attack. 
 
March/April Soviet armed forces conduct most comprehensive rehearsal for 
nuclear war ever detected. 
 
April KGB Headquarters released new, refined Operation RYAN 
collection requirements.  Foreign Minister Gromyko issues an 
unprecedented instruction to Soviet embassies to not interfere with 
or obstruct the work of KGB/GRU officers. 
 
May Defense Minister Ustinov, continuing the anti-U.S. media attack, 
accuses the U.S. of trying to “achieve military superiority” and to 
blackmail the Soviet Union. 
 
May General Secretary Chernenko’s health begins to decline.  This may 
have led to a power shift to younger Politburo members, including 
Gorbachev. 
 
June Gorbachev speech in Smolensk does not highlight the “war scare” 
themes pervasive in past Soviet speeches.  However, Soviet senor 
leader fear of imminent nuclear attack continues into the fall. 
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Summer Moscow orders additional Warsaw Pact measures to increase 
combat readiness. 
 
June Soviets conduct largest unilateral combat exercise in Eastern 
Europe consisting of 60,000 Soviet troops in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. 
 
June/July KGB emphasis begins shifting from surprise nuclear attack to 
collection/analysis of US scientific-technical developments that 
could lead to weapons technology breakthroughs. 
 
Fall The Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff, and other 
senior military and KGB leaders are restricted from traveling far 
from their offices.  First Deputy Minister of Defense, Marshal 
Akhromeyev compares the situation in Europe with the weeks 
preceding the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941.  Warsaw 
Pact members increase harassment of Western military attaches 
and restrict their travel. 
 
2 September General Secretary Chernenko omits reference to past requirements 
to remove US Pershing II or GLCM missiles from Western Europe 
as a condition for returning to the Geneva arms control talks in an 
interview. 
 
September Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov suddenly removed and re-
assigned, probably in a move for the Politburo to regain more 
control over the military and to improve relations with the U.S.  
This possibly represents a power struggle between the younger 
generation of Politburo members (Gorbachev, Romanov, and 
Aliev) vs. older, hard-line members (Gromyko and Ustinov).  
Marshal Akhromeyev, more flexible on arms control, named as 
new Chief of General Staff. 
 
6 October Foreign Minister Gromyko delivers harsh speech at the United 
Nations attacking Reagan’s “reckless designs” and “obsession” 
with achieving military superiority. 
 
17 October General Secretary Chernenko’s Washington Post interview offers a 
lighter, improved tone towards US-Soviet relations. 
 
6 November President Reagan re-elected. 
 
November General Secretary Chernenko agrees to return to the Geneva arms 
control talks in January 1985. 
 
20 December Suffering from pneumonia, Defense Minister Ustinov dies. 
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The VRYAN computer model calculates Soviet power at 45% of 
US power. 
 
1985 
KGB attitudes shift markedly.  The threat of surprise nuclear attack 
is no longer taken seriously, even in the First Chief Directorate.  
Scientific-technical intelligence now an equal collection 
requirement with RYAN requirements. 
 
10 March General Secretary Chernenko dies after several months of 
deteriorating health, Gorbachev named as new General Secretary. 
 
July General Secretary Gorbachev distances himself from his 
predecessor’s’ policies and stresses importance of arms control 
agreements in a speech for military officers in Minsk. 
 
19 July Colonel Oleg Gordievsky, Resident-designate, KGB Residence 
London, defects to the United Kingdom. 
